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Abstract	  Survivor	  Guilt	  (SG)	  is	  a	  complex	  emotional	  reaction	  that	  transpires	  from	  surviving	  a	  fatal	  trauma.	  SG	  is	  a	  poorly	  understood	  clinical	  phenomenon,	  and	  no	  studies	  have	  investigated	  psychological	  treatment	  options	  for	  SG.	  Imagery	  Rescripting	  (IR)	  is	  a	  transdiagnostic	  technique	  that	  involves	  mental	  manipulation	  of	  imagery,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  updating	  the	  meaning	  and	  emotional	  valence.	  IR	  is	  considered	  a	  particularly	  useful	  technique	  for	  guilt	  and	  shame-­‐based	  PTSD.	  However,	  PTSD	  researchers	  have	  not	  investigated	  the	  stand-­‐alone	  effect	  of	  IR,	  or	  determined	  the	  active	  ingredients	  of	  IR.	  The	  present	  study	  was	  a	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  trial	  of	  treatment	  of	  SG	  using	  IR.	  A	  dismantling	  design	  was	  used	  to	  evaluate	  IR	  as	  a	  separate	  experiential	  technique,	  delivered	  as	  an	  add-­‐on	  to	  standard	  trauma-­‐focused	  treatment.	  Fourteen	  participants	  with	  PTSD	  and	  self-­‐reported	  SG	  after	  a	  fatal	  trauma,	  attended	  two	  consecutive	  imagery	  sessions.	  The	  exploration	  session	  focused	  on	  elaborating	  imagery.	  The	  rescripting	  session	  used	  IR	  to	  modify	  imagery	  in	  whatever	  way	  participants	  felt	  would	  be	  helpful.	  The	  results	  revealed	  significant	  improvements	  in	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  SG	  components,	  and	  distress	  from	  SG	  imagery,	  that	  were	  attributable	  to	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  Weekly	  outcome	  measures	  failed	  to	  detect	  effects.	  Observations	  indicated	  that	  treatment	  responders	  more	  commonly	  experienced	  SG	  relating	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  survival	  (rather	  than	  regrets	  about	  actions)	  and	  changed	  SG	  imagery	  by	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  in	  the	  afterlife.	  The	  rescripting	  process	  was	  also	  explored	  using	  a	  coding	  framework	  to	  advance	  understanding	  of	  variables	  that	  predict	  effective	  IR.	  Observations	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indicated	  enhanced	  IR	  effects	  when:	  therapists	  provided	  substantial	  guidance;	  changes	  were	  made	  directly	  to	  the	  imagery	  sequence;	  imagery	  was	  active	  but	  not	  overly	  vivid	  or	  emotionally	  charged;	  and	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  compelling	  and	  evoked	  a	  high	  level	  of	  new	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and	  sensations.	  These	  findings	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  SG	  treatment,	  and	  for	  clinical	  application	  of	  IR.	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1 Introduction	  Feelings	   of	   guilt	   and	   shame	   are	   common	   after	   exposure	   to	   a	   traumatic	  event	  and	  often	  play	  an	  important	  role	  in	  presentations	  of	  Post-­‐Traumatic	  Stress	  Disorder	   (PTSD;	   Kubany	   et	   al.,	   1996).	   Several	   effective	   cognitive	   treatment	  models	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  address	  post-­‐traumatic	  reactions	  where	  guilt	  or	  shame	  are	  salient	  issues	  (Kubany	  &	  Ralston,	  2006;	  Lee,	  Scragg,	  &	  Turner,	  2001).	  Guilt	   and	   shame	   can	   relate	   to	   a	   range	  of	   peri-­‐	   and	  post-­‐traumatic	   experiences,	  thoughts,	   behaviours,	   and	   emotional	   or	   physiological	   reactions.	   Nash	   and	   Litz	  (2014)	   argued	   that	   current	   psychological	   PTSD	   treatments	   have	   limited	   utility	  for	  formulating	  and	  treating	  distress	  which	  stems	  from	  events	  that	  pose	  a	  moral	  or	  ethical	  challenge.	  Feelings	   of	   shame	   and	   guilt	   are	   the	   link	   between	   moral	   standards	   and	  moral	  behaviour,	  and	  serve	  as	  a	  barometer	  of	  our	  moral	  concordance	  (Tangney,	  Stuewig,	  &	  Mashek,	  2007).	  Events	  that	  violate	  moral	  standards	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  our	  sense	  of	  social	  belonging	  and	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  intense	  self-­‐conscious	  emotions	  that	  are	  complex	  and	  resistant	  to	  change	  (Litz	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Deaths	  during	  or	  as	  a	  consequence	   of	   trauma	   challenges	   the	   notion	   of	   the	  world	   as	   fair	   and	   orderly.	  Many	  survivors	  struggle	   to	  make	  sense	  of	   this	  aspect	  of	   fatal	   traumas	  and	  may	  experience	  survivor	  guilt	  (SG)	  in	  the	  aftermath.	  SG	  consists	  of	  emotional	  distress	  and	   negative	   self-­‐appraisals	   relating	   to	   having	   survived	   when	   others	   did	   not.	  Upsetting	   feelings	   associated	   with	   SG	   are	   sometimes	   underpinned	   by	   an	  exaggerated	  sense	  of	   responsibility	   for	  deaths,	  even	   if	   the	  survivor	  had	  no	  real	  power	  of	  influence	  (Tangney	  &	  Dearing,	  2002).	  SG	  can	  also	  occur	  in	  the	  complete	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absence	  of	  perceived	  wrongdoing,	  experienced	  as	  a	  feeling	  of	  accountability	  for	  deaths	  or	  a	  sense	  of	  disentitlement	  to	  survival.	  Clinical	   observations	   indicate	   that	  many	   trauma	   survivors	   experience	   SG	  (Niederland,	   1981)	   and	   that	   SG	   causes	   substantial	   distress	   (Glover,	   1984).	  Research	   has	   demonstrated	   that	   SG	   is	   linked	   to	  more	   severe	   PTSD	   symptoms	  (Joseph,	  Hodgkinson,	  Yule,	  &	  Williams,	  1993)	  and	  increased	  risk	  of	  suicide	  (Hyer,	  McCranie,	  Woods,	  &	  Boudewyns,	  1990).	  It	  has	  also	  been	  observed	  clinically	  that	  SG	   can	  be	   resistant	   to	   change	   (Niederland,	  1981)	  and	  may	  pose	  an	  obstacle	   to	  broader	   therapeutic	   progress	   (Khouzam	   &	   Kissmeyer,	   1997).	   Despite	   the	  potential	  clinical	  implications	  of	  SG,	  it	  is	  surprising	  to	  find	  that	  little	  research	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  understanding	  SG.	  An	  extensive	  search	  of	  the	  literature,	  that	  was	  carried	   out	   as	   part	   of	   this	   study,	   failed	   to	   identify	   any	   studies	   that	   have	  systematically	  investigated	  SG	  after	  trauma	  or	  its	  treatment	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  Contemporary	   psychological	   treatment	   packages	   emphasise	   the	  importance	  of	  actively	  targeting	  the	  full	  range	  of	  individual	  emotional	  reactions	  after	   traumatic	   events	   as	   part	   of	   successful	   PTSD	   treatment	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2001).	  There	  is	  a	  need	  for	  research	  that	  explores	  treatment	  options	  for	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  Imagery	  Rescripting	  (IR)	  is	  an	  experiential	  technique	  that	  is	  growing	  in	  interest	  among	   clinicians	   and	   researchers	   (Holmes,	   Arntz,	   &	   Smucker,	   2007).	   IR	   is	  considered	   particularly	   useful	   for	   clients	   with	   PTSD	   who	   experience	   strong	  feelings	  of	   guilt	   or	   shame	   (Arntz,	   2012),	   and	  has	  potential	   an	   effective	   tool	   for	  treating	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  The	  present	  study	  is	  a	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  clinical	  trial	  of	  the	   therapeutic	   use	   of	   creative	   imagery	   as	   a	   method	   for	   addressing	   SG	   after	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trauma.	   The	   IR	   intervention	   was	   delivered	   and	   evaluated	   within	   standard	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  treatment	  for	  people	  with	  a	  diagnosis	  of	  PTSD.	  	  
 Post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  disorder	  1.1 PTSD	   is	   a	   psychopathological	   reaction	   that	   occurs	   in	   response	   to	   a	  traumatic	   event.	   Trauma	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   negative	   life	   event	   which	   produces	  psychologically	   overwhelming	   stress	   that	   poses	   a	   challenge	   to	   normal	   human	  ability	  to	  cope	  (Herman,	  1992).	  Events	  that	  threatened	  life	  and	  physical	  integrity	  are	   considered	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   normal	   human	   experiences,	   for	   example	  accidents	   and	   disasters;	   life-­‐threatening	   illness	   or	   suicide;	   military	   combat;	  imprisonment;	  and	  sexual	  or	  physical	   interpersonal	  violence.	  Traumatic	  events	  may	  be	  experienced	  directly,	  witnessed,	  or	  indirectly	  experienced	  by	  learning	  of	  such	   events	   from	   a	   close	   family	   member	   or	   friend,	   or	   in	   the	   course	   of	  professional	  duties	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  2013).	  PTSD	  was	  originally	  classified	  as	  a	   fear-­‐based	  anxiety	  disorder	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  1980).	  Our	  understanding	  of	  psychological	   trauma	  and	  its	   consequences	   has	   developed	   significantly	   over	   the	   past	   decades.	   It	   is	   now	  known	   that	   PTSD	  may	   arise	   through	   other	  mechanisms	   than	   fear	   conditioning	  and	   that	   the	   emotional	   reactions	   that	   transpire	   depend	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	  threat	   associated	   with	   the	   traumatic	   event	   (Farnsworth,	   Drescher,	   Nieuwsma,	  Walser,	  &	  Currier,	  2014).	  For	  example,	   trauma	  that	   threatens	  physical	  safety	   is	  thought	  to	  elicit	  fear	  and	  activate	  the	  fight-­‐or-­‐flight	  response.	  Trauma	  that	  poses	  a	  threat	  to	  our	  sense	  of	  self	  in	  a	  social	  context	  is	  hypothesised	  to	  elicit	  negative	  self-­‐conscious	  emotions	  like	  embarrassment,	  guilt	  and	  shame	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2001).	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Three	   key	   changes	   in	   the	   fifth	   edition	   of	   the	   Diagnostic	   and	   Statistical	  Manual	  (DSM-­‐5;	  American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  2013)	  denote	  advances	  in	  our	  conceptual	   understanding	   of	   PTSD:	   PTSD	  was	   separated	   in	   classification	   from	  anxiety	   disorders;	   Criterion	   A2	   (‘intense	   fear,	   helplessness,	   or	   horror’)	   was	  removed;	  and	  a	  fourth	  symptom-­‐cluster	  was	  incorporated	  to	  define	  the	  range	  of	  emotional	   reactions	   that	   may	   transpire	   from	   traumatic	   events.	   Criterion	   D	  includes	  negative	  beliefs	  about	  oneself	  or	  the	  world,	  persistent	  blame	  of	  self	  or	  others	   for	   the	   traumatic	   event	   or	   its	   consequences,	   and	   persistent	   negative	  trauma-­‐related	   emotions	   (O’Donnell	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   The	   full	   DSM-­‐5	   diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  PTSD	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  The	  DSM-­‐5	  is	  the	  first	  edition	  to	  make	  specific	  reference	  to	  guilt	  and	  shame	  in	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  as	  core	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  trauma.1	  	  These	  changes	  signify	  developments	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  PTSD	  as	  a	  post-­‐traumatic	  problem	  which	   comprises	   a	   variety	   of	   distressing	   feelings.	   Complex	   self-­‐conscious	  emotions	  such	  as	  guilt	  and	  shame	  are	  now	  considered	  central	  features	  of	  PTSD.	  	  
 Shame	  and	  guilt	  1.1.1In	   trauma	   literature,	   guilt	   and	   shame	   are	   rarely	   mentioned	   without	   the	  other	   and	   the	   terms	   are	   often	  used	   interchangeably.	   Guilt	   and	   shame	   are	   both	  morally	   based,	   self-­‐conscious	   emotions	   that	   consist	   of	   negative	   self-­‐judgments	  and	   negative	   affect	   (Tangney,	   1991).	   They	   are	   commonly	   conceptualised	   as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  	  Survivor	  guilt	  was	  listed	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  PTSD	  in	  the	  DSM-­‐III	  and	  reclassified	  as	  an	  associated	  feature	  in	  the	  DSM-­‐IIIR	  (Leys,	  2006).	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evolutionary	   adaptive	   emotions	   that	   facilitate	   group	   belonging,	   minimise	  damage	  to	  social	  relationships	  and	  increase	  survival	  odds	  (Lee	  &	  James,	  2012).	  Guilt	   and	   shame	  are	   strongly	   correlated	  and	   considerable	   theoretical	   and	  empirical	   literature	   has	   been	   devoted	   to	   distinguishing	   guilt	   and	   shame	  (Tangney,	  1991).	  Early	  conceptualisations	  suggest	   that	   the	  object	  of	  evaluation	  may	  differentiate	  guilt	  from	  shame	  (Lewis,	  1971):	  “The	  experience	  of	  shame	  is	  directly	  about	  the	  self,	  which	  is	  the	  focus	  of	   evaluation.	   In	   guilt,	   the	   self	   is	   not	   the	   central	   object	   of	   negative	  evaluation,	  but	  rather	  the	  thing	  done	  or	  undone	  is	  the	  focus.”	  (p.	  30)	  This	   theoretical	   proposition	   is	   supported	   by	   research	   which	   shows	   that	   guilt	  situations	  are	  accompanied	  by	  counterfactual	  thoughts	  about	  undoing	  aspects	  of	  behaviour,	  and	  shame	  situations	  about	  undoing	  aspects	  of	   the	  self	   (Niedenthal,	  Tangney,	  &	  Gavanski,	  1994).	  Object-­‐based	  definitions	  suggest	   that	  shame	  could	  arise	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  guilt:	   if	  an	  act	  of	  transgression	  is	  viewed	  as	  sufficiently	  severe	   to	   reflect	   negatively	   on	   the	   person,	   guilt-­‐provoking	   events	   can	   lead	   to	  shame	  (Tangney,	  Miller,	  Flicker,	  &	  Barlow,	  1996).	  Some	  suggest	  that	  shame	  is	  a	  more	  intense	  variant	  of	  guilt	  but	  phenomenological	  investigations	  show	  that	  the	  two	  experiences	  differ	  in	  quality,	  not	  just	  intensity.	  Tangney	  et	  al.	  (1996)	  found	  that	   shame	   is	   considered	   more	   painful	   and	   difficult	   to	   describe,	   is	   associated	  with	  a	  feeling	  of	  being	  small	  and	  inferior,	  and	  triggers	  an	  urge	  to	  hide	  (as	  oppose	  to	   confess	  or	  make	  amends).	  Tangney	  and	  Dearing	   (2002)	   showed	   that	  people	  were	   poor	   at	   describing	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   experiences	   but	  were	  able	   to	   consistently	   differentiate	   between	   scenarios	   that	   were	   designed	   to	  specifically	  evoke	  guilt	  or	  shame.	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The	   conceptualisation	   of	   guilt	   as	   a	   response	   to	   acts	   of	   transgression	   is	  contradicted	  by	  observations	  that	  guilt	  sometimes	  occurs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  self-­‐perceived	  wrongdoing.	   Baumeister,	   Stillwell	   and	   Heatherton	   (1994)	   suggested	  that	  guilt	  may	  arise	  from	  two	  sources:	  (1)	  fear	  of	  social	  exclusion	  stemming	  from	  personal	   violation	   of	   social	   norms	   (i.e.,	   transgressions),	   or	   (2)	   an	   empathic	  emotional	  response	  to	  perceived	  inequity	  that	  is	  not	  related	  to	  personal	  conduct.	  ‘Empathic	   distress’	   involves	   feeling	   guilty	   simply	   on	   behalf	   of	   another’s	  misfortune.	  Baumeister	  et	  al.	  (1994)	  argued	  that	  empathic	  distress	  guilt	  is	  more	  harmful,	   because	   it	   does	   not	   trigger	   prosocial	   action	   tendencies,	   and	   therefore	  does	   not	   have	   the	   interpersonal	   benefits	   associated	   with	   transgression-­‐based	  guilt.	   Tangney,	   Stuewig	   and	   Mashek	   (2007)	   suggested	   that	   guilt	   that	   is	   not	  associated	  with	   specific	   transgressions	   is	  more	   likely	   to	   lead	   to	   unhelpful	   self-­‐castigation,	  feelings	  of	  shame	  and	  clinical	  distress.	  The	   important	  role	   that	  guilt	  and	  shame	  play	   in	   the	  presentation	  of	  PTSD	  has	   been	   firmly	   established	   through	   ample	   research.	   For	   example,	   research	  shows	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   shame	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   the	   development	   of	   PTSD	  after	   trauma	   (La	   Bash	   &	   Papa,	   2014)	   and	   that	   guilt	   predicts	   severity	   of	   PTSD	  symptoms	  (Kubany	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  Henning	  &	  Frueh,	  1997).	  Research	  also	  suggests	  that	   guilt	   and	   shame	   might	   serve	   as	   maintaining	   factors	   of	   PTSD,	   and	   are	  therapeutic	  mechanisms	  of	  change	  for	  other	  symptoms	  (Norman,	  Wilkins,	  Myers	  &	   Allard,	   2014).	   Modern	   PTSD	   treatment	   models	   stress	   the	   importance	   of	  actively	  targeting	  guilt	  and	  shame.	  Several	  effective	  psychological	  interventions,	  that	  focus	  specifically	  on	  addressing	  guilt	  and	  shame,	  are	  now	  available	  including	  Compassion-­‐Focused	   Therapy	   (Lee	   &	   James,	   2012),	   Cognitive	   Processing	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Therapy	  (Resick	  &	  Schnicke,	  1993),	  and	   Imagery	  Rescripting	  and	  Reprocessing	  Therapy	  (Smucker	  &	  Dancu,	  1999).	  Death	  during,	  or	  as	  a	  consequence	  of,	  trauma	  is	  a	  key	  source	  of	  distress	  for	  people	  who	  have	  survived	   that	   trauma.	  Survivors	  may	  experience	   intense	  guilt	  and/or	   shame	   upon	   the	   realisation	   that,	   despite	   having	   suffered	   trauma,	   they	  were	   fortunate	   to	   survive	   when	   others	   did	   not.	   Survivors	   may	   grapple	   with	  questions	  about	  the	  role	  that	  they	  played	  in	  causing	  or	  failing	  to	  prevent	  deaths,	  whether	   they	   deserved	   to	   survive,	   and	   the	   meaning	   of	   survival.	   Distress	   and	  maladaptive	   appraisals	   relating	   to	   having	   survived	   a	   traumatic	   event	   in	  which	  others	  died	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘survivor	  guilt’.	  	  
 Survivor	  guilt	  1.2 SG	  is	  a	  complex	  emotional	  reaction	  that	  is	  often	  described	  clinically	  with	  an	  implicit	   understanding	   of	   what	   it	   is.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   clarity	   and	  consistency	   in	   research	   and	   in	   practice	   about	   the	   concept	   of	   SG	   (Tangney	   &	  Fischer,	  1995).	  Despite	  advanced	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  addressing	  the	  full	  range	  of	  emotional	  reactions	  as	  part	  of	  successful	  PTSD	  treatment,	  SG	  as	  a	   clinical	  phenomenon	  has	  been	   largely	  neglected	   in	  contemporary	  research.	  A	  comprehensive	   search	   of	   the	   literature	  was	   performed	   to	   identify	   studies	   that	  are	  relevant	  for	  understand	  and	  treating	  SG.	  Only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  studies	  were	  found	   that	   described	   the	   presentation	   of	   SG	   after	   trauma,	   and	   explored	   its	  relationship	  to	  other	  psychological	  problems.	  A	  few	  studies	  were	  also	  identified	  that	  investigated	  SG	  in	  other	  populations.	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 What	  is	  SG?	  1.2.1The	   term	   SG	   was	   coined	   by	   Neiderland	   from	   his	   observations	   of	   the	  ‘Survivor	   Syndrome’	   in	   Holocaust	   concentration	   camp	   survivors.	   Neiderland	  (1968)	  described	  a	  type	  of	  “unresolved	  grief	  and	  mourning”	  (p.	  314)	  that	  was	  of	  such	   magnitude,	   severity	   and	   duration	   that	   it	   was	   recognisable	   as	   a	   distinct	  clinical	   syndrome.	   Niederland	   (1981)	   hypothesised	   an	   inner	   conflict	   that	  resulted	  in	  “life-­‐long	  burden	  of	  pain,	  guilt	  and	  shame”	  (p.	  416).	  The	  source	  of	  this	  conflict	   was	   often	   decisions	   and	   actions	   taken	   during	   the	   war,	   but	   sometimes	  arose	  from	  survival	  itself.	  Glover	   (1984)	  described	  his	   observations	  of	   SG	   in	  Vietnam	  war	   veterans.	  He	   identified	   a	   sub-­‐group	   of	   veterans	   for	   whom	   symptoms	   had	   diminished	  except	   for	   a	   “central	   and	   dominant	   conflict	   of	   survivor	   guilt”	   	   (p.	   395).	   This	  conflict	  was	  underpinned	  by	   thoughts	   that	   other	   soldiers	  had	  more	   reasons	   to	  live,	  or	  were	  more	  worthy	  of	  survival,	  or	  that	  their	  own	  survival	  was	  contingent	  on	  another	  person’s	  death.	  These	  thoughts	  were	  sometimes	  not	  connected	  to	  an	  identifiable,	   discrete	   act	   of	   transgression;	   in	   fact,	   often	   the	   sequence	   of	   events	  suggested	  that	  the	  individual’s	  survival	  was	  not	  linked	  to	  other	  fatalities.	  Glover	  noted	  that	  this	  ‘illogicality’	  of	  the	  experience	  was	  a	  curious	  feature	  of	  SG.	  SG	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  wrongdoing	  was	  also	  observed	  in	  Holocaust	  concentration	  camp	  survivors.	  Jaffe	  (1970)	  distinguished	  between	  ‘true	  guilt’	  where	  actions	  or	  inactions	  lead	  to	  the	  death	  of	  another	  person,	  and	  unfounded	  ‘mere	  guilt	  feelings’	  where	  survival	  had	  not	  occurred	  at	  someone	  else’s	  expense.	  Unfounded	  SG	  seemed	  more	  severe	  and	  enduring.	  Carmelly	  (1975)	  distinguished	  between	  two	  types	  of	  survival	  related	  guilt	  based	  on	  her	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own	  experiences	  and	  observations	  of	  ten	  other	  Holocaust	  concentration	  camp	  survivors.	  Carmelly	  argued	  that	  some	  were	  ‘active	  guilt	  carriers’:	  these	  people	  felt	  guilt	  about	  acts	  that	  earned	  them	  survival.	  Others	  were	  ‘passive	  guilt	  carriers’:	  these	  people	  felt	  guilt	  for	  merely	  having	  survived	  when	  many	  others	  did	  not.	  Lifton	  (1976)	  proposed	  that	  SG	  stems	  from	  survivors	  connecting	  their	  own	  survival	  to	  others’	  deaths.	  He	  observed	  that	  survivors	  of	  the	  Hiroshima	  bombing	  often	  conveyed	  beliefs	  that	  their	  own	  survival	  was	  purchased	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  another	  person’s	  life,	  or	  that	  dying	  would	  have	  allowed	  someone	  else	  to	  live.	  Roese	  (2005)	  also	  de-­‐emphasised	  the	  role	  that	  perceived	  transgressions	  play	  in	  SG	  from	  his	  research	  on	  counterfactual	  thinking	  and	  regret.	  He	  described	  SG	  as	  a	  type	  of	  ‘anguished	  self-­‐blame’	  upon	  the	  realisation	  that	  the	  survivor	  could	  have	  died	  instead	  of	  someone	  else.	  These	  studies	  provide	  a	  useful	  overview	  of	  SG	  phenomena	  after	  trauma,	  but	  the	   literature	   carries	   important	   methodological	   limitations	   that	   restrict	   the	  conclusions	   that	   can	   be	   drawn.	   SG	   studies	   to	   date	   are	   theoretical	   and	   mostly	  based	  on	  subjective	  observation.	  The	  samples	  were	  not	  confined	   to	   individuals	  that	   met	   criteria	   for	   PTSD	   but	   were	   limited	   to	   specific	   groups	   of	   trauma	  survivors	  that	  are	  not	  comparable	  to	  the	  broad	  range	  of	  individuals	  that	  present	  in	  clinical	  settings.	  The	  findings	  may	  not	  generalise	  to	  clients	  that	  meet	  criteria	  for	  PTSD,	   and	   survivors	  of	   other	   fatal	   traumatic	   events	   (e.g.,	   accidents,	   natural	  disasters,	   armed	   conflict,	   or	   critical	   illness).	   No	   research	   has	   systematically	  explored	  the	  nature	  of	  SG	  in	  a	  routine	  clinical	  setting	  or	  used	  empirical	  methods	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to	   understand	   SG	   phenomenology	   in	   individuals	   with	   PTSD	   after	   a	   variety	   of	  traumatic	  events.	  	  
 SG	  in	  other	  populations	  1.2.2The	  experience	  of	  SG	  has	  also	  been	  described	  in	  non-­‐trauma	  populations	  including	  individuals	  with	  end-­‐stage	  renal	  disease	  (Vamos,	  1997),	  or	  people	  who	  experienced	  clinical	  depression	  (Blacher,	  2000),	  HIV-­‐negative	  gay	  men	  (Wayment	  &	  Silver,	  1995),	  and	  bereaved	  grandparents	  (Fry,	  1997).	  These	  studies	  provide	  ideas	  for	  cognitive	  themes	  that	  may	  underpin	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  Vamos	  (1997)	  argued	  that	  the	  presentation	  of	  odds	  in	  medical	  setting	  may	  lead	  to	  misconstruction	  that	  one’s	  survival	  is	  somehow	  linked	  to	  another’s	  death,	  which	  triggers	  an	  unfavourable	  comparison	  of	  reasons	  for	  living	  and	  the	  individual’s	  relative	  ‘worthiness’	  of	  survival.	  He	  proposed	  that	  the	  peculiarity	  of	  SG	  (in	  comparison	  to	  other	  types	  of	  guilt)	  indicate	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  grief	  response.	  Blacher	  (2000)	  suggested	  that	  SG	  arose	  from	  a	  perception	  that	  one	  had	  received	  more	  than	  one’s	  share,	  and	  erroneous	  reasoning	  that	  one’s	  advantage	  was	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  someone	  else.	  Wayment	  and	  Silver	  (1995)	  noted	  that	  uninfected	  men	  frequently	  made	  statements	  that	  related	  to	  the	  question	  ‘why	  me’	  in	  response	  to	  open-­‐ended	  questions	  about	  the	  AIDS	  epidemic.	  They	  proposed	  that	  SG	  relates	  both	  to	  actions	  that	  were	  perceived	  as	  leading	  to	  survival	  and	  to	  existential	  questions	  about	  life.	  Fry	  (1997)	  used	  factor	  analysis	  to	  identify	  SG	  as	  a	  dimension	  of	  grief	  in	  bereaved	  grandparents.	  He	  found	  that	  SG	  was	  associated	  with	  beliefs	  about	  having	  survived	  instead	  of	  their	  grandchild,	  that	  they	  should	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have	  died	  and	  that	  it	  was	  their	  turn	  to	  die.	  He	  proposed	  that	  difficulties	  making	  sense	  of	  violations	  of	  the	  ‘natural	  order’	  of	  death	  underpinned	  SG.	  These	  findings	  need	  to	  be	  interpreted	  with	  caution	  since	  they	  may	  not	  generalise	  to	  trauma	  populations.	  Several	  studies	  defined	  SG	  broadly,	  including	  individuals	  who’s	  distress	  related	  to	  non-­‐fatal	  discrepancies.	  The	  cognitive	  processes	  that	  underpin	  SG	  after	  a	  fatal	  traumatic	  event	  could	  be	  different	  from	  the	  SG	  experienced	  by	  individuals	  in	  the	  studies	  described	  above.	  	  
 Sub-­‐classification	  1.2.3Observations	  of	  Holocaust	  concentration	  camp	  survivors	  indicated	  that	  SG	  related	   to	   actions	   during	   the	  war	   (‘true	   guilt’	   or	   ‘active	   carriers’)	   or	   stemmed	  from	   survival	   itself	   (‘mere	   guilt’	   or	   ‘passive	   carriers’).	   These	   sources	   of	   SG	   fit	  with	   Baumeister	   and	   colleagues’	   hypothesis	   that	   guilt	   can	   arise	   from	   personal	  transgressions	  or	   from	  empathising	  with	  others’	  misfortune	   (Baumeister	  et	   al.,	  1994).	  Matsakis	   (1999)	  suggested	   that	   there	  are	  multiple	   types	  of	  SG	  based	  on	  her	  work	  with	  survivors	  of	  various	  traumas.	  She	  used	  the	  terms	  ‘content	  SG’	  and	  ‘existential	  SG’	  to	  distinguish	  between	  transgression-­‐based	  and	  transgressionless	  SG	  experiences.	  Existential	  SG	  was	  defined	  as	  guilt	  about	  being	  the	  perceived	  beneficiary	  of	  a	   disparity	   of	   suffering	   –	   it	   is	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   having	   stayed	  alive.	  People	  that	  experience	  existential	  SG	  may	  question	  why	  they	  were	  spared	  when	  others	  were	  not,	  and	  become	  preoccupied	  with	  existential	  questions	  about	  the	  purpose	   and	  meaning	  of	   life	   and	  death.	  Emotional	  distress	   associated	  with	  existential	  SG	  is	  sometimes	  linked	  to	  beliefs	  that	  others	  would	  have	  done	  more	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with	  a	  second	  chance	  to	  life	  and/or	  a	  perception	  of	  self	  as	  unworthy	  of	  survival	  (Matsakis,	   1999).	   Existential	   SG	  may	   fit	   closely	  with	   the	   suggested	   pathway	   of	  empathic	  distress	  guilt	  (Baumeister,	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  Content	  SG	  was	  defined	  as	  guilt	  about	  the	  substance	  of	  what	  the	  person	  did,	  thought,	  or	  felt	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  alive;	  it	  is	  closely	  linked	  to	  how	  events	  played	  out	  before	   and	   during	   trauma.	   Content	   SG	   stems	   from	   a	   perception	   of	   failed	  competency	  or	  negligence	   in	  one’s	   role	   as	   a	  professional	  or	   as	   a	   fellow	  human	  being	  (Matsakis,	  1999).	  Sherman	   (2011)	   suggested	   that	   SG	   that	   relates	   to	   one’s	   actions	   may	   be	  further	   separated	   into	   objective	   or	   subjective	   variants.	   Emotional	   distress	  associated	  with	  both	  subjective	  and	  objective	  SG	  stems	  from	  regret	  about	  peri-­‐traumatic	   actions	  or	   inactions.	   People	  with	   subjective	   SG	   experience	   this	   a	   felt	  sense	  of	  blameworthiness:	  deep	  down	  they	  know	  that	  personal	  actions	  did	  not	  cause	   outcomes,	   and	   that	   they	   are	   not	   responsible	   for	   others’	   deaths’,	   but	   yet	  they	   feel	   morally	   implicated	   (Sherman,	   2011).	   Survivors	   who	   experience	  subjective	  SG	  may	  think	  that	  their	  feelings	  are	  displaced,	  but	  feel	  unable	  to	  let	  go	  of	  ‘if	  only’	  thoughts	  and	  find	  resolution	  to	  their	  distress.	  In	  contrast,	  people	  with	  objective	   SG	   believe	   that	   they	   are	   accountable	   and	   blameworthy	   for	   what	  happened,	   and	   are	   able	   to	   map	   a	   cause-­‐and-­‐effect	   chain	   between	   their	  (perceived)	   transgression	   and	   others’	   deaths.	   Objective	   SG	   is	   a	   type	   of	   ‘should	  have’	   guilt.	   It	   is	   the	   SG	   variant	   that	   is	   most	   similar	   to	   trauma-­‐related	   guilt	  described	  in	  the	  literature	  because	  it	  noticeably	  links	  to	  beliefs	  that	  one	  should	  have	   felt,	   thought	   or	   acted	   differently	   (Kubany	   &	  Manke,	   1995).	   Combat	   guilt	  (Kubany,	  1994)	  and	  perpetration	  guilt	  (McNair,	  2002)	  may	  particularly	  overlap	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with	  objective	  content	  SG.	  Figure	  1	  illustrates	  the	  proposed	  relationship	  between	  SG	  and	  other	  conceptualisations	  of	  guilt	  phenomenon.	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Subjective	  SG	   Objective	  
SG	  Content	  SG	  
Trauma-­‐related	  guilt	  	  (Kubany,	  &	  Manke,	  1995)	  Perpetration	  guilt	  (McNair,	  2002)	  
Combat	  guilt	  (Kubany,	  1994)	  
Empathic	  distress	  	  (Baumeister,	  Stillwell,	  &	  Heatherton,	  1994)	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 Emotional	  content	  1.2.4The	  emotional	  remit	  of	  SG	  includes	  intense	  and	  persistent	  guilt	  but	  other	  complex	  emotions	  may	  also	  be	  embedded	  within	  the	  experience.	  For	  example,	  survivors	  may	  experience	  feelings	  of	  demoralisation,	  internal	  and	  external	  shame,	  lost	  sense	  of	  self,	  alienation,	  anguish	  and	  grief.	  	  Shame	  in	  particular	  in	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  core	  emotional	  component	  of	  SG	  (Sherman,	  2014).	  	  There	  are	  several	  theoretical	  reasons	  for	  why	  shame	  may	  be	  intrinsic	  to	  SG	  experience.	  Research	  suggests	  that	  severe	  wrongdoing	  and	  lack	  of	  options	  for	  reparation	  lead	  to	  exacerbation	  of	  guilt	  feelings	  and	  can	  trigger	  negative	  judgments	  about	  the	  whole	  self	  and	  elicit	  shame	  (Kubany	  &	  Watson,	  2003).	  The	  severity	  and	  irreversible	  nature	  of	  perceived	  transgressions	  in	  SG	  may	  lead	  to	  shame	  attributions.	  SG	  may	  also	  elicit	  shame	  feelings	  because	  it	  is	  grounded	  in	  moral	  beliefs.	  Behavioural	  transgressions,	  which	  are	  usually	  more	  likely	  to	  elicit	  guilt	  feelings,	  trigger	  shame	  because	  beliefs	  about	  the	  self	  as	  a	  moral	  person	  are	  determined	  by	  action	  (Farnsworth	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Finally,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  identifiable	  transgression,	  survivors	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  make	  attributions	  that	  are	  internal	  and	  stable,	  which	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  feelings	  of	  shame	  than	  guilt	  (Tracey	  &	  Robins,	  2006).	  The	  observation	  that	  SG	  does	  not	  consist	  of	  one-­‐dimensional	  guilt	  and	  may	  occur	   without	   maladaptive	   beliefs	   about	   culpability	   has	   implications	   for	  treatment.	   Existential	   SG	   or	   shame-­‐fused	   SG	   may	   fail	   to	   respond	   to	   cognitive	  treatment	  techniques	  that	  seek	  to	  reduce	  guilt	  by	  challenging	  biased	  appraisals	  about	  responsibility	  and	  accountability	  (Kubany	  &	  Manke,	  1995).	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 Conceptual	  definition	  1.2.5The	   concept	   of	   SG	   remains	   uncertain	   and	   further	   research	   is	   needed	  (Walbott	  &	  Scherer,	  1995).	  There	   is	   currently	  not	  an	  agreed	  upon	  definition	  of	  SG.	  The	  DSM-­‐IV-­‐TR	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  2000)	   included	  SG	  as	  an	  associated	  feature	  of	  PTSD	  and	  provides	  the	  following	  definition	  of	  SG:	  “…	  painful	  guilt	  feelings	  about	  surviving	  when	  others	  did	  not	  survive	  or	  about	  the	  things	  they	  had	  to	  do	  to	  survive.”	  (p.465)	  The	  DSM-­‐IV-­‐TR	  definition	  of	  SG	  identifies	  guilt	  as	  the	  sole	  emotional	  component	  and	  does	  not	  fully	  cover	  the	  concept	  of	  SG.	  Review	  of	  the	  literature	  suggests	  that	  the	   experience	   of	   SG	   varies	   substantially	   between	   individuals	   and	   that	   it	   may	  contain	   other	   important	   emotions.	   Shame	   in	   particular	   is	   a	   feeling	   that	   is	  hypothesised	  as	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  SG.	  Researchers	  have	  operationalised	  SG	  in	   various	  ways,	  most	   commonly	   through	   endorsement	   of	   specific	   beliefs	   that	  may	  not	  capture	  the	  complete	  experience	  of	  SG.	  Matsakis	  (1999)	  argued	  that	  the	  unique	   aspect	   of	   SG	   is	   not	   survival,	   but	   distress	   that	   relates	   to	   remaining	  uninjured	  when	  others	  were	  severely	  harmed	  or	  died.	  Drawing	  on	  the	  literature	  discussed	  above,	  the	  present	  study	  provides	  the	  following	  conceptual	  definition	  of	  SG:	  “Survivor	  guilt	  is	  emotional	  distress	  that	  is	  primarily	  self-­‐conscious	  in	  nature	  (i.e.	  guilt	  and/or	  shame	  feelings),	  originating	  from	  the	  serendipity	  of	  having	  survived	  a	  traumatic	  event	  in	  which	  others	  died.”	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 Prevalence	  1.2.6The	   prevalence	   of	   SG	   has	   been	   investigated	   as	   part	   of	   PTSD	   research	   in	  samples	   of	   disaster	   survivors	   and	   military	   combat	   veterans.	   These	   studies	  operationalised	  SG	  as	  a	  single	  binary	  item.	  Guilt	  about	  being	  alive	  was	  reported	  by	   61%	   of	   survivors	   of	   a	   ferry	   disaster	   (n=73;	   Joseph	   et	   al.,	   1993).	   A	   large	  proportion	  of	  the	  sample	  also	  reported	  guilt	  about	  things	  that	  they	  did	  and	  did	  not	  do	  during	  the	  disaster	  (35%	  and	  69%,	  respectively).	  Beliefs	  that	  one	  should	  have	   died	   or	   suffered	   instead	   of	   someone	   else	   were	   reported	   by	   38%	   of	  hospitalised	   Nigerian	   army	   veterans	   (n=1131,	   Okulate	   &	   Jones,	   2006).	   Hull,	  Alexander	   and	   Klein	   (2002)	   investigated	   the	   prevalence	   of	   types	   of	   guilt	   36	  survivors	  of	  an	  oil	  platform	  disaster.	  36%	  endorsed	  the	  item	  ‘I	  should	  not	  have	  survived’	   at	   the	   time	   of	   assessment	   (10	   years	   post-­‐trauma)	   and	   70%	  retrospectively	   endorsed	   the	   item	   in	   the	   acute	   phase	   after	   trauma.	   These	  findings	  are	  limited	  to	  specific	  populations	  that	  may	  not	  be	  representative	  of	  the	  range	  of	  individuals	  with	  PTSD	  encountered	  in	  clinical	  settings.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  high	   prevalence	   reported	   by	   researchers	   (35-­‐70%)	   is	   consistent	   with	   clinical	  observations	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  common	  experience	  after	  a	  fatal	  trauma.	  	  
 Relationship	  to	  other	  clinical	  problems	  1.2.7Four	   studies	   investigated	   the	   relationship	   between	   SG	   and	   PTSD,	   and	  suggest	   that	   SG	   may	   be	   associated	   with	   more	   severe	   symptoms.	   Joseph	   et	   al.	  (1993)	  found	  that	  guilt	  about	  being	  alive	  (measured	  using	  a	  single	  yes/no	  item)	  was	  related	  to	  avoidant	  behaviour	  and	  intrusive	  symptoms	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  Impact	   of	   Event	   Scale	   (Horowitz,	  Wilner,	  &	  Alvarez,	   1979).	   Guilt	   about	   actions	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was	   associated	   with	   avoidant	   behaviour,	   and	   guilt	   about	   inactions	   was	  associated	  with	   intrusive	  symptoms.	  Hull	  et	  al.	   (2002)	   found	  that	  retrospective	  reports	  of	  acute	  SG	  (yes	  to	   ‘I	  should	  not	  have	  survived’)	  predicted	  more	  severe	  PTSD	   as	   measured	   by	   the	   Clinician	   Administered	   PTSD	   Scale	   –	   Diagnostic	  Version	  (CAPS;	  Blake	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  Okulate	  and	  Jones	  (2006)	  found	  that	  SG	  (yes	  to	   ‘Do	   you	   think	   you	   should	   have	   died	   or	   suffered	   in	   the	   place	   of	   the	   other	  persons	  who	  died?’)	   significantly	  predicted	  meeting	   criteria	   for	  PTSD.	  Henning	  and	  Frueh	   (1997)	  used	   the	  Combat	  Guilt	   Scale	   to	   investigate	   combat	   guilt	   in	   a	  sample	  of	  40	  veterans.	  A	  multiple	  regression	  analysis	  showed	  that	  combat	  guilt	  (including	   one	   subscale	   on	   SG)	   predicted	   a	   significant	   amount	   of	   variance	   of	   a	  combined	   score	   of	   CAPS	   re-­‐experiencing	   and	   avoidance	   subscales	   and	   of	   the	  Mississippi	   PTSD	   Scale	   (Keane,	   Caddell,	   &	   Taylor,	   1988)	   total	   score.	   These	  investigations	   of	   SG	   looked	   at	   the	   phenomenon	   in	   specific	   samples	   (disaster	  survivors	   and	   combat	   veterans)	   that	  may	   not	   be	   comparable	   to	   other	   trauma	  populations.	  SG	  was	  operationalised	  using	  binary	  single-­‐item	  measurement	  that	  may	  lack	  reliability	  ad	  validity.	  These	  findings	  may	  have	  limited	  applicability	  to	  other	  PTSD	  populations	  and	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  draw	  any	  clear	  general	  conclusions	  about	  how	  SG	  relates	  to	  PTSD	  from	  these	  studies.	  Two	   studies	   suggested	   that	   SG	   may	   be	   associated	   with	   a	   higher	   rate	   of	  suicide	  in	  combat	  veterans.	  Hendin	  and	  Haas	  (1991)	  found	  that	  experience	  of	  SG	  was	  more	  common	  in	  veterans	  (n=100)	  who	  had	  attempted	  suicide	  but	  a	  logistic	  regression	   analysis	   failed	   to	   detect	   a	   significant	   relationship	   between	   SG	   and	  suicide	   attempts.	   However,	   combat	   guilt	   was	   a	   strong	   predictor	   of	   suicidal	  ideation.	   They	   concluded	   that	   combat	   guilt	   and	   SG	   overlapped	   and	   together	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predict	   suicidal	   behaviour	   in	   veterans.	   Hyer	   et	   al.	   (1990)	   used	   regression	  analysis	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  SG	  significantly	  predicted	  suicidal	  behaviour	  in	  60	  veterans.	  They	  noted	  that	  SG	  appeared	  to	  be	  entrenched	  and	  highly	  resistant	  to	  change.	  These	  studies	  looked	  at	  SG	  as	  a	  sub-­‐component	  of	  combat-­‐related	  guilt.	  Their	  definitions	  of	  SG	  were	  not	  clearly	  explained	  but	  their	  operationalisation	  of	  combat	  guilt	  emphasised	  guilt	  that	  related	  to	  actions	  during	  trauma.	  Both	  studies	  also	   used	   veteran	   samples,	   and	   the	   findings	   may	   not	   apply	   to	   other	   trauma	  populations	   or	   individuals	   who	   experience	   SG	   that	   relates	   to	   existential	  questions	  about	  survival.	  The	  potential	  disruptive	  effect	  of	  SG	  was	  demonstrated	  in	  a	  case	  study	  of	  a	  veteran	   with	   PTSD,	   major	   depression	   and	   alcohol	   addiction	   (Khouzam	   &	  Kissmeyer,	  1997).	  Strong	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  about	  surviving	  when	  other	  soldiers	   died	   emerged	   when	   the	   client’s	   symptoms	   began	   to	   improve	   with	  antidepressant	  medication.	   In	  response,	   the	  client	  discontinued	  his	  medication,	  experienced	   a	   rapid	   deterioration	   in	   mental	   state	   and	   relapsed	   into	   alcohol	  misuse.	   The	   client’s	   feelings	   of	   guilt	   and	   shame	   were	   alleviated	   following	   a	  spiritual	  awakening	  –	  this	   led	  to	  spontaneous	  recovery	  from	  all	  symptoms.	  The	  authors	   concluded	   that	   SG	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   symptom	   of	   depression	   but	   an	  important	   feature	   of	   PTSD	   presentation,	   and	   if	   left	   untreated	   SG	   can	   interfere	  with	  treatment	  and	  lead	  to	  symptom	  chronicity.	  This	  study	  suggests	  that	  SG	  can	  present	   as	   a	   distinct	   phenomenon	   that	  warrants	   direct	   intervention.	  However,	  the	   study	   was	   a	   case	   investigation	   (n=1)	   and	   no	   general	   conclusions	   can	   be	  drawn	  about	  how	  SG	  relates	  to	  treatment	  response.	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Despite	   important	   methodological	   limitations,	   these	   studies	   support	   the	  argument	   that	   SG	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   PTSD	   presentation.	   Clear	  conclusions	  cannot	  be	  drawn	  until	  the	  results	  are	  replicated	  in	  larger,	  systematic	  studies	  using	  more	  diverse	  populations	  and	  a	  consistent	  operational	  definition	  of	  SG	  that	  is	  grounded	  in	  research	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  the	  experience.	  	  
 Formulation	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  1.3 There	  are	  currently	  no	  comprehensive	  theoretical	  accounts	  of	  SG.	  Current	  conceptualisations	  consists	  primarily	  of	  clinical	  descriptions	  that	  are	  underpinned	  by	  early	  psychoanalytic	  ideas.	  Modern	  cognitive	  theories	  have	  not	  been	  used	  to	  formulate	  SG.	  Poor	  conceptual	  understanding	  of	  SG	  poses	  a	  challenge	  for	  selecting	  the	  best	  treatment	  approach.	  The	  complexity	  of	  SG	  experience	  and	  variability	  in	  presentations	  suggest	  that	  several	  mechanisms	  may	  underpin	  SG,	  and	  that	  different	  processes	  may	  need	  to	  be	  addressed.	  Existing	  cognitive	  PTSD	  treatment	  models	  are	  useful	  for	  explaining	  some	  aspects	  of	  SG	  but	  may	  not	  account	  for	  all	  aspects.	  Theories	  that	  enhance	  our	  understanding	  of	  SG,	  and	  guide	  selection	  of	  appropriate	  treatment	  techniques,	  are	  found	  in	  research	  on	  moral	  injury,	  counterfactual	  thinking,	  meaning-­‐making	  and	  complicated	  grief.	  A	  summary	  of	  research	  that	  highlight	  some	  processes	  that	  may	  be	  implicated	  in	  SG	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  next	  four	  sections.	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 Cognitive	  PTSD	  treatment	  models	  1.3.1Ehlers	  and	  Clark’s	  (2000)	  cognitive	  conceptualisation	  of	  PTSD	  suggests	  that	  symptoms	  are	  developed	  and	  maintained	  through	  two	  processing	  pathways	  that	  produce	  a	  sense	  of	  on-­‐going	  threat.	  The	  first	  path	  is	  created	  by	  poor	  elaboration	  and	  integration	  of	  trauma	  memories	  –	  this	  leads	  to	  distressing	  involuntary	  intrusions	  when	  presented	  with	  trauma	  cues.	  The	  second	  path	  is	  created	  by	  dissonance	  between	  traumatic	  experiences	  and	  prior	  experiences	  or	  beliefs	  –	  this	  leads	  to	  unhelpful	  appraisals	  of	  trauma	  or	  its	  sequelae.	  Guilt	  and	  shame	  are	  construed	  within	  this	  model	  as	  internal	  threats.	  The	  perceived	  threat	  is	  maintained	  by	  avoidance	  of	  reminders	  that	  prevents	  adaptive	  integration	  of	  traumatic	  experiences	  into	  autobiographical	  memory.	  A	  visual	  illustration	  of	  Ehlers	  and	  Clark’s	  cognitive	  model	  of	  PTSD	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  Kubany	  and	  Manke	  (1995)	  proposed	  that	  trauma-­‐related	  guilt	  stems	  from	  irrational	   beliefs	   that	   one	   has	   acted	  wrongfully	   and	   caused	  harm.	   Their	  model	  suggests	   that	   biased	   reasoning	   occurs	   across	   domains	   of	   wrongdoing;	  responsibility	   for	   causing	   a	   negative	   outcome;	   insufficient	   justification	   for	  actions	  taken;	  violation	  of	  values;	  and	  errors	  of	  foreseeability	  and	  preventability	  are	   primary	   sources	   of	   distress.	   Hindsight	   bias	   was	   hypothesised	   as	   a	   key	  process	  that	  prevents	  objective	  and	  accurate	  evaluation	  of	  one’s	  role	  in	  trauma,	  and	  underpins	  reasoning	  errors	  across	  these	  domains	  (Kubany	  &	  Watson,	  2003).	  The	   Kubany	   and	   Manke	   cognitive	   model	   of	   trauma-­‐related	   guilt	   is	   useful	   for	  understanding	  objective	  content	  SG.	  Emotional	  distress	  associated	  with	  objective	  SG	   stems	   from	   negative	   self-­‐appraisals	   about	   one’s	   involvement	   in	   traumatic	  deaths	   that	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   hindsight	   bias.	   For	   example,	   survivors	   may	  
	   33	  
exaggerate	  the	  role	  that	  their	  actions	  or	  inactions	  played	  in	  deaths,	  overestimate	  the	   foreseeability	  and	  preventability	  of	  death,	  and	  neglect	   the	  context	   in	  which	  the	   transgression	   occurred	   (e.g.,	   the	   limitations	   that	   traumatic	   circumstances	  place	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  protect	  others).	  This	  leads	  to	  an	  exaggerated	  perception	  of	  accountability	  for	  deaths	  and	  self-­‐blame.	  Cognitive	  models	   that	   emphasise	   the	   role	   of	   pre-­‐existing	   schemas	   in	   the	  development	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  after	  trauma	  provide	  some	  further	  insights	  into	  SG.	  Subjective	  content	  SG	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  felt	  sense	  of	  blameworthiness	  and	  ‘if	  only’	   thoughts,	   it	   is	  not	  underpinned	  by	  beliefs	  about	  wrongdoing.	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (2001)	   proposed	   that	   interpretations	   of	   traumatic	   experiences	   activates	   pre-­‐existing	   schemas	   about	   the	   self.	   Activation	   of	   congruent	   negative	   schemas,	   or	  incongruent	  positive	  schemas	  gives	  rise	   to	  guilt	  or	  shame	  cognitions,	  upsetting	  mental	  imagery	  and	  associated	  distress.	  	  Subjective	  SG	  may	  stem	  from	  activation	  of	   pre-­‐existing	   schemas	   of	   unrelenting	   standards	   and	   exaggerated	   sense	   of	  responsibility	  (Young,	  1994).	  For	  example,	  failure	  to	  save	  others	  during	  trauma,	  even	  if	  there	  was	  no	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so,	  may	  contradict	  positive	  schemas	  about	  self	   (e.g.,	   ‘I	   am	   a	   good	   person,	   I	   help	   others’),	   trigger	   guilt	   cognitions	   (e.g.	   ‘I	  should	  have	   saved	   them’)	   and	   guilt-­‐related	  distress.	   If	   failure	   to	   save	   others	   is	  congruent	  with	  pre-­‐existing	  self-­‐schemas	  (e.g.,	  ‘I	  am	  a	  failure,	  I	  always	  let	  others	  down’)	  the	  experience	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  trigger	  shame	  cognitions	  (e.g.,	  ‘I	  am	  a	  bad	  person’)	   and	   feelings	   of	   shame.	   Negative	   self-­‐appraisals	   produce	   distressing	  intrusive	   imagery	   that	   replays	   in	   the	   client’s	   mind	   and	   trigger	   SG.	   A	   visual	  illustration	   of	   Lee,	   Scragg	   and	   Turner’s	   cognitive	   models	   of	   guilt-­‐based	   and	  shame-­‐based	  PTSD	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  C.	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Cognitive	   PTSD	   treatment	  models	   predominantly	   focus	   on	   variables	   that	  are	  relevant	  for	  understanding	  content	  SG.	  These	  models	  are	  less	  readily	  applied	  to	   SG	   that	   is	   not	   linked	   to	   regretted	   action,	   and	   it	   is	   unclear	   how	   the	   model	  conceptualises	  existential	  SG.	  Research	  in	  the	  area	  of	  moral	  injury	  has	  started	  to	  explore	  distress	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  philosophical,	  spiritual	  and	  ethical	  questions	  that	  traumatic	  events	  raise.	  	  
 Moral	  injury	  1.3.2The	  term	  moral	  injury	  has	  been	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  psychosocial	  impact	  of	  war-­‐time	  events	  that	  violate	  personal	  or	  societal	  moral	  values	  (Litz	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Moral	   beliefs	   and	   expectations	   consist	   of	   internalised	   rules	   about	   personal	  conduct	  and	  how	  the	  world	  should	  operate,	   that	  are	  developed	   from	   ideas	  and	  assumptions	   about	   right	   and	   wrong.	   Moral	   standards	   serve	   to	   facilitate	   social	  order	   and	  maintain	   the	  welfare	   of	   society	   and	   its	  members	   (Farnsworth	   et	   al.,	  2014).	  Emotional	  consequences	  of	  moral	   injury	   include	  reduced	  positive	  moral	  feelings	   (e.g.,	   pride,	   gratitude	   and	   forgiveness)	   and	   increased	   negative	   feelings	  (e.g.,	   anger,	   disgust,	   guilt	   and	   shame).	   The	   kind	   of	   emotional	   distress	   that	   is	  evoked	  from	  events	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  attributions	  that	  are	  made	  about	  moral	  violations.	  Feelings	  of	  guilt	  or	  shame	  arise	  when	  moral	  violations	  are	  attributed	  to	  internal	  sources	  (Tangney	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Litz	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   developed	   a	   preliminary	  model	   of	  moral	   injury	   using	   a	  social-­‐cognitive	   account	   of	   PTSD.	   Social-­‐cognitive	   theories	   delineate	   how	  traumatic	   experiences	   lead	   to	   psychopathology	   by	   clashing	   with	   pre-­‐existing	  schemas	  about	  self,	  others	  and	  the	  world	  (Horowitz,	  1976;	  Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  1989).	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Violations	   of	   moral	   standards	   during	   trauma	   impair	   contextualisation,	  accommodation	  and	  integration	  of	  experiences	  into	  broader	  frameworks	  of	  life,	  which	  gives	  rise	  to	  dissonance,	  tension	  and	  distress	  (Litz	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  inner	  conflict	  created	  by	  moral	  violations	  leads	  to	  a	  loss	  of	  trust	  in	  deeply	  held	  beliefs	  of	  one’s	  own	  or	  others’	  ability	  to	  uphold	  moral	  standards,	  and	  provokes	  feelings	  of	  demoralisation	  and	   loss	  of	  moral	   self.	  This	  prompts	  motivation	   to	  withdraw	  from	  social	  contact,	  which	  perpetuates	  moral	  injury	  by	  preventing	  corrective	  and	  repairing	  experiences	  (Nash	  &	  Litz,	  2013).	  Failure	  to	   integrate	  moral	  violations	  also	  leads	  to	  intrusive	  mental	   imagery	  that	  reminds	  the	  individual	  of	  his	  or	  her	  conflict,	   eliciting	   emotional	   distress	   and	   intensifying	   behavioural	   avoidance.	   A	  visual	  illustration	  of	  the	  model	  of	  moral	  injury	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  D.	  Morally	  injurious	  events	  were	  defined	  as	  experiences	  that	  abruptly	  contradict	  moral	  codes	  of	  conduct	  (Dombo,	  Gray,	  &	  Early,	  2013).	  Active	  violations	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  or	  failures	  to	  prevent	  others’	  suffering	  during	  war	  have	  obvious	  moral	  implications.	  For	  example,	  killing	  or	  failing	  to	  prevent	  the	  death	  of	  a	  friend	  are	  experiences	  that	  are	  particularly	  likely	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  moral	  injury	  and	  elicit	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  (Bryan,	  Bryan,	  Morrow,	  Etienne,	  &	  Ray-­‐Sannerud,	  2014).	  Litz	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  be	  counterproductive	  to	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  moral	  injury	  to	  combat-­‐trauma	  and	  active	  transgressions,	  and	  that	  any	  trauma	  that	  is	  contrary	  to	  moral	  expectations	  can	  produce	  moral	  injury.	  In	  other	  words,	  witnessing	  or	  being	  passively	  implicated	  in	  events	  that	  violate	  moral	  beliefs	  may	  produce	  moral	  outrage	  and	  lead	  to	  distress	  even	  if	  there	  is	  no	  identifiable	  transgressor.	  Using	  this	  broader	  definition,	  SG	  may	  be	  formulated	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  moral	  injury.	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Untimely	  death	  resulting	  from	  trauma	  is	  fundamentally	  incongruent	  with	  aspects	  of	  most	  people’s	  moral	  framework.	  Surviving	  a	  fatal	  trauma	  may	  violate	  rules	  about	  fairness,	  predictability	  and	  order.	  The	  role	  that	  violations	  of	  the	  ‘natural	  order	  of	  life’	  may	  play	  in	  presentation	  of	  SG	  was	  noted	  by	  Fry	  (1997).	  Using	  the	  model	  of	  moral	  injury,	  violation	  of	  moral	  rules	  how	  the	  world	  should	  operate	  may	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  moral	  integrity	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  corruption.	  Damage	  to	  sense	  of	  moral	  self,	  may	  elicit	  thoughts	  associated	  with	  existential	  SG	  (i.e.,	  the	  meaning	  of	  survival	  and	  survival	  worthiness)	  or	  content	  SG	  (regrets	  about	  actions)	  and	  self-­‐conscious	  feelings.	  These	  feelings	  prompt	  motivations	  to	  withdraw	  from	  others,	  preventing	  corrective	  and	  repairing	  experiences.	  Intrusive	  imagery	  about	  others’	  death	  activates	  SG	  feelings	  and	  intensifies	  behavioural	  avoidance	  (Nash	  &	  Litz,	  2013).	  The	   moral	   injury	   literature	   is	   useful	   for	   adding	   to	   our	   preliminary	  formulation	  of	  SG.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  moral	  injury	  research	  is	  in	   its	   early	   stages	   and	   the	   model	   and	   treatment	   protocol	   has	   not	   yet	   been	  empirically	  tested.	  	  
 Meaning-­‐making	  and	  counterfactual	  thinking	  1.3.3
Meaning-­‐making.	  Psychological	  trauma	  inherently	  disrupts	  the	  global	  meaning	  system	  which	  brings	  coherence	  and	  purpose	  to	  life	  (Park,	  2010).	  For	  example,	  beliefs	  about	  oneself	  as	  being	  good,	  righteous	  or	  decent;	  other	  people	  as	  being	  kind	  and	  benevolent;	  and	  the	  world	  as	  being	  safe	  may	  be	  shattered	  (Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  1992).	  Roese	  (2005)	  suggested	  that	  attempts	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  experiences	  are	  spontaneously	  initiated	  after	  traumatic	  events.	  Park	  (2010)	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argued	  that	  these	  attempts	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  trauma,	  including	  identifying	  why,	  how	  and	  whom,	  serve	  to	  create	  situational	  meaning	  and	  maintain	  the	  global	  meaning	  system.	  However,	  research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  people	  who	  searched	  for	  meaning	  presented	  with	  greater	  emotional	  distress	  months	  after	  trauma	  compared	  to	  those	  who	  did	  not	  search	  for	  meaning	  irrespective	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  their	  search	  (Davis,	  Wortman,	  Lehman,	  &	  Silver,	  2000).	  Distress	  associated	  with	  SG	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  on-­‐going	  attempts	  to	  find	  meaning	  in	  traumatic	  experiences.	  Several	  researchers	  have	  proposed	  a	  link	  between	  attempts	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  traumatic	  deaths	  and	  SG.	  Matsakis	  (1999)	  suggested	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  normal	  reaction	  to	  the	  process	  of	  sense	  making	  after	  trauma,	  but	  that	  SG	  becomes	  problematic	  when	  meaning	  making	  is	  extensive	  and	  prolonged.	  Roese	  (2005)	  suggested	  that	  failure	  to	  identify	  a	  causal	  agent	  (whom)	  leads	  to	  generation	  of	  “phantom	  explanations	  or	  phony	  sense-­‐making”	  (p.	  190)	  that	  link	  tragic	  outcomes	  to	  mundane	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  own	  behaviour,	  eliciting	  self-­‐blame	  and	  SG.	  Sherman	  (2010)	  argued	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  product	  of	  attempts	  to	  impose	  moral	  order	  on	  the	  world	  (why)	  and	  protect	  against	  chaos	  –	  in	  some	  ways	  it	  is	  easier	  or	  preferred	  to	  blame	  oneself	  for	  deaths	  than	  to	  accept	  that	  life	  is	  often	  arbitrary.	  The	  process	  by	  which	  searching	  for	  meaning	  leads	  to	  guilt	  is	  evident	  in	  a	  quote	  by	  a	  survivor	  of	  the	  September	  11	  bombings	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Centre:	  “Given	  the	  common	  threads	  that	  joined	  me	  and	  Anthony,	  I	  thought	  for	  a	   brief	   moment,	   why	   him	   and	   not	   me?	   He	   did	   not	   deserve	   that	   fate	  more	   than	   I	   do.	   So	  why	   him?	  …	  Without	   an	   answer	   I	   resorted	   to	   an	  empty	  feeling	  of	  guilt.”	  (p.	  191,	  Roese,	  2005)	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Counterfactual	  thinking.	  Counterfactual	  thinking	  involves	  constructing	  alternative	  scenarios	  in	  our	  minds	  to	  what	  happened.	  Upward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  involves	  thinking	  about	  ways	  in	  which	  better	  outcomes	  could	  have	  been	  achieved;	  downward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  involves	  thinking	  about	  ways	  in	  which	  worse	  outcomes	  could	  have	  occurred	  (Markman,	  Gavanski,	  &	  Sherman,	  1993).	  Counterfactual	  thinking	  is	  used	  to	  create	  positive	  meaning,	  learn	  from	  experiences	  and	  influence	  future	  behaviour;	  it	  becomes	  unhelpful	  only	  when	  it	  fails	  to	  provide	  resolution	  (Epstude,	  &	  Roese,	  2008;	  Roese,	  1997).	  Counterfactual	  thinking	  is	  considered	  a	  key	  process	  that	  underlies	  and	  shapes	  guilt	  and	  shame	  (Niedenthal	  et	  al.	  1994).	  Research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  people	  who	  were	  prone	  to	  counterfactual	  thinking	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  ruminate	  and	  experience	  feelings	  of	  regret	  related	  to	  past	  events	  (Bartlett	  &	  Brannon,	  2007).	  Research	  has	  also	  showed	  that	  individuals	  who	  engaged	  in	  counterfactual	  thinking	  after	  losing	  a	  loved	  one	  reported	  greater	  distress	  about	  the	  event	  (Davis	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  Upward	  and	  downward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  processes	  can	  be	  used	  to	  understand	  the	  experiences	  of	  content	  and	  existential	  SG.	  Guilt	  has	  been	  most	  closely	  linked	  to	  upward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  (Neidenthal	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  The	  ‘counterfactual	  fallacy’:	  the	  tendency	  to	  confuse	  what	  ought	  to	  have	  been	  and	  what	  could	  have	  been	  (Miller	  &	  Turnbull,	  1990),	  is	  thought	  to	  underpin	  this	  relationship.	  Survivors	  that	  engage	  in	  upward	  counterfactualising	  may	  experience	  content	  SG	  when	  they	  confuse	  the	  role	  that	  he	  or	  she	  could	  have	  played	  in	  preventing	  deaths	  with	  the	  role	  that	  he	  or	  she	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  play.	  Upward	  counterfactualising	  may	  also	  be	  an	  attempt	  at	  reparation	  by	  ‘undoing	  deaths’	  in	  one’s	  mind	  or	  atoning	  for	  perceived	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transgressions	  through	  self-­‐punishment.	  Research	  suggests	  that	  guilt	  after	  trauma	  is	  exacerbated	  when	  there	  are	  no	  appropriate	  available	  avenues	  for	  restitution	  (Kubany	  &	  Watson,	  2003).	  The	  irreversible	  and	  irreparable	  nature	  of	  death	  constrains	  options	  for	  relieving	  SG	  through	  atonement,	  because	  the	  outcome	  cannot	  be	  undone	  and	  forgiveness	  cannot	  be	  sought	  from	  victims.	  Blocked	  restitution	  may	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  understanding	  the	  persistence	  of	  content	  SG.	  Roese	   (2005)	   suggested	   that	   SG	   is	   more	   closely	   linked	   to	   downward	  counterfactualising.	  Thompson	  (1985)	  argued	  that	  imagining	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  situation	   could	   have	   been	   worse	   and	   comparing	   ourselves	   to	   less	   fortunate	  individuals	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  find	  a	  ‘silver	  lining’	  and	  build	  positive	  meaning	  from	  negative	  events.	  Downward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  may	  be	  used	  by	  survivors	  of	  fatal	  traumas	  to	  elicit	  positive	  feelings	  about	  the	  outcome.	  However,	  relief	  about	  escaping	  death	  may	  come	  into	  conflict	  with	  feelings	  of	  sadness	  about	  deaths	  and	  trigger	  ruminative	  thinking	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  luck	  and	  whether	  others	  were	  more	   deserving	   of	   survival	   (i.e.,	   cognitive	   components	   of	   existential	   SG).	  This	  claim	  is	  supported	  by	  experimental	  research	  which	  shows	  that	  experiencing	  luck	  can	  elicit	  both	  feelings	  of	  gratitude	  and	  guilt	  through	  a	  process	  of	  downward	  counterfactual	  thinking	  (Teigen	  &	  Jensen,	  2010).	  	  
 Stunted	  grief	  processing	  and	  complicated	  grief	  1.3.4Grieving	  is	  a	  normal	  process	  after	  bereavement	  that	  helps	  the	  bereaved	  person	  mourn	  his	  or	  her	  loss	  to	  reach	  a	  healthy	  state	  of	  acceptance	  that	  allows	  the	  person	  to	  move	  on	  with	  life	  (Zisook	  &	  Shear,	  2009).	  Grief	  processing	  varies	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considerably	  between	  individuals	  and	  a	  range	  of	  different	  emotions	  may	  be	  evoked	  at	  various	  points	  of	  the	  process.	  Similarly	  to	  SG,	  grief	  is	  considered	  a	  normal	  reaction	  that	  becomes	  pathological	  when	  distressing	  feelings	  do	  not	  lessen	  with	  time	  and	  prevent	  the	  person	  from	  moving	  on	  from	  the	  upsetting	  experience	  (Matsakis,	  1999;	  Zisook	  &	  Shear,	  2009).	  There	  is	  disagreement	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  what	  constitutes	  normal	  grieving	  but	  empirical	  research	  verifies	  that	  some	  people	  fail	  to	  progress	  through	  a	  healthy	  grieving	  process	  (Hogan,	  Worden,	  &	  Schmidt,	  2004).	  ‘Complicated	  grief’	  occurs	  when	  an	  individual	  fails	  to	  transition	  from	  acute	  to	  integrated	  grief	  and	  becomes	  stuck	  in	  a	  state	  of	  constant	  mourning	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  distress	  and	  impaired	  functioning	  (Zisook	  &	  Shear,	  2009).	  	  Complicated	  grief	  is	  characterised	  by	  persistent	  separation	  distress	  that	  consists	  of	  intrusive	  thoughts	  and	  imagery;	  intense	  feelings	  of	  pain,	  sorrow	  or	  grief;	  and	  yearning	  for	  the	  lost	  person	  (Shear	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Other	  key	  cognitive,	  emotional	  and	  behavioural	  symptoms	  include	  preoccupation	  with	  loss,	  searching	  for	  answers,	  inability	  to	  accept	  the	  loss	  and	  difficulties	  moving	  on	  with	  life	  (Raphael	  &	  Martinek,	  1997).	  Grief	  is	  often	  mentioned	  in	  descriptions	  of	  SG	  presentations	  (Niederland,	  1968;	  Vamos,	  1997).	  The	  hypothesised	  cognitive	  components	  of	  complicated	  grief	  appear	  similar	  to	  problematic	  beliefs	  and	  unhelpful	  thinking	  exhibited	  by	  trauma	  survivors	  who	  experience	  SG.	  For	  example,	  Sherman	  (2010)	  noted	  that	  combat	  veterans	  reported	  that	  being	  a	  survivor	  felt	  like	  a	  betrayal	  of	  human	  solidarity,	  and	  that	  moving	  on	  with	  life	  would	  represent	  another	  betrayal.	  She	  suggested	  that	  SG	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  form	  of	  self-­‐indictment	  by	  preventing	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prospects	  for	  happiness.	  Beliefs	  that	  continued	  mourning	  maintains	  a	  bond	  with	  the	  deceased,	  and	  that	  stopping	  mourning	  would	  erase	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased,	  are	  commonly	  reported	  by	  people	  who	  experience	  complicated	  grief	  (Boelen	  &	  Lensvelt-­‐Mulders,	  2005).	  	  Other	  important	  cognitive	  processes	  of	  complicated	  grief	  that	  may	  also	  overlap	  with	  SG	  include	  excessive	  self-­‐blame	  for	  deaths;	  preoccupation	  with	  unfairness;	  beliefs	  that	  the	  victim	  deserved	  to	  live/the	  survivor	  deserved	  to	  die;	  and	  thoughts	  that	  letting	  go	  will	  offend	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased.	  Boelen,	  van	  den	  Hout	  and	  van	  den	  Bout’s	  (2006)	  cognitive	  conceptualisation	  proposes	  that	  symptoms	  of	  complicated	  grief	  are	  developed	  and	  maintained	  through	  a	  reciprocal	  interplay	  between:	  failed	  integration	  of	  loss	  into	  autobiographical	  memory;	  unhelpful	  beliefs	  about	  loss	  and	  the	  grieving	  process;	  and	  behavioural	  avoidance	  of	  positive	  activities	  and	  experiences	  (see	  visual	  illustration	  in	  Appendix	  E).	  These	  processes	  give	  rise	  to	  intrusive	  imagery	  associated	  with	  bereavement,	  which	  leads	  to	  yearning	  for	  the	  deceased	  and	  inability	  to	  move	  on	  from	  the	  loss.	  Applying	  the	  cognitive	  model	  of	  complicated	  grief	  to	  SG,	  unhelpful	  appraisals	  about	  traumatic	  deaths	  exhibited	  by	  survivors	  lead	  to	  avoidance	  of	  experiences	  that	  would	  repair	  and	  restore	  meaning	  to	  the	  individual’s	  life,	  and	  facilitate	  processing	  and	  acceptance	  of	  losses.	  This	  perpetuates	  SG,	  and	  prevents	  survivors	  from	  accepting	  traumatic	  losses	  and	  moving	  on	  with	  life.	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 Treatment	  of	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  1.4 No	  studies	  to	  date	  have	  investigated	  treatment	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  specifically.	  Exposure	  therapy	  (ET)	  and	  Trauma-­‐Focused	  Cognitive	  Behavioural	  Therapy	  (TF-­‐CBT)	  are	  common	  psychological	  approaches	  for	  treatment	  of	  PTSD.	  ET	  involves	  reliving	  of	  trauma	  memories	  using	  imaginal	  and/or	  in	  vivo	  exposure	  techniques.	  TF-­‐CBT	  combines	  exposure	  techniques	  with	  cognitive	  techniques	  to	  reduce	  emotional	  distress.	  Extensive	  research	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  comparing	  ET	  and	  TF-­‐CBT,	  concluding	  that	  both	  are	  effective	  therapies	  for	  PTSD	  but	  that	  neither	  shows	  a	  clear	  advantage	  (Marks,	  Lovell,	  Noshirvani,	  Livanou,	  &	  Thrasher,	  1998;	  Paunovic	  &	  Öst,	  2001).	  Researchers	  are	  now	  beginning	  to	  focus	  their	  efforts	  at	  exploring	  when	  and	  for	  whom	  different	  techniques	  are	  most	  useful.	  	  
 Exposure	  Therapy	  for	  PTSD	  1.4.1ET	   was	   developed	   from	   behavioural	   learning	   theory	   and	   principles	   of	  classical	   conditioning	   (Pavlov,	   1927;	   Watson	   &	   Rayner,	   1920).	   Behavioural	  learning	  theory	  suggests	  that	  PTSD	  develops	  through	  fear	  conditioning	  whereby	  previously	   neutral	   stimuli	   become	   associated	   with	   feared	   stimuli.	   The	   Fear	  Network	   Theory	   (Foa,	   Steketee,	   &	   Rothbaum,	   1989)	   suggests	   that	  representations	   of	   trauma	  memories	   include	   sensory,	   emotional,	   cognitive	   and	  physiological	  information.	  Encounters	  with	  conditioned	  stimuli	  (e.g.,	  sensations,	  bodily	  experiences	  or	  feelings	  during	  trauma)	  elicit	  the	  fear	  response	  and	  lead	  to	  physiological	   hyperarousal,	   re-­‐experiencing	   of	   the	   traumatic	   event,	   and	  avoidance	   of	   internal	   and	   external	   reminders	   (VanElzakker,	   Dahlgren,	   Davis,	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Dubois,	   &	   Shin,	   2014).	   The	   aim	   of	   ET	   is	   to	   eliminate	   avoidant	   behaviour	   and	  reduce	  the	  fear	  response	  through	  systematic	  exposure	  to	  feared	  stimuli.	  The	  primary	  technique	  in	  ET	  for	  PTSD	  is	  Imaginal	  Exposure	  (IE).	  IE	  involves	  repeated	  reliving	  of	  traumatic	  experiences	  in	  imagination.	  The	  client	  vividly	  recalls	  and	  describes	  details	  of	  the	  trauma	  including	  peri-­‐traumatic	  sensations,	  feelings	  and	  thoughts.	  Repeated	  confrontation	  of	  mental	  representations	  of	  feared	  stimuli	  during	  IE	  leads	  to	  habituation.	  PTSD	  symptoms	  reduce	  as	  new	  information	  is	  incorporated	  into	  the	  fear	  network	  and	  the	  previously	  associated	  fear	  response	  becomes	  extinct	  (Foa	  et	  al.,	  1989).	  IE	   is	   a	  distressing	  process	   that	   is	   sometimes	  not	   tolerated.	  Arntz,	  Tiesma	  and	  Kindt	  (2007)	  found	  that	  51%	  of	  clients	  dropped	  out	  of	  IE	  before	  the	  eighth	  sessions.	   Shearing,	   Lee	   and	   Clohessy	   (2011)	   stated	   that	   it	   is	   imperative	   to	  provide	   clients	   with	   a	   good	   understanding	   of	   how	   IE	   will	   lead	   to	   symptom	  reduction,	  and	  convey	  confidence	  in	  the	  technique.	  The	  theoretical	  rationale	  for	  treatment	   of	   PTSD	   using	   IE	   is	   clear	   when	   fear	   is	   the	   predominant	   emotional	  reaction	   –	   the	   justification	   for	   its	   use	  with	   guilt	   and	   shame-­‐based	  PTSD	   is	   less	  clear.	  Researchers	  have	  argued	  that	  guilt	  and	  shame	  are	  maintained	  by	  different	  mechanisms	   from	   fear,	   and	   that	   techniques	   that	   operate	   through	   processes	   of	  habituation	   are	   unlikely	   to	   work	   (e.g.,	   Lee	   et	   al.,	   2001).	   This	   argument	   is	  supported	  by	  research	  which	  showed	  that	  ET	  was	  highly	  effective	  for	  PTSD	  when	  fear	  and	  avoidance	  were	  key	   symptoms,	  but	  had	   limited	  effects	  when	  non-­‐fear	  emotions,	  such	  as	  guilt	  and	  shame,	  were	  important	  features	  of	  the	  presentation	  (Grunert,	  Weis,	  Smucker,	  &	  Christianson,	  2007;	  Arntz	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Researchers	  have	   also	   suggested	   that	   repeated	   activation	   of	   trauma-­‐
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without	  addressing	   these	  may	  actually	  worsen	  guilt	   and	  shame	   (e.g.,	   Lee	  et	  al.,	  2001).	   The	   potential	   detrimental	   effect	   of	   IE	   has	   been	   documented	   in	   a	   case	  study:	   Grunert,	   Smucker,	   Weis	   and	   Rusch	   (2003)	   found	   that	   two	   clients	   with	  PTSD	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  became	  increasingly	  distressed	  and	  self-­‐blaming	  during	  treatment	  and	  reported	  increased	  anger,	  guilt	  and	  hopelessness	  post-­‐treatment.	  Given	  that	  guilt	  and	  shame	  are	  central	  components	  of	  SG,	  other	  approaches	  may	  be	  more	  suitable	  for	  treating	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  	  
 Trauma-­‐Focused	  Cognitive-­‐Behavioural	  Therapy	  1.4.2TF-­‐CBT	  is	  recommended	  as	  a	  first	  line	  treatment	  of	  choice	  for	  PTSD	  by	  the	  National	   Institute	   of	   Health	   and	   Care	   Excellence	   (National	   Institute	   for	   Health	  and	   Care	   Excellence,	   2005).	   TF-­‐CBT	   is	   an	   approach	   that	   is	   considered	  particularly	  appropriate	  when	  guilt	  or	  shame	  are	  central	  emotions	  after	  trauma	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  Research	  shows	  that	  TF-­‐CBT	  is	  effective	  in	  reducing	  guilt,	  PTSD	  and	   depression	   symptomatology	   (Kubany,	   Hill	   &	   Owens,	   2003;	   Kubany,	   1998;	  Norman	  et	  al.,	  2014);	  the	  evidence	  base	  for	  treatment	  of	  shame	  suing	  TF-­‐CBT	  is	  weaker.	  Kubany	  and	  Ralston	   (2006)	  argued	   that	   the	  same	  deductive	   reasoning	  process	   is	   implicated	   in	   the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	   guilt	   and	   shame,	  and	   that	   shame	   may	   dissipate	   naturally	   without	   direct	   intervention	   following	  successful	   treatment	  of	   trauma-­‐related	  guilt.	  Other	   researchers	  have	   suggested	  that	  shame	  may	  require	  a	  different	  approach	  (Lee	  &	  James,	  2012).	  TF-­‐CBT	   was	   developed	   from	   cognitive	   models	   of	   PTSD.	   Dual	  Representation	   Theory	   suggests	   that	   autobiographical	   memory	   consist	   of	   two	  systems:	  one	  that	  stores	  verbal	  contextualising	  information	  (verbally	  accessible	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memory,	   VAM)	   and	   one	   that	   stores	   sensory	   snapshots	   of	   experiences	  (situationally	   accessible	  memory,	   SAM;	  Brewin,	  Dalgeish,	  &	   Joseph,	   1996).	   The	  experience	   of	   trauma	   disrupts	   VAM	   processing	   which	   leads	   to	   under-­‐representation	  of	  contextualising	   information	  (c-­‐reps),	  and	  over-­‐representation	  of	   sensory	   information	   (s-­‐reps)	   in	   SAM.	   Imbalance	   between	   s-­‐reps	   and	   c-­‐reps	  leads	   to	   poor	   integration	   of	   traumatic	   events	   with	   previous	   experiences	   and	  gives	   rise	   to	   PTSD	   symptoms	   (Brewin,	   Gregory,	   Lipton,	   &	   Burgess,	   2010).	  Cognitive	   and	   behavioural	   avoidance	   that	   seek	   to	   reduce	   the	   sense	   of	   threat	  prevents	  integration	  of	  trauma	  memories.	  TF-­‐CBT	   is	   an	   umbrella	   term	   for	   techniques	   that	   seek	   to	   modify	   neural	  network	   representations	   of	   trauma	   memories	   by	   drawing	   on	   the	   association	  between	  perceptual,	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  processes.	  TF-­‐CBT	  relies	  heavily	  on	  reliving	   techniques	  but	   the	   rationale	   behind	   their	   use	  differs	   from	   their	   use	   in	  ET.	   TF-­‐CBT	   incorporates	   reliving	   with	   cognitive	   techniques	   with	   the	   aim	   to	  update	  the	  memory	  of	  traumatic	  events	  with	  more	  adaptive	  appraisals.	  The	  main	  cognitive	  technique	  in	  TF-­‐CBT	  is	  cognitive	  restructuring.	  Cognitive	  restructuring	  is	   used	   to	   identify	   and	   dispute	   irrational	   or	   unhelpful	   thinking	   through	   logical	  verbal	   discourse	   between	   clients	   and	   therapists	   (Kubany	   &	   Ralston,	   2006).	  Processing	   the	  meaning	   of	   trauma	   allows	   clients	   to	   develop	   a	   verbal	   narrative	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  personal	  schemas	  of	  self,	  others	  and	  the	  world	  (Lee	  at	  al.,	  2001).	   Consequently,	   trauma	   memories	   become	   less	   threatening	   and	   less	  intrusive,	  and	  PTSD	  symptoms	  reduce	  (Ehlers	  &	  Clark,	  2001).	  Cognitive	  treatment	  techniques	  are	  invaluable	  clinical	  tools	  for	  treating	  PTSD.	  However,	  many	  PTSD	  specialists	  consider	  the	  effects	  of	  verbal-­‐intellectual	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processing	  of	  trauma	  memories	  to	  be	  limited	  when	  working	  with	  clients	  with	  complex	  post-­‐traumatic	  emotional	  reactions	  (Arntz	  &	  Weertman,	  1999).	  Research	  shows	  that	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  can	  exist	  despite	  logical	  counterevidence,	  and	  can	  persist	  beyond	  remission	  of	  cognitive	  distortions	  (Ehlers,	  Clark,	  Hackmann,	  McManus,	  &	  Fennell,	  2005).	  Smucker	  (1997)	  suggested	  that	  the	  cognitive-­‐affective	  disturbance	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  PTSD	  is	  predominantly	  embedded	  within	  mental	  imagery,	  and	  that	  changing	  the	  imagery	  directly	  may	  be	  preferred	  to	  challenging	  the	  verbal	  meaning	  of	  trauma.	  Research	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  perceptual	  processing	  of	  trauma	  memories	  is	  a	  necessary	  component	  for	  effective	  treatment,	  and	  that	  perceptual	  processing	  precedes	  conceptual	  changes	  (Kindt,	  Buck,	  Arntz,	  &	  Soeter,	  2007).	  The	  role	  that	  mental	  imagery	  plays	  in	  maintenance	  of	  PTSD	  and	  how	  imagery	  can	  be	  harnessed	  in	  therapy	  is	  a	  current	  topic	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  literature.	  	  
 Mental	  imagery	  in	  PTSD	  1.5 Mental	  imagery	  is	  thinking	  using	  our	  senses:	  a	  quasi-­‐perceptual	  experience	  that	  occurs	  in	  imagination	  without	  external	  stimuli.	  Mental	  imagery	  is	  often	  described	  as	  ‘pictures	  in	  our	  mind’	  or	  ‘visualisation’	  but	  mental	  imagery	  covers	  all	  sensory	  domains.	  Fleeting	  mental	  imagery	  that	  does	  not	  lead	  to	  unmanageable	  distress	  is	  a	  normal	  experience	  of	  everyday	  life	  (Rusch	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  However,	  mental	  imagery	  has	  the	  power	  to	  elicit	  strong	  emotional	  responses	  (Holmes	  &	  Mathews,	  2005).	  Intense	  distressing	  mental	  imagery	  is	  the	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hallmark	  symptom	  of	  PTSD	  and	  the	  experience	  that	  prompts	  many	  individuals	  to	  seek	  help	  after	  trauma.	  Key	  PTSD	  theories	  have	  accounted	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  distressing	  mental	  imagery	  in	  PTSD.	  The	  Fear	  Network	  Theory	  (Foa	  &	  Kozak,	  1986)	  suggests	  that	  mental	  imagery	  arises	  from	  neural	  networks	  that	  contain	  sensory,	  physiological,	  emotional	  and	  cognitive	  representations	  of	  traumatic	  experiences.	  The	  Dual	  Representation	  Theory	  (Brewin	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  suggests	  that	  distressing	  mental	  imagery	  arises	  from	  the	  overrepresentation	  of	  sensory	  information	  and	  underrepresentation	  of	  contextual	  information	  associated	  with	  trauma	  memories.	  Both	  theories	  propose	  that	  avoidance	  of	  mental	  imagery	  maintains	  PTSD	  symptoms.	  Working	  with	  mental	  imagery	  is	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  psychological	  treatment	  of	  PTSD.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  mental	  imagery	  work	  is	  that	  activation	  and	  modification	  of	  the	  verbal	  narrative	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  to	  reduce	  PTSD	  symptoms,	  and	  that	  imagery	  permits	  access	  to	  a	  primitive	  cognitive	  level	  that	  is	  more	  closely	  connected	  to	  emotional	  processing	  pathways	  (Edwards,	  1990).	  Preliminary	  research	  shows	  that	  imagery	  processing	  has	  a	  more	  pronounced	  effect	  on	  physiological	  and	  emotional	  responses	  than	  verbal-­‐semantic	  processing	  of	  the	  same	  material	  (Holmes	  &	  Mathews,	  2005;	  Holmes,	  Mathews,	  Dalgeish	  &	  Mackintosh,	  2006).	  An	  explanatory	  hypothesis	  for	  these	  findings	  is	  that	  mental	  imagery	  imitates	  real	  life	  experiences	  because	  it	  is	  processed	  by	  the	  same	  neural	  structures	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  processing	  perceptual	  input	  (Epstein,	  1994;	  Holmes	  &	  Mathews,	  2010).	  Holmes	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  proposed	  that	  mental	  imagery	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can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  ‘emotional	  amplifier’	  and	  a	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  “powerful	  psychotherapeutic	  tool	  for	  alleviating	  emotional	  distress”	  (p.	  298).	  	  
 Imagery	  rescripting	  1.6 Imagery	  Rescripting	  (IR)	  is	  an	  increasingly	  popular	  transdiagnostic	  psychological	  treatment	  technique	  that	  seeks	  to	  reduce	  distress	  through	  manipulation	  of	  mental	  imagery	  (Long	  &	  Quevillon,	  2009).	  Clients	  are	  guided	  to	  visualise	  and	  describe	  imagery	  including	  their	  surroundings,	  any	  sensory	  experiences	  associated	  with	  the	  imagery,	  and	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  activated	  by	  the	  imagery	  (Rusch,	  Grunert,	  Mendelsohn,	  &	  Smucker,	  2000).	  Potential	  options	  for	  changing	  the	  imagery	  to	  reduce	  associated	  distress	  are	  explored	  and	  the	  client	  is	  then	  guided	  to	  make	  these	  changes	  in	  imagination.	  IR	  is	  an	  experiential	  technique	  that	  differs	  from	  traditional	  cognitive	  techniques	  for	  PTSD	  which	  typically	  seeks	  to	  change	  the	  verbal	  meaning	  of	  trauma.	  Arntz	  and	  Weertman	  (1999)	  proposed	  that	  using	  experience	  to	  introduce	  new	  perspectives	  on	  what	  happened	  have	  a	  stronger	  and	  more	  direct	  effect	  on	  emotions	  than	  information	  that	  is	  presented	  through	  logical	  discourse.	  Edwards	  (2007)	  suggested	  that	  mental	  imagery	  operates	  at	  a	  perceptual-­‐cognitive	  level	  that	  is	  difficult	  to	  access	  with	  verbal	  restructuring,	  and	  that	  imagery-­‐based	  restructuring	  can	  be	  used	  to	  change	  the	  implicational	  meaning	  of	  trauma.	  IR	  is	  most	  commonly	  used	  as	  an	  adjunct	  to	  cognitive	  restructuring	  to	  solidify	  changes	  at	  emotional	  levels	  (Hagenaars	  &	  Arntz,	  2012).	  A	  recent	  review	  showed	  that	  IR	  has	  a	  solid	  evidence-­‐base	  for	  treatment	  of	  PTSD,	  particularly	  when	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  are	  key	  emotional	  reactions	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after	  trauma	  (Arntz,	  2012).	  For	  example,	  Grunert	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  showed	  that	  78%	  of	  23	  industrial	  accident	  survivors	  with	  PTSD	  experienced	  full	  symptomatic	  recovery	  after	  1-­‐3	  sessions	  of	  IR.	  These	  participants	  had	  failed	  to	  respond	  to	  several	  sessions	  of	  IE	  and	  reported	  non-­‐fear	  emotions	  as	  the	  predominant	  emotion.	  Arntz	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  demonstrated	  the	  advantage	  of	  adding	  IR	  to	  IE	  when	  treating	  67	  survivors	  of	  various	  traumas.	  They	  found	  that	  IR	  did	  not	  produce	  additional	  benefits	  to	  symptoms,	  but	  significantly	  reduced	  drop	  outs	  and	  improved	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame.	  The	  processes	  that	  operate	  during	  IR	  are	  currently	  under	  debate	  and	  several	  theories	  provide	  plausible	  explanations.	  The	  Retrieval	  Competition	  hypothesis	  suggests	  that	  IR	  draws	  on	  associative	  sensory	  processes,	  creating	  an	  alternative	  representation	  in	  memory	  that	  overrides	  the	  original	  imagery	  (Brewin,	  2006).	  Cognitive	  theory	  suggests	  that	  IR	  reduces	  emotional	  distress	  associated	  with	  mental	  imagery	  because	  it	  changes	  the	  semantic	  meaning	  of	  the	  imagery.	  For	  example,	  activation	  of	  positive	  emotions	  during	  IR	  stimulates	  adaptive	  schemas,	  which	  leads	  to	  a	  helpful	  shift	  in	  thinking	  about	  traumatic	  experiences	  (Long	  &	  Quevillon,	  2009).	  Behavioural	  theory	  suggests	  that	  modification	  of	  mental	  imagery	  reduces	  distress	  by	  creating	  a	  new	  associated	  emotional	  response	  (Rusch	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Wolpe,	  1958,	  1969).	  The	  Fear	  Network	  Theory	  suggests	  that	  reduced	  avoidance	  of	  mental	  imagery	  allows	  new	  more	  adaptive	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and	  sensations	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  the	  fear	  network	  (Foa	  &	  Kozak,	  1986).	  A	  focus	  of	  the	  debate	  concerning	  the	  active	  ingredients	  of	  IR	  is	  whether	  IR	  works	  through	  the	  same	  habituation	  processes	  as	  exposure	  techniques,	  or	  via	  a	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semantic	  route	  similar	  to	  cognitive	  restructuring	  (Long	  &	  Quevillon,	  2009).	  Most	  studies	  to	  date	  have	  combined	  IR	  with	  other	  techniques	  making	  it	  impossible	  to	  ascertain	  the	  specific	  impact	  of	  IR,	  or	  to	  elucidate	  the	  processes	  that	  underpin	  IR.	  Arntz	  (2012)	  suggested	  that	  future	  research	  should	  use	  dismantling	  designs	  to	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  stand-­‐alone	  effect	  of	  IR	  and	  the	  processes	  that	  predict	  effective	  IR.	  	  A	  few	  studies	  of	  IR	  have	  deployed	  such	  methods.	  Wild,	  Hackmann	  and	  Clark	  (2008)	  used	  a	  within-­‐subjects	  design	  to	  investigate	  IR	  as	  a	  brief	  intervention	  for	  social	  anxiety.	  Eleven	  participants	  were	  offered	  two	  imagery	  sessions	  before	  the	  start	  of	  or	  during	  a	  gap	  in	  their	  standard	  therapy.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  control	  session,	  which	  focused	  on	  exploring	  imagery	  in	  a	  non-­‐directive	  manner;	  the	  second	  was	  an	  experimental	  session	  that	  used	  IR	  and	  cognitive	  restructuring	  to	  update	  and	  give	  context	  to	  imagery.	  Visual	  Analogue	  Scales	  (VASs)	  were	  used	  to	  capture	  within-­‐session	  changes,	  and	  outcome	  measures	  evaluated	  changes	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  sessions.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  trial	  was	  to	  understand	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  IR	  produced	  effects	  beyond	  those	  of	  imagery	  exploration.	  Significant	  improvements	  were	  observed	  on	  measures	  of	  social	  anxiety	  and	  imagery	  that	  could	  be	  attributed	  specifically	  to	  the	  experimental	  session	  (Wild	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  The	  study	  used	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  forms	  a	  precedent	  for	  investigating	  IR	  separately	  from	  exposure	  techniques.	  Delivery	  of	  IR	  as	  an	  optional	  two-­‐session	  insert	  also	  enabled	  evaluation	  of	  its	  effects	  without	  disrupting	  or	  reducing	  the	  quality	  of	  standard	  care.	  However,	  combining	  IR	  with	  verbal	  cognitive	  restructuring	  prevented	  evaluation	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  purely	  experiential,	  imagery-­‐based	  technique.	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  argued	  that	  extensive	  pilot	  work	  had	  indicated	  that	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independent	  IR	  seemed	  less	  promising,	  and	  that	  both	  techniques	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  observed	  effects.	  Building	  on	  the	  work	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  Nilsson,	  Lundh	  and	  Viborg	  (2012)	  evaluated	  the	  impact	  of	  IR	  on	  social	  anxiety	  using	  an	  experimental	  between-­‐subjects	  design	  and	  a	  modified	  treatment	  protocol.	  They	  demonstrated	  that	  IR	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  explicit	  verbal	  restructuring.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  IR	  alone	  can	  produce	  a	  cognitive	  shift,	  or	  alternatively	  that	  IR	  operates	  through	  different	  processes.	  These	  dismantling	  designs	  are	  yet	  be	  used	  in	  research	  of	  IR	  for	  people	  with	  PTSD.	  	  
 Imagery	  rescripting	  for	  survivor	  guilt	  1.6.1There	  is	  currently	  no	  evidence	  concerning	  the	  use	  of	  psychological	  therapy	  techniques	  to	  address	  SG	  specifically.	  IR	  has	  been	  promoted	  as	  a	  technique	  that	  is	  useful	  for	  treating	  guilt	  and	  shame	  after	  trauma	  (Arntz,	  2012).	  Furthermore,	  a	  published	  case	  study	  indicates	  that	  IR	  can	  be	  used	  to	  address	  guilt	  that	  relates	  to	  a	  disparity	  of	  suffering:	  Charles	  experienced	  intense	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  about	  escaping	  physically	  unharmed	  and	  failing	  to	  save	  others	  from	  severe	  injury	  after	  an	  industrial	  accident	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  Charles	  became	  increasingly	  distressed	  and	  self-­‐blaming	  during	  IE,	  and	  reported	  higher	  levels	  of	  anger,	  guilt	  and	  hopelessness	  post-­‐treatment.	  Grunert	  et	  al.	  (2003)	  proposed	  that	  Charles’	  ‘survivor	  guilt’	  prevented	  successful	  emotional	  processing	  of	  trauma	  and	  posed	  an	  obstacle	  to	  therapeutic	  change.	  The	  treatment	  approach	  was	  adjusted	  to	  incorporate	  a	  cognitive	  component	  consisting	  of	  verbal	  restructuring	  and	  imaginal	  modification	  of	  mental	  imagery.	  Dramatic	  improvements	  in	  PTSD,	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depression	  and	  anxiety	  symptoms	  were	  observed	  following	  just	  one	  session	  using	  the	  new	  treatment	  protocol.	  Charles	  also	  reported	  improved	  sleep,	  concentration,	  energy	  levels	  and	  confidence.	  No	  further	  sessions	  were	  conducted	  and	  positive	  gains	  were	  maintained	  and	  improved	  further	  at	  one,	  three	  and	  six-­‐month	  follow-­‐ups.	  No	  one	  died	  in	  Charles’	  trauma	  and	  his	  experiences	  are	  not	  directly	  comparable	  to	  people	  that	  experience	  SG	  following	  a	  fatal	  trauma.	  However,	  the	  emotional	  and	  cognitive	  content	  of	  Charles’	  difficulties	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  observed	  distress	  in	  individuals	  who	  report	  SG	  that	  relates	  to	  a	  fatal	  trauma.	  This	  case	  study	  provides	  a	  clinical	  precedent	  for	  investigation	  the	  application	  of	  IR	  to	  treat	  SG	  after	  a	  traumatic	  event	  in	  which	  other	  people	  died.	  Our	  current	  understanding	  of	  SG	  remains	  theoretical.	  Individual	  variations	  in	   SG	   presentation	   suggest	   that	   several	   mechanisms	   may	   be	   implicated.	  Cognitive	  models	  of	  PTSD,	  moral	  injury,	  and	  complicated	  grief;	  and	  research	  on	  	  meaning-­‐making	   and	   counterfactual	   thinking,	   were	   used	   to	   formulate	   the	  development	  and	  maintenance	  of	  SG.	  Each	  of	   the	  models	  explored	  suggest	   that	  distressing	   mental	   imagery	   prevents	   contextualisation	   and	   integration	   of	  experiences,	   strengthens	   avoidance	   of	   new	   experiences	   that	   may	   repair	   and	  restore	   healthy	   functioning,	   and	   perpetuates	   distress.	   Research	   on	  counterfactual	   thinking	   also	   highlight	   the	   importance	   of	   mental	   imagery:	   for	  example,	  Bartlett	  and	  Brannon	  (2007)	  found	  that	  participants	  with	  a	  high	  ability	  for	   mental	   imagery	   generated	  more	   counterfactuals	   and	   experienced	   stronger	  affective	  response	  to	  these	  counterfactuals	  across	  scenarios.	  They	  concluded	  that	  imagery	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   counterfactual	   thinking.	   These	  models	   and	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findings	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  rationale	  for	  addressing	  mental	  imagery	  as	  part	  of	  SG	   treatment.	   IR	   is	   well	   suited	   for	   this	   purpose	   and	   is	   already	   used	   as	   a	  component	   of	   treatment	   protocols	   for	   PTSD	   (Hackmann,	   2011),	   moral	   injury	  (Litz	  et	  al.,	  2009)	  and	  complicated	  grief	  (Fidaleo,	  Proano,	  &	  Friedberg,	  1999).	  An	  advantage	  of	  IR	  is	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  technique	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  meet	  individual	  needs	  –	  rescripts	  can	  be	  tailored	  to	  specifically	  target	  the	  aspects	  of	  imagery	  that	  are	  most	  distressing	  for	  clients.	  This	  may	  be	  particularly	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  SG	  treatment	  where	  different	  presentations	  of	  SG	  (e.g.,	  existential	  and	  content	  sub-­‐types)	  may	  be	  underpinned	  by	  different	  maintaining	  processes.	  Based	  on	  the	  conceptual	  ideas	  mentioned	  in	  previous	  sections,	  some	  suggestions	  for	  how	  IR	  can	  be	  used	  to	  reduce	  SG	  after	  trauma	  are	  presented	  below.	  IR	  may	  be	  used	  to	  create	  positive	  changes	  to	  meaning	  and	  shift	  unhelpful	  appraisals	  associated	  with	  SG.	  For	  example,	  IR	  can	  be	  used	  to	  explore	  alternative	  counterfactual	  scenarios	  in	  imagination	  to	  help	  clients	  discover	  that	  their	  role	  and	  power	  of	  influence	  on	  traumatic	  outcomes	  was	  less	  than	  originally	  perceived.	  In	  comparison	  to	  verbal	  restructuring	  techniques,	  introducing	  changes	  through	  the	  use	  of	  creative	  imagery	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  changing	  the	  implicational	  meaning,	  which	  could	  exert	  more	  powerful	  effects	  on	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG.	  IR	  may	  also	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  helpful	  corrective	  and	  repairing	  experiences	  that	  reduce	  SG	  distress.	  The	  cognitive	  model	  of	  trauma-­‐related	  guilt	  suggests	  that	  opportunities	  for	  atonement	  are	  crucial	  for	  reducing	  guilt	  feelings	  (Kubany	  &	  Manke,	  1995).	  The	  irreversible	  nature	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  perceived	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transgression	  in	  SG	  (i.e.	  death)	  restricts	  options	  for	  relieving	  SG	  through	  atonement.	  IR	  provides	  a	  tool	  for	  repentant	  action	  in	  imagination.	  For	  example,	  IR	  may	  be	  used	  to	  converse	  with	  and	  seek	  forgiveness	  from	  the	  deceased.	  The	  moral	  injury	  literature	  also	  suggests	  that	  restorative	  experiences	  are	  important	  to	  promote	  processes	  of	  self-­‐forgiveness	  and	  reparation.	  Moral	  repair	  therapy	  incorporates	  an	  imagery-­‐based	  internal	  dialogue	  with	  an	  imagined	  benevolent	  moral	  authority	  (Litz	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  IR	  can	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  comparable	  imaginal	  corrective	  experience	  that	  repairs	  injury	  to	  moral	  values	  of	  fairness,	  predictability	  and	  world	  order	  that	  may	  be	  damaged	  in	  the	  context	  of	  SG.	  IR	  may	  also	  provide	  a	  useful	  tool	  for	  expression	  and	  resolution	  of	  complex	  grief-­‐related	  emotions	  associated	  with	  SG.	  Researchers	  suggest	  that	  mental	  imagery	  can	  block	  bereaved	  individuals	  from	  completing	  emotional	  tasks	  that	  are	  part	  of	  successful	  mourning	  (Fidaleo	  et	  al.,	  1999),	  and	  that	  updating	  mental	  imagery	  is	  important	  to	  overcome	  complicated	  grief	  (Boelen	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  Fidaleo	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  suggests	  that	  clients	  should	  be	  invited	  to	  repair	  the	  imagery	  in	  a	  way	  that	  they	  believe	  would	  be	  helpful	  and	  that	  this	  will	  allow	  grief	  to	  progress	  with	  its	  natural	  course.	  For	  example,	  trauma	  survivors	  may	  find	  it	  helpful	  to	  hold	  a	  funeral	  ceremony	  in	  imagination	  for	  the	  deceased	  if	  the	  traumatic	  event	  prevented	  proper	  burial.	  IR	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  a	  helpful	  alternative	  for	  honouring	  the	  deceased	  and	  maintaining	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  event.	  For	  example,	  mental	  imagery	  can	  be	  used	  to	  create	  a	  place	  in	  imagination	  where	  the	  survivor	  can	  return	  to	  commemorate	  the	  deceased.	  This	  may	  be	  helpful	  when	  survivors	  feel	  that	  moving	  on	  with	  life	  would	  represent	  a	  betrayal	  of	  those	  who	  died.	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 Present	  study	  1.7 The	  present	  study	  is	  a	  preliminary	  investigation	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  technique	  for	  SG.	  Previous	  clinical	  trials	  in	  PTSD	  have	  combined	  IR	  with	  other	  techniques,	  or	  embedded	  it	  within	  treatment	  packages,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  the	  impact	  of	  IR	  specifically.	  Previous	  researchers	  have	  called	  for	  dismantling	  studies	  that	  incorporate	  measures	  of	  processes	  that	  may	  be	  affected	  by	  IR	  to	  further	  our	  understanding	  of	  IR	  (Arntz,	  2012).	  The	  present	  study	  used	  a	  dismantling	  design	  that	  was	  based	  on	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  The	  design	  used	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  was	  chosen	  over	  the	  between-­‐subjects	  designed	  used	  by	  Nilsson	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  because	  within-­‐subjects	  designs	  require	  fewer	  participants	  to	  detect	  an	  effect.	  Minimising	  the	  number	  of	  participants	  required	  is	  an	  appropriate	  consideration	  for	  a	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  clinical	  trial	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  technique	  for	  SG.	  The	  intervention	  was	  delivered	  as	  an	  optional	  component	  to	  standard	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  treatment	  by	  the	  participant’s	  treating	  clinician.	  The	  format	  of	  sessions	  was	  the	  same	  as	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  Participants	  attended	  two	  consecutive	  imagery	  sessions	  at	  an	  appropriate	  point	  in	  therapy.	  The	  first	  session	  focused	  on	  exploring	  and	  elaborating	  the	  distressing	  imagery	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  establishing	  a	  baseline	  effect	  of	  an	  imagery	  session.	  The	  second	  used	  IR	  to	  modify	  the	  distressing	  imagery.	  Following	  recommendations	  in	  the	  literature,	  both	  standardised	  outcome	  measures	  and	  non-­‐standardised	  process	  measures	  were	  included.	  Standardised	  scales	  that	  measured	  both	  depression	  and	  PTSD	  symptoms	  were	  included	  due	  to	  the	  high	  prevalence	  and	  overlap	  of	  depression	  and	  PTSD	  following	  trauma	  (Friedman	  et	  al.,	  2011).	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In	  contrast	  to	  the	  study	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  explicit	  verbal	  restructuring	  was	  not	  included	  as	  part	  of	  the	  intervention.	  This	  decision	  was	  made	  to	  enable	  evaluation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  purely	  experiential,	  imagery-­‐based	  technique	  distinct	  from	  other	  techniques.	  A	  flexible	  protocol	  was	  chosen	  to	  enable	  targeting	  of	  different	  processes	  that	  appeared	  to	  underpin	  individual	  SG	  presentations.	  As	  recommended	  by	  Fidaleo	  et	  al.	  (1999),	  participants	  were	  encouraged	  to	  change	  the	  imagery	  in	  whatever	  way	  they	  felt	  would	  be	  helpful.	  All	  changes	  to	  imagery	  were	  introduced	  through	  imagination	  using	  the	  protocol	  developed	  by	  Brewin	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Outcome	  measures	  were	  delivered	  before	  each	  session	  and	  at	  one-­‐week	  follow-­‐up.	  VASs	  were	  used	  to	  measure	  changes	  to	  perceptual,	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  processes	  during	  the	  sessions.	  The	  primary	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  evaluate	  IR	  as	  an	  independent	  technique	  for	  treating	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  The	  study	  aimed	  to	  explore	  the	  value	  of	  IR	  as	  an	  experiential	  technique	  and	  determine	  if	  IR	  effects	  extended	  beyond	  those	  of	  imagery	  exploration.	  It	  was	  predicted	  that	  the	  intervention	  would	  lead	  to	  significant	  improvements	  for	  participants.	  It	  was	  hypothesised	  that:	  (H1)	  	   Scores	  on	  VASs	  that	  measured	  cognitive,	  emotional	  and	  perceptual	  SG	  processes	  would	  reduce	  significantly	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  but	  not	  at	  other	  time	  points;	  (H2)	  	   Scores	  on	  weekly	  measures	  of	  SG	  and	  mental	  imagery	  would	  reduce	  significantly	  the	  week	  following	  the	  rescripting	  session;	  (H3)	  	   Scores	  on	  standardised	  measures	  of	  depression	  and	  PTSD	  symptoms	  would	  reduce	  significantly	  the	  week	  following	  the	  rescripting	  session.	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Individual	  trajectories	  were	  also	  examined	  to	  further	  understand	  the	  variables	  that	  influenced	  variations	  in	  treatment	  response.	  In	  depth	  exploration	  of	  the	  rescripting	  process	  was	  suggested	  by	  Arntz	  (2012)	  as	  an	  important	  next	  step	  that	  would	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  IR.	  Rescripting	  process	  themes	  were	  selected	  from	  a	  recently	  developed	  coding	  framework	  (Salter,	  El	  Leithy,	  &	  Brown,	  in	  prep).	  A	  brief	  version	  of	  the	  coding	  framework	  was	  used	  to	  characterise	  the	  rescripting	  process	  and	  compare	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  It	  was	  hoped	  that	  comparison	  of	  rescripting	  process	  themes	  across	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  would	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  indication	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  are	  important	  for	  effective	  IR.	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2 Method	  
 Participants	  2.1
 Sample	  2.1.1The	  sample	  consisted	  of	  14	  participants	  who	  were	  recruited	  from	  two	  specialist	  PTSD	  treatment	  services.	  These	  were	  based	  at	  Springfield	  University	  Hospital,	  South	  West	  London	  and	  St	  George’s	  Mental	  Health	  NHS	  Trust	  (SWLSTG)	  and	  St	  Pancras	  Hospital,	  Camden	  and	  Islington	  NHS	  Foundation	  Trust	  (CANDI).	  The	  time	  period	  for	  recruitment	  was	  May	  2014	  –	  April	  2015.	  	  
 Inclusion	  criteria	  2.1.2The	  following	  inclusion	  criteria	  were	  used	  for	  the	  study:	  1. Diagnosis	  of	  PTSD;	  2. Currently	  in	  treatment	  at	  one	  of	  the	  participating	  services;	  3. Experience	  of	  a	  DSM-­‐5	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  2013)	  Criterion	  A	  defined	  traumatic	  event	  that	  involved	  the	  death	  of	  one	  or	  more	  people;	  4. Sufficient	  English-­‐language	  ability	  to	  complete	  the	  study	  without	  the	  use	  of	  an	  interpreter;	  5. Current	  self-­‐reported	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt.	  Clients	  who	  reported	  active	  suicidal	  intent	  or	  had	  a	  recent	  suicide	  attempt,	  and	  clients	  who	  lacked	  capacity	  to	  consent	  to	  the	  study	  were	  excluded.	  Clinicians	  were	  also	  able	  to	  exclude	  clients	  if	  it	  was	  predicted	  that	  participation	  in	  the	  research	  study	  was	  not	  in	  the	  client’s	  best	  interest	  at	  present.	  For	  example,	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Figure	  2.	  Flow	  of	  clients	  that	  were	  approached	  for	  the	  study.	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  Recruitment	  2.1.3Clinicians	  at	  the	  participating	  services	  were	  approached	  by	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  and	  asked	  to	  consider	  clients	  on	  their	  caseload	  against	  the	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  criteria.	  Criterion	  I	  (diagnosis	  of	  PTSD)	  was	  not	  formally	  assessed,	  but	  was	  assumed	  if	  clients	  were	  under	  the	  care	  of	  a	  specialist	  PTSD	  treatment	  service	  (Criterion	  II).	  Clients	  who	  met	  study	  Criteria	  III	  and	  IV,	  and	  did	  not	  fulfil	  any	  of	  the	  exclusion	  criteria,	  were	  approached	  by	  their	  treating	  clinician.	  Clients	  were	  asked	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  SG	  using	  this	  or	  an	  equivalent	  question:	  “Some	  people	  that	  have	  experienced	  trauma	  say	  that	  they	  sometimes	  feel	  guilty	  or	  ashamed	  about	  having	  survived	  when	  others	  died	  –	  we	  call	  this	  survivor	  guilt.	  Do	  you	  ever	  feel	  survivor	  guilt?”	  Clients	  who	  reported	  SG	  were	  informed	  of	  the	  study	  and	  provided	  with	  the	  information	  sheet	  (Appendix	  F)	  and	  consent	  form	  (Appendix	  G).	  Clients	  who	  expressed	  interest	  in	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  study	  collaboratively	  agreed	  the	  best	  time	  to	  complete	  the	  study	  with	  their	  treating	  clinician.	  The	  study	  intervention	  was	  scheduled	  at	  an	  appropriate	  point	  that	  fitted	  the	  natural	  flow	  of	  therapy	  sessions.	  Special	  consideration	  was	  given	  to	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  treatment	  plan	  to	  ensure	  that	  participation	  did	  not	  disrupt	  participants’	  standard	  treatment.	  	  
 Power	  analysis	  2.1.4The	  required	  sample	  size	  was	  determined	  using	  power	  analysis.	  No	  comparative	  studies	  were	  identified	  in	  the	  PTSD	  literature.	  The	  power	  analysis	  was	  calculated	  using	  data	  from	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  IR	  has	  a	  strong	  evidence	  base	  in	  PTSD	  and	  it	  was	  expected	  that	  the	  effects	  in	  the	  present	  study	  would	  be	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comparable	  to	  the	  observed	  effects	  in	  the	  study	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  The	  VAS	  –	  Encapsulated	  Belief	  and	  VAS	  –	  Imagery	  distress	  (pre-­‐control	  session,	  pre-­‐experimental	  session	  and	  follow-­‐up	  scores)	  were	  chosen	  to	  estimate	  the	  required	  sample	  size	  because	  these	  measures	  corresponded	  most	  closely	  to	  the	  main	  outcome	  measures	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  Power	  analysis	  using	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  ratings	  indicated	  a	  sample	  size	  of	  n=5,	  and	  calculations	  using	  imagery	  distress	  indicated	  a	  sample	  size	  of	  n=14.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  power	  analysis	  suggested	  that	  a	  sample	  of	  5-­‐14	  participants	  would	  be	  able	  to	  detect	  an	  effect	  at	  standard	  alpha	  level	  (.05)	  and	  80%	  power.	  	  
 Ethics	  2.2 The	  study	  was	  reviewed	  and	  approved	  by	  Royal	  Holloway,	  University	  of	  London	  Research	  Committee	  (Appendix	  H).	  Ethical	  approval	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  Dulwich	  National	  Research	  Ethics	  Service	  Committee	  on	  25th	  March	  2014	  (Appendix	  I)	  and	  from	  Royal	  Holloway,	  University	  of	  London	  Ethics	  Committee	  on	  24th	  April	  2014	  (Appendix	  J).	  The	  study	  was	  also	  given	  local	  support	  from	  SWLSTG	  Research	  &	  Development	  Committee	  on	  23rd	  April	  2014	  (Appendix	  K)	  and	  CANDI	  Research	  Support	  Service	  on	  14th	  November	  2014	  (Appendix	  L).	  	  
 Service	  user	  consultation	  2.3 A	  service	  user	  was	  asked	  to	  advise	  on	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  research	  methods	  and	  the	  wording	  of	  non-­‐standardised	  measures	  and	  verbal	  instructions	  (Appendix	  M).	  The	  service	  user	  was	  a	  current	  client	  at	  the	  traumatic	  stress	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service	  at	  Springfield	  University	  Hospital	  and	  was	  representative	  of	  the	  target	  population.	  Materials	  and	  procedures	  were	  adapted	  to	  reflect	  the	  views	  of	  the	  service	  user.	  The	  service	  user	  was	  given	  a	  £50	  gift	  certificate	  for	  the	  two-­‐hour	  consultation.	  	  
 Design	  2.4 The	  overall	  design	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  based	  on	  the	  study	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  Two	  imagery	  session	  were	  delivered:	  the	  first	  was	  an	  exploration	  session	  which	  focused	  on	  elaborating	  the	  imagery,	  the	  second	  was	  a	  rescripting	  session	  which	  used	  IR	  to	  modify	  the	  imagery.	  The	  research	  therapy	  sessions	  were	  delivered	  during	  a	  break	  in	  participants’	  standard	  therapy	  or	  at	  the	  end	  of	  participants’	  trauma-­‐focused	  treatment.	  An	  imagery	  interview	  (see	  Section	  2.6)	  was	  conducted	  before	  the	  exploration	  session	  to	  identify	  SG	  imagery	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  imagery.	  Weekly	  measures	  (standardised	  and	  non-­‐standardised	  questionnaires)	  and	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  were	  administered	  before	  each	  session,	  and	  one	  week	  after	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  Single-­‐item	  VASs	  were	  also	  administered	  after	  each	  session.	  A	  visual	  illustration	  of	  the	  study,	  procedures	  and	  analysis	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  3.	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 Measures	  2.5 The	  literature	  was	  searched	  for	  measures	  of	  (1)	  survivor	  guilt,	  (2)	  mental	  imagery,	  (3)	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms,	  and	  (4)	  depression	  symptoms.	  Post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms	  were	  measured	  using	  parts	  of	  the	  Post-­‐traumatic	  Diagnostic	  Scale	  (PDS;	  Foa,	  1995).	  Depression	  symptoms	  were	  measured	  using	  the	  Patient	  Health	  Questionnaire-­‐9	  (PHQ-­‐9;	  Kroenke,	  Spitzer,	  &	  Williams,	  2001).	  Non-­‐standardised	  questionnaires	  were	  developed	  to	  measure	  weekly	  survivor	  guilt	  and	  mental	  imagery.	  Single-­‐item	  VASs	  were	  also	  created	  to	  measure	  cognitive,	  emotional	  and	  perceptual	  SG	  processes	  at	  five	  moments	  in	  time.	  A	  participant	  feedback	  form	  was	  devised	  and	  administered	  at	  follow-­‐up.	  Demographic	  and	  clinical	  information	  was	  collected	  from	  the	  treating	  clinician,	  and	  a	  coding	  framework	  was	  used	  to	  extract	  information	  about	  the	  rescripting	  process	  from	  audio	  transcripts	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  	  
 Survivor	  Guilt	  Measure	  2.5.1There	  are	  currently	  no	  validated	  measures	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  after	  trauma.	  The	  Survivor	  Guilt	  Measure	  (SGM;	  Appendix	  N)	  was	  developed	  using	  relevant	  items	  from	  the	  Clinician	  Administered	  PTSD	  Scale	  (CAPS;	  Blake	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  The	  CAPS	  is	  a	  clinician-­‐rated	  scale	  that	  measures	  PTSD	  symptoms	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  DSM-­‐IV	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  1994).	  It	  measures	  the	  lifetime	  occurrence	  of	  symptoms,	  and	  the	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  symptoms	  over	  the	  past	  week	  or	  month.	  The	  CAPS	  features	  behaviourally	  anchored	  rating	  scales	  to	  reliably	  capture	  clinical	  change	  (Blake	  et	  al.,	  1995).	  Research	  shows	  that	  the	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CAPS	  has	  good	  psychometric	  properties	  including	  excellent	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  clinical	  change	  (Weathers,	  Keane,	  &	  Davidson,	  2001).	  Two	  items	  that	  measure	  the	  frequency	  and	  intensity	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  over	  the	  past	  week	  were	  taken	  from	  the	  additional	  features	  section	  of	  the	  CAPS.	  The	  wording	  of	  items	  and	  response	  options	  was	  kept	  the	  same	  as	  the	  original	  CAPS.	  The	  frequency	  rating	  scale	  ranged	  from	  0=’None	  of	  the	  time’	  to	  4=’Most	  or	  all	  of	  the	  time	  (more	  than	  80%)’.	  The	  intensity	  rating	  scale	  ranged	  from	  0=’No	  feelings	  of	  guilt’	  to	  4=’Extreme,	  pervasive	  feelings	  of	  guilt,	  incapacitating	  distress’.	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  rate	  items	  over	  the	  past	  week.	  	  The	  SGM	  was	  introduced	  with	  a	  written	  operational	  definition	  of	  survivor	  guilt:	  “Survivor	  guilt	  refers	  to	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and/or	  shame	  about	  surviving	  a	  traumatic	  event	  when	  others	  did	  not.”	  The	  two	  ratings	  were	  combined	  to	  form	  a	  total	  SGM	  score	  (range=0-­‐8).	  The	  	  internal	  consistency	  of	  the	  measure	  was	  explored	  using	  the	  baseline	  SGM	  scores.	  The	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  statistic	  for	  the	  scale	  was	  .95	  and	  the	  item-­‐total	  correlations	  were	  .92.	  High	  alpha	  and	  item-­‐total	  correlations	  suggest	  that	  the	  items	  measure	  a	  similar	  construct,	  but	  that	  the	  scale	  may	  contain	  redundant	  items	  (Streiner	  &	  Norman,	  1989).	  The	  observed	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  SGM	  was	  internally	  consistent	  but	  that	  one	  of	  the	  items	  could	  be	  removed.	  	  
 Mental	  Imagery	  Scale	  2.5.2The	  only	  identified	  method	  for	  measuring	  mental	  imagery	  was	  with	  non-­‐standardised	  VASs.	  VASs	  are	  commonly	  used	  to	  measure	  imagery	  in	  IR	  research;	  for	  example,	  ratings	  of	  frequency,	  vividness,	  uncontrollability,	  interference	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and/or	  associated	  distress	  have	  been	  used	  previously.	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  measured	  imagery	  distress,	  vividness	  and	  frequency	  over	  the	  past	  week	  using	  three	  items.	  In	  their	  study,	  imagery	  distress	  and	  imagery	  frequency	  showed	  good	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  before	  and	  after	  the	  control	  session	  (r=0.71,	  p<0.01,	  r=0.92,	  p<0.01	  respectively),	  but	  imagery	  vividness	  did	  not	  (r=0.13,	  p<0.71).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  distress	  and	  frequency	  items	  would	  have	  provided	  more	  reliable	  estimates	  of	  clinical	  change.	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  clinical	  observations	  that	  imagery	  vividness	  and	  intensity	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify,	  and	  are	  less	  useful	  for	  tracking	  mental	  imagery	  over	  time.	  The	  Mental	  Imagery	  Scale	  (MIS;	  Appendix	  O)	  was	  developed	  using	  two	  VASs	  that	  measured	  imagery	  frequency	  and	  imagery	  distress.	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  rate	  how	  frequent	  and	  distressing	  their	  SG	  imagery	  (identified	  during	  the	  Imagery	  Interview)	  had	  been	  over	  the	  past	  week	  from	  0=’Not	  at	  all’	  to	  100=’Extremely’.	  The	  two	  ratings	  were	  combined	  to	  form	  a	  total	  MIS	  score	  (range=0-­‐200).	  The	  internal	  consistency	  of	  the	  measure	  was	  explored	  using	  the	  baseline	  MIS	  scores.	  The	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  statistic	  for	  the	  scale	  was	  .91	  and	  the	  item-­‐total	  correlations	  were	  .83.	  The	  observed	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  MIS	  was	  internally	  consistent	  but	  that	  one	  of	  the	  items	  could	  be	  removed.	  	  
 Process	  measures	  2.5.3The	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  (Appendix	  P)	  were	  also	  adapted	  from	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  Three	  ratings	  scales	  were	  constructed	  to	  measure	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG,	  and	  level	  of	  imagery	  distress,	  at	  five	  moments	  in	  time.	  The	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  ranged	  from	  0=’Not	  at	  all’	  to	  100=’Extremely’.	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Cognitive	  SG	  components	  were	  measured	  by	  identifying	  participants’	  ‘encapsulated	  belief’	  (see	  Imagery	  Interview,	  Section	  2.6).	  The	  encapsulated	  belief	  consisted	  of	  a	  statement	  that	  summarised	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  participant’s	  SG	  imagery.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  how	  much	  they	  believed	  the	  statement	  to	  be	  true	  right	  now	  (VAS-­‐EB).	  The	  imagery	  distress	  item	  (VAS-­‐ID)	  measured	  level	  of	  distress	  associated	  with	  the	  SG	  imagery.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  dwell	  on	  their	  image	  for	  a	  few	  moments	  and	  rate	  the	  amount	  of	  distress	  that	  the	  imagery	  caused	  them	  right	  now.	  Finally,	  the	  survivor	  guilt	  item	  (VAS-­‐SG)	  measured	  participants’	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt.	  Participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  rate	  how	  strong	  their	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  were	  right	  now.	  The	  VAS-­‐SG	  item	  was	  selected	  as	  the	  primary	  outcome	  measure	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  	  	  
 Post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms	  2.5.4Severity	  of	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms	  was	  measured	  using	  Part	  3	  of	  the	  PDS	  (Foa,	  1995).	  Parts	  1,	  2	  and	  4	  were	  excluded	  because	  they	  were	  not	  relevant	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  Part	  1	  captures	  information	  about	  the	  lifetime	  occurrence	  of	  traumatic	  experiences,	  Part	  2	  identifies	  the	  traumatic	  experience	  that	  is	  causing	  the	  most	  distress	  and	  impairment,	  and	  Part	  4	  uses	  a	  binary	  scale	  to	  identify	  the	  areas	  that	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms	  have	  interfered	  with.	  Part	  3	  measures	  17	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms	  across	  three	  symptoms	  clusters	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  DSM-­‐IV	  PTSD	  diagnostic	  criteria	  (American	  Psychiatric	  Association,	  1994).	  Items	  in	  Part	  3	  are	  rated	  from	  0=’Not	  at	  all	  or	  only	  one	  time’	  to	  3=’5	  or	  more	  times	  a	  week/almost	  always’	  (total	  score	  range=0-­‐51).	  Scores	  on	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the	  PDS	  were	  combined	  into	  sub-­‐scale	  scores:	  re-­‐experiencing	  (total	  range=0-­‐15),	  avoidance	  (total	  range=0-­‐21),	  and	  hyperarousal	  (total	  range=0-­‐15).	  The	  PDS	  was	  chosen	  over	  other	  measures	  because	  it	  incorporates	  symptoms	  from	  three	  symptom	  domains,	  and	  corresponds	  closely	  to	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria.	  The	  PDS	  shows	  high	  agreement	  with	  the	  PTSD	  module	  of	  the	  Structured	  Clinical	  Interview	  (SCID;	  Spitzer,	  Williams,	  Gibbons,	  &	  First,	  1990)	  and	  is	  considered	  a	  useful	  option	  when	  clinical	  interview	  would	  be	  impractical	  (Sheeran	  &	  Zimmerman,	  2002;	  McCarthy,	  2008).	  The	  symptom	  items	  (Part	  3)	  have	  good	  psychometric	  properties	  including	  high	  internal	  consistency,	  content	  and	  discriminant	  validity,	  and	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  (Foa,	  Cashman,	  Jaycox,	  &	  Perry,	  1997).	  Part	  3	  of	  the	  PDS	  has	  been	  successfully	  used	  in	  other	  clinical	  trials	  to	  capture	  treatment-­‐related	  change	  (Duffy,	  Gillespie,	  &	  Clark,	  2007).	  Because	  it	  was	  unclear	  prior	  to	  the	  study	  if	  SG	  would	  relate	  to	  a	  specific	  traumatic	  event,	  multiple	  events	  or	  the	  accumulated	  effect	  of	  multiple	  events,	  the	  PDS	  was	  administered	  as	  a	  general	  measure	  of	  PTSD	  symptoms	  relating	  to	  any	  traumatic	  event.	  The	  time	  period	  was	  also	  changed	  to	  measure	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  symptoms	  over	  the	  past	  week	  to	  capture	  potential	  changes	  following	  each	  session.	  Part	  3	  of	  the	  amended	  PDS	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Appendix	  Q.	  	  
 Depression	  symptoms	  2.5.5The	  Beck	  Depression	  Inventory	  (BDI,	  Beck,	  1961)	  is	  considered	  the	  gold	  standard	  for	  measurement	  of	  depression	  symptoms	  using	  self-­‐report	  questionnaire	  methods	  (Cusin,	  Yang,	  Yeung,	  &	  Fava,	  2010).	  The	  PHQ-­‐9	  (Kroenke	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  is	  an	  alternative	  measure	  of	  depression	  symptoms	  that	  is	  free	  to	  use.	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The	  PHQ-­‐9	  displays	  similar	  psychometric	  properties	  to	  the	  BDI	  but	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  shorter	  and	  based	  on	  the	  diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  depression	  (Titov,	  Dear,	  McMillan,	  Anderson,	  Zou,	  &	  Sunderland,	  2011).	  The	  PHQ-­‐9	  shows	  adequate	  reliability,	  responsiveness	  to	  change	  and	  construct	  validity	  (Kroenke	  et	  al.,	  2001),	  and	  high	  correlation	  with	  other	  measures	  of	  depression	  including	  the	  BDI	  (Titov	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  PHQ-­‐9	  contains	  nine	  items	  that	  measure	  common	  symptoms	  of	  depression	  over	  the	  past	  two	  weeks.	  The	  frequency	  of	  symptoms	  is	  rated	  on	  scales	  that	  range	  from	  0=’Not	  at	  all’	  to	  3=’Nearly	  everyday’	  (total	  range=0-­‐27).	  The	  questionnaire	  also	  contains	  one	  item	  that	  measures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  symptoms	  have	  impacted	  on	  daily	  living	  (rated	  0=’Not	  at	  all	  difficult’	  to	  4=’Extremely	  difficult’).	  The	  time	  frame	  of	  the	  PHQ-­‐9	  was	  changed	  to	  measure	  depression	  symptoms	  over	  the	  past	  week	  to	  capture	  potential	  changes	  following	  each	  session	  (Appendix	  R).	  	  
 Subjective	  feedback	  2.5.6A	  Client	  Feedback	  Form	  (Appendix	  S)	  was	  developed	  to	  capture	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  participants.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  how	  helpful	  they	  found	  the	  intervention	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  how	  helpful	  they	  had	  found	  each	  session,	  on	  VASs	  that	  ranged	  from	  0=’Not	  at	  all’	  to	  100=’Extremely’.	  The	  feedback	  form	  also	  contained	  free	  text	  space	  where	  participants	  could	  provide	  comments	  about	  the	  intervention.	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 Original	  imagery	  variables	  2.5.7Coding	  of	  original	  SG	  imagery	  was	  carried	  out	  using	  information	  provided	  by	  the	  therapists	  (see	  Section	  2.6)	  and	  information	  that	  was	  extracted	  from	  audio	  transcripts	  of	  the	  exploration	  session.	  No	  previous	  research	  was	  identified	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  categorise	  original	  imagery.	  The	  Principal	  Investigator	  explored	  similarities	  between	  participants’	  imagery	  and	  identified	  three	  categories:	  (1)	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  trauma	  memory;	  (2)	  imagery	  that	  involved	  the	  last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  and	  last	  opportunity	  to	  intervene/prevent	  death;	  and	  (3)	  constructed	  imagery.	  Constructed	  imagery	  described	  imagery	  that	  was	  not	  a	  memory	  of	  an	  event;	  it	  included	  real	  events	  that	  the	  participant	  was	  told	  about	  but	  did	  not	  witness	  directly,	  and	  events	  that	  were	  imagined	  by	  the	  participant.	  Some	  participants	  reported	  imagery	  that	  fitted	  the	  criteria	  for	  two	  categories	  –	  theses	  participants	  were	  given	  two	  original	  imagery	  codes.	  Primary	  and	  secondary	  SG	  types	  (existential	  or	  content)	  were	  also	  coded.	  The	  decision	  to	  code	  secondary	  SG	  was	  made	  because	  several	  participants	  appeared	  to	  describe	  both	  experiences.	  Classification	  of	  content	  SG	  into	  objective	  and	  subjective	  sub-­‐types	  was	  considered.	  However,	  audio	  transcripts	  contained	  limited	  information	  about	  the	  source	  and	  phenomenology	  of	  participants’	  SG,	  and	  initial	  attempts	  by	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  indicated	  that	  objective	  and	  subjective	  SG	  could	  not	  be	  reliably	  coded.	  SG	  types	  were	  coded	  by	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  and	  a	  second	  blind	  rater	  using	  audio	  transcripts	  of	  the	  exploration	  session.	  Excellent	  agreement	  was	  found	  between	  the	  raters:	  the	  average	  measure	  ICC	  was	  .91	  with	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  from	  .80	  to	  .96	  (F(25,25)=10.97,	  p<.001).	  Primary	  SG	  was	  coded	  the	  same	  for	  all	  participants	  but	  raters	  differed	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on	  coding	  of	  secondary	  SG	  for	  three	  participants.	  These	  codes	  were	  discussed	  and	  agreed	  between	  raters	  and	  the	  relevant	  therapists.	  Primary	  and	  secondary	  SG	  for	  two	  participants	  that	  did	  not	  consent	  to	  audio	  recording	  (Participants	  11	  and	  12)	  were	  coded	  jointly	  by	  Principal	  Investigator	  and	  therapists.	  	  
 Rescripted	  imagery	  and	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  2.5.8Information	  about	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  and	  rescripting	  process	  was	  extracted	  using	  audio	  transcripts	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session	  and	  ratings	  provided	  by	  therapists	  (see	  Section	  2.6).	  The	  rescripting	  process	  was	  explored	  using	  a	  brief	  coding	  framework	  that	  was	  constructed	  from	  research	  by	  Salter	  et	  al.	  (in	  prep).	  Salter	  et	  al.	  (in	  prep)	  used	  thematic	  analysis	  to	  develop	  a	  coding	  framework	  that	  systematically	  captured	  the	  content	  of	  an	  IR	  session.	  The	  coding	  framework	  was	  also	  piloted	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  six	  participants	  with	  PTSD	  using	  a	  single-­‐case	  experimental	  design.	  The	  original	  coding	  framework	  was	  condensed	  into	  a	  brief	  version	  (Appendix	  T).	  Codes	  that	  related	  to	  outcomes	  of	  IR	  sessions	  were	  identified	  from	  the	  results	  of	  the	  previous	  study,	  and	  through	  discussions	  with	  the	  researchers	  who	  developed	  the	  original	  coding	  framework.	  Relevant	  codes	  were	  summarised	  into	  nine	  themes	  by	  the	  Principal	  Investigator:	  1. Activation	  of	  imagery;	  2. Ability	  to	  stay	  with	  the	  imagery;	  3. Development	  of	  a	  coherent	  narrative;	  4. Amount	  of	  therapist	  guidance;	  5. Activation	  of	  original	  internal	  processes;	  
	   72	  
6. Departure	  from	  original	  imagery;	  7. Timing	  of	  change;	  8. Believability	  of	  rescript;	  9. Activation	  of	  new	  internal	  processes;	  One	  item	  was	  created	  for	  each	  theme	  using	  material	  from	  the	  original	  coding	  framework.	  Each	  item	  incorporated	  several	  codes	  subsumed	  under	  each	  theme,	  but	  codes	  that	  were	  particularly	  representative	  of	  themes	  were	  emphasised	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  items.	  The	  ratings	  scales	  were	  changed	  to	  four-­‐point	  scales	  to	  increase	  consistency	  between	  items.	  The	  new	  items	  were	  inspected	  and	  refined	  through	  an	  iterative	  process	  between	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  and	  the	  researchers	  who	  developed	  the	  original	  coding	  framework.	  Feedback	  was	  also	  sought	  from	  two	  external	  researchers.	  The	  inter-­‐rater	  reliability	  of	  the	  brief	  coding	  framework	  was	  assessed	  by	  a	  second	  blind	  rater	  who	  coded	  the	  rescripting	  sessions	  of	  two	  participants.	  Excellent	  agreement	  was	  found	  between	  the	  raters:	  the	  average	  measure	  ICC	  was	  .92	  with	  a	  95%	  confidence	  interval	  from	  .81	  to	  .97	  (F(19,19)=13.2,	  p<.001).	  The	  imagery	  codes	  developed	  by	  Salter	  et	  al.	  (in	  prep)	  to	  categorise	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  were	  not	  applicable	  to	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  Principal	  Investigator	  explored	  similarities	  between	  participants’	  rescripted	  imagery	  and	  identified	  four	  categories	  of	  rescripted	  imagery:	  (1)	  preventing	  death;	  (2)	  afterlife	  imagery;	  (3)	  repairing	  imagery	  and	  moving	  the	  scene	  forward;	  and	  (4)	  positive	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased.	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 Imagery	  interview	  2.6 An	  imagery	  interview	  was	  carried	  out	  before	  the	  exploration	  session.	  The	  imagery	  interview	  followed	  a	  similar	  process	  to	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  and	  was	  20-­‐30	  minutes	  in	  length.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  interview	  was	  to	  elicit	  imagery	  that	  was	  linked	  to	  participants’	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  and	  identify	  the	  encapsulated	  belief.	  Participants	  were	  given	  the	  following	  explanation:	  “Mental	  images	  are	  ‘pictures	  in	  our	  mind’.	  They	  can	  include	  smells,	  tastes,	  sounds	  and	  sensations.	  They	  can	  be	  a	  memory	  of	  an	  event,	  or	  an	  imaginary	  situation.	  Mental	  images	  can	  be	  very	  powerful	  and	  linked	  to	  strong	  feelings.	  They	  can	  be	  very	  distressing	  when	  they	  are	  linked	  to	  unpleasant	  feelings.	  I	  want	  to	  help	  you	  identify	  any	  mental	  images	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  your	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt.”	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  and	  notice	  any	  images	  that	  went	  through	  their	  mind.	  Optional	  prompts	  were	  offered	  when	  necessary	  to	  identify	  relevant	  imagery.	  The	  imagery	  that	  was	  most	  upsetting	  to	  the	  participant,	  or	  the	  imagery	  that	  was	  most	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  participant’s	  SG,	  was	  selected	  by	  the	  participant.	  Participants	  were	  then	  told	  that	  mental	  images	  often	  mean	  something	  to	  the	  person,	  and	  were	  asked	  if	  the	  identified	  SG	  image	  had	  a	  particular	  meaning	  to	  him	  or	  her.	  The	  encapsulated	  belief	  of	  the	  imagery	  was	  explored	  and	  determined	  through	  a	  process	  of	  Socratic	  questioning.	  Optional	  prompts	  were	  provided	  when	  necessary	  at	  therapists’	  discretion.	  The	  following	  guidance	  was	  given	  to	  therapists:	  “The	  purpose	  of	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  is	  to	  find	  the	  essential	  meaning	  of	  the	  imagery	  for	  your	  client.	  This	  is	  most	  commonly	  an	  negative	  belief	  about	  the	  person	  but	  may	  be	  a	  belief	  about	  something	  else.”	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Therapists	  categorised	  the	  imagery	  as	  memory,	  constructed	  imagery	  or	  combination	  (part	  memory	  and	  part	  constructed	  image).	  Memory-­‐based	  imagery	  were	  further	  categorised	  as	  trauma	  or	  non-­‐trauma.	  The	  participant	  and	  therapist	  also	  rated	  the	  level	  of	  distortion	  of	  the	  imagery	  (0=’Not	  at	  all’	  to	  100=’Completely	  distorted’).	  	  
 Intervention	  2.7 Similarly	  to	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  the	  research	  intervention	  consisted	  of	  two	  imagery	  therapy	  sessions	  that	  were	  scheduled	  over	  two	  consecutive	  weeks.	  Both	  sessions	  were	  client-­‐led,	  and	  therapists	  were	  instructed	  to	  provide	  limited	  but	  sufficient	  direction	  to	  progress	  the	  sessions.	  The	  sessions	  were	  45-­‐60	  minutes	  in	  length	  and	  were	  carried	  out	  during	  the	  participant’s	  usual	  therapy	  time	  slot.	  The	  benefit	  of	  counterbalancing	  sessions	  was	  noted	  during	  the	  design	  phase	  of	  the	  study	  but	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  feasible	  option.	  A	  between-­‐subjects	  design	  would	  have	  required	  many	  more	  participants	  and	  was	  not	  considered	  appropriate	  at	  this	  stage	  of	  research.	  Furthermore,	  administration	  of	  the	  exploration	  session	  after	  the	  rescripting	  session	  would	  carry	  a	  high	  risk	  of	  cross-­‐contamination.	  For	  example,	  exploration	  of	  original	  SG	  imagery	  after	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  introduced	  would	  likely	  lead	  to	  spontaneous	  exposure	  to	  the	  rescripted	  imagery.	  Quantitative	  analysis	  was	  supplemented	  with	  and	  interpreted	  in	  light	  of	  observations	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  sessions	  obtained	  from	  audio	  transcripts.	  The	  implications	  of	  standardising	  the	  order	  of	  sessions	  on	  the	  conclusions	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  results	  are	  considered	  in	  the	  discussion.	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 Exploration	  session	  2.7.1The	  purpose	  of	  the	  exploration	  session	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  baseline	  effect	  of	  an	  imagery	  therapy	  session	  and	  enable	  more	  accurate	  evaluation	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  rescripting	  specifically.	  Therapists	  were	  instructed	  to	  support	  participants	  to	  elaborate	  the	  content	  and	  context	  of	  SG	  imagery,	  without	  actively	  changing	  the	  imagery	  or	  its	  meaning.	  Therapists	  were	  given	  the	  following	  summary	  of	  the	  session	  aims:	  “The	  purpose	  of	  the	  session	  is	  to	  elaborate	  the	  imagery	  without	  interfering	  with	  it.	  Explore	  the	  content	  and	  meaning	  of	  the	  imagery	  in	  a	  non-­‐directional	  way.	  Gently	  lead	  your	  client	  to	  vividly	  imagine	  and	  share	  details	  of	  the	  imagery.	  Listen,	  reflect	  and	  empathise	  but	  do	  not	  challenge	  interpretations.”	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  bring	  their	  imagery	  to	  mind	  and	  give	  a	  detailed	  narrative	  account	  of	  the	  imagery.	  Participants	  were	  prompted	  to	  describe	  sensory	  details,	  the	  emotive	  context	  of	  the	  imagery	  and	  what	  the	  imagery	  meant	  to	  the	  participant.	  Participants	  were	  also	  prompted	  to	  explore	  related	  material;	  for	  example,	  similar	  experiences	  or	  memories	  that	  the	  participant	  was	  reminded	  of.	   	  
 Rescripting	  session	  2.7.2The	  procedure	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session	  was	  based	  on	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  but	  the	  content	  was	  different.	  The	  key	  difference	  was	  that	  the	  rescripting	  session	  in	  the	  present	  study	  did	  not	  include	  a	  cognitive	  restructuring	  component.	  This	  component	  was	  excluded	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  confound	  effects	  from	  active	  verbal	  restructuring	  and	  enable	  evaluation	  of	  IR	  as	  an	  imagery-­‐based	  technique.	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The	  experiential	  focus	  of	  the	  rescripting	  process	  was	  similar	  to	  the	  IR	  protocol	  used	  by	  Brewin	  at	  al.	  (2009).	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session	  was	  to	  change	  the	  content	  of	  the	  imagery	  to	  make	  it	  less	  distressing	  to	  the	  participant.	  Participants	  were	  encouraged	  to	  choose	  their	  rescripted	  imagery	  but	  therapists	  provided	  suggestions	  when	  necessary.	  Therapists	  were	  given	  the	  following	  summary	  of	  the	  session	  aims:	  “The	  purpose	  of	  the	  session	  is	  to	  make	  changes	  or	  add	  to	  the	  imagery	  to	  make	  it	  feel	  less	  distressing.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  in	  many	  ways.	  Research	  suggests	  that	  individualised,	  client-­‐lead	  rescripts	  are	  most	  helpful.	  We	  are	  also	  interested	  to	  find	  out	  what	  rescripts	  participants	  choose	  so	  introduce	  ideas	  in	  general	  terms	  and	  only	  when	  necessary.	  Help	  your	  client	  to	  be	  as	  creative	  as	  they	  want.	  Do	  not	  introduce	  ideas	  with	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  changing	  the	  verbal	  meaning.”	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  think	  about	  changes	  that	  they	  would	  like	  to	  make	  to	  the	  imagery.	  Therapists	  told	  participants	  that	  they	  could	  change	  details	  of	  the	  imagery,	  create	  a	  different	  outcome,	  build	  on	  ‘the	  story’	  of	  the	  imagery,	  or	  change	  the	  imagery	  in	  some	  other	  way.	  After	  suitable	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  identified,	  participants’	  were	  asked	  to	  bring	  their	  imagery	  to	  mind.	  Therapists	  provided	  participants	  with	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  assistance	  in	  changing	  the	  SG	  imagery	  using	  the	  agreed	  rescript.	  All	  changes	  were	  introduced	  through	  imagination	  and	  participants	  were	  encouraged	  to	  focus	  on	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  aspects	  of	  the	  imagery.	  Participants	  were	  able	  to	  make	  additional	  changes	  that	  were	  identified	  during	  the	  rescripting	  process	  and/or	  carry	  out	  several	  rescripts.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session,	  therapists	  rated	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  rescripted	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imagery	  was	  chosen	  by	  the	  participant	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  therapist)	  using	  a	  percentage	  rating	  scale	  (0-­‐100%).	  	  
 Procedures	  2.8 A	  manual	  was	  developed	  to	  maximise	  therapist	  adherence	  to	  the	  study	  protocol	  (Appendix	  U).	  A	  training	  event	  was	  also	  held	  for	  therapists.	  The	  training	  event	  included	  a	  PowerPoint	  presentation,	  which	  summarised	  the	  background	  to	  the	  study,	  the	  main	  research	  questions	  and	  the	  trial	  procedures	  (Appendix	  V).	  Therapists	  were	  also	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  familiarise	  themselves	  with	  the	  project	  manual.	  The	  identification	  of	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery,	  and	  the	  purpose	  and	  process	  of	  the	  exploration	  and	  rescripting	  sessions,	  were	  given	  particular	  attention	  during	  the	  training	  event.	  The	  research	  sessions	  were	  conducted	  by	  the	  participant’s	  treating	  clinician	  at	  the	  service	  where	  the	  participant	  was	  seen	  for	  psychological	  treatment.	  Participants	  were	  able	  to	  claim	  travel	  expenses	  for	  the	  research	  sessions	  (Appendix	  W).	  They	  were	  also	  given	  the	  option	  to	  receive	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  research	  findings	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  trial	  (Appendix	  X).	  Two	  participants	  chose	  to	  claim	  travel	  expenses	  and	  thirteen	  participants	  opted	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  study	  results.	  Twelve	  participants	  agreed	  to	  audio	  recording	  of	  sessions.	  Therapists	  completed	  some	  background	  demographic	  and	  clinical	  information	  outside	  sessions	  (pages	  3-­‐4,	  Study	  Manual).	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 Exploration	  session	  2.8.1Written	  informed	  consent	  was	  obtained	  by	  the	  therapists	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  session.	  Participants	  were	  then	  informed	  about	  the	  opportunity	  to	  claim	  travel	  expenses	  and	  to	  receive	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  study	  results.	  The	  audio	  recorder	  was	  started	  and	  participants	  completed	  the	  PHQ-­‐9,	  PDS	  and	  SGM.	  The	  imagery	  interview	  (pages	  6-­‐8	  in	  the	  project	  manual)	  was	  introduced	  with	  a	  brief	  definition	  of	  mental	  imagery.	  Participants	  were	  guided	  by	  their	  therapists	  to	  identify	  mental	  imagery	  that	  was	  linked	  to	  their	  feelings	  of	  SG	  and	  choose	  the	  most	  appropriate	  imagery	  to	  work	  on	  during	  the	  sessions.	  Therapists	  coded	  the	  imagery	  and	  rated	  distortion	  level	  with	  the	  participant.	  Therapists	  then	  guided	  participants	  to	  identify	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  and	  recorded	  it	  on	  five	  copies	  of	  VAS-­‐EB.	  The	  MIS	  and	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  were	  administered	  to	  participants.	  The	  imagery	  exploration	  session	  was	  introduced	  with	  standardised	  instructions	  from	  the	  project	  manual	  (page	  9).	  Therapists	  explored	  the	  SG	  imagery	  with	  the	  participant	  as	  described	  in	  Section	  1.7.1.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session,	  participants	  completed	  another	  set	  of	  the	  single-­‐item	  VASs.	  Therapists	  assessed	  participants’	  mental	  and	  emotional	  state,	  and	  participants	  were	  reminded	  of	  ways	  to	  access	  support	  before	  the	  next	  session.	  	  
 Rescripting	  session	  2.8.2The	  second	  session	  was	  scheduled	  one	  week	  after	  the	  exploration	  session.	  Audio	  recording	  of	  the	  session	  was	  started	  and	  participants	  completed	  the	  questionnaires	  (PHQ-­‐9,	  PDS,	  SGM	  and	  MIS)	  and	  single-­‐item	  VASs.	  Therapists	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assisted	  participants	  to	  identify	  suitable	  rescripts	  using	  standardised	  instructions	  and	  optional	  prompts	  from	  the	  project	  manual	  (page	  12).	  Therapists	  rescripted	  the	  SG	  imagery	  with	  the	  participant	  as	  described	  in	  Section	  1.7.2.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session,	  participants	  completed	  another	  set	  of	  the	  single-­‐item	  VASs.	  Therapists	  assessed	  participants’	  mental	  and	  emotional	  state,	  and	  participants	  were	  reminded	  of	  ways	  to	  access	  support	  before	  the	  next	  session.	  	  	  
 Follow-­‐up	  2.8.3The	  follow-­‐up	  was	  scheduled	  one	  week	  after	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  Participants	  completed	  the	  questionnaires	  (PHQ-­‐9,	  PDS,	  SGM	  and	  MIS)	  and	  single-­‐item	  VASs.	  Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  the	  Client	  Feedback	  Form	  –	  this	  concluded	  the	  participant’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  study.	  Therapists	  placed	  all	  study	  materials	  in	  a	  folder.	  The	  data	  was	  collected	  and	  entered	  by	  the	  Principal	  Investigator.	  The	  study	  materials	  were	  filed	  in	  locked	  filing	  cabinets	  at	  Springfield	  traumatic	  stress	  service.	  Consent	  forms	  and	  results	  opt-­‐in	  forms	  were	  stored	  separately	  from	  the	  data.	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3 Results	  
 Demographic	  and	  clinical	  information	  3.1 The	  demographic	  and	  clinical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  sample	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  1.	  Due	  to	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  and	  the	  personal	  nature	  of	  the	  information,	  some	  demographic	  details	  were	  modified	  to	  prevent	  identification	  of	  individual	  participants.	  The	  sample	  consisted	  of	  64.3%	  men	  (n=9)	  and	  the	  average	  age	  of	  participants	  was	  49	  years	  (M=48.50,	  SD=7.04,	  range=36-­‐59).	  The	  sample	  was	  ethnically	  diverse:	  only	  35.7%	  of	  the	  sample	  (n=5)	  were	  of	  White	  British	  origin.	  Participants	  had	  experienced	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  traumatic	  events	  that	  occurred	  in	  different	  contexts.	  Eleven	  participants	  (78.6%)	  had	  experienced	  interpersonal	  violence	  during	  the	  trauma	  that	  their	  SG	  related	  to.	  Twelve	  participants	  (85.7%)	  had	  experienced	  repeated	  and	  multiple	  traumas.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  traumatic	  events	  listed	  in	  Table	  1,	  participants	  had	  experienced	  child	  abuse,	  sexual	  and	  physical	  assaults,	  witnessing	  and/or	  perpetrating	  atrocities,	  suicide	  by	  a	  friend	  or	  family	  member,	  traumatic	  bereavement,	  forced	  migration,	  imprisonment	  and	  torture.	  The	  time	  since	  traumatic	  events	  varied	  extensively	  between	  participants:	  the	  average	  time	  since	  the	  last	  traumatic	  event	  was	  21	  years	  (M=21.25,	  SD=10.22,	  range=5-­‐35).	  	  All	  participants	  except	  Participant	  13	  were	  currently	  undergoing	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  treatment.	  Participants	  had	  completed	  between	  20-­‐100	  sessions	  (M=49.00,	  SD=25.68)	  of	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  therapy	  prior	  to	  participation	  in	  the	  study.	  Five	  participants	  (35.7%)	  had	  worked	  on	  SG	  as	  part	  of	  their	  treatment:	  three	  participants	  had	  spent	  one	  session	  working	  on	  SG,	  Participant	  11	  had	  spent	  four	  sessions	  working	  on	  SG,	  and	  Participant	  4	  had	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spent	  five	  sessions	  working	  on	  SG.	  Nine	  participants	  (64.3%)	  had	  experience	  of	  IR.	  These	  nine	  participants	  had	  received	  4	  sessions	  of	  IR	  on	  average	  (M=3.67,	  SD=2.00,	  range=1-­‐8).	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 Analysis	  of	  imagery	  and	  session	  variables	  3.2 Participant	  13	  dropped	  out	  after	  the	  exploration	  session	  because	  he	  found	  it	  too	  distressing.	  Participant	  13	  was	  included	  in	  analysis	  of	  original	  imagery,	  SG	  type	  and	  exploration	  session	  data	  (n=14),	  but	  was	  excluded	  from	  analysis	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  and	  rescripting	  session	  data	  (n=13).	  	  
 Survivor	  guilt	  types,	  and	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery	  3.2.1Original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery	  were	  analysed	  using	  visual	  inspection	  of	  frequencies	  and	  patterns.	  	  Seven	  participants	  (50%)	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  SG,	  three	  of	  these	  participants	  also	  experienced	  secondary	  content	  SG.	  Seven	  participants	  (50%)	  experienced	  primary	  content	  SG,	  and	  two	  of	  these	  participants	  also	  experienced	  secondary	  existential	  SG.	  Summaries	  of	  the	  participants’	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery,	  encapsulated	  beliefs	  and	  SG	  type	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  2.	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Last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  Trauma	  memory	  Trauma	  memory	  /	  last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  Constructed	  imagery	  Combination:	  constructed	  imagery	  /	  trauma	  memory	  
Participants	  who	  experienced	  primary	  content	  SG	  most	  commonly	  reported	  imagery	  that	  included	  the	  last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  and	  last	  opportunity	  to	  intervene/prevent	  death.	  Participants	  who	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  SG	  most	  commonly	  reported	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  trauma	  memory,	  constructed	  imagery,	  or	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  two.	  The	  frequency	  of	  different	  types	  of	  original	  imagery	  reported	  by	  participants	  who	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  or	  content	  SG	  type	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  4.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  4.	  Frequency	  of	  original	  imagery	  categories	  for	  participants	  who	  experienced	  primary	  content	  (n=7)	  or	  existential	  (n=7)	  survivor	  guilt	  (SG).	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The	  differences	  in	  the	  original	  imagery	  reported	  by	  participants	  that	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  or	  content	  SG	  was	  not	  analysed	  using	  inferential	  statistics.	  Roscoe	  and	  Byars	  (1971)	  suggested	  that	  analysis	  using	  chi-­‐square	  test	  requires	  average	  expected	  cell	  frequencies	  to	  be	  two	  or	  more.	  The	  average	  expected	  cell	  frequencies	  for	  analysis	  of	  original	  imagery	  across	  participants	  who	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  or	  content	  SG	  was	  1.4.	  The	  most	  common	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  afterlife	  imagery:	  five	  participants	  (38.5%)	  imagined	  the	  deceased	  in	  the	  afterlife;	  two	  participants	  (15.4%)	  prevented	  death;	  two	  participants	  (15.4%)	  chose	  rescripted	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  positive	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased	  when	  they	  were	  alive,	  and	  three	  participants	  (23.1%)	  modified	  SG	  imagery	  by	  repairing	  distressing	  aspects	  of	  the	  imagery	  and	  moving	  the	  scene	  forward.	  The	  rescripted	  imagery	  of	  one	  participant	  (7.7%)	  could	  not	  be	  coded.	  Participant	  12	  tried	  to	  leave	  the	  SG	  imagery	  but	  could	  not	  find	  an	  exit	  and	  was	  unable	  to	  complete	  the	  rescripting	  process.	  The	  rescripted	  imagery	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  differ	  between	  participants	  who	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  or	  content	  SG.	  Therapists	  rated	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  selected	  by	  the	  client	  or	  the	  therapist.	  The	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  mostly	  selected	  by	  the	  client	  or	  collaboratively	  selected:	  seven	  therapists	  (53.9%)	  rated	  that	  the	  rescript	  was	  mostly	  chosen	  by	  the	  client	  (i.e.,	  70-­‐90%	  chosen	  by	  client)	  and	  five	  therapists	  (38.5%)	  rated	  that	  the	  rescript	  was	  equally	  chosen	  by	  the	  therapist	  and	  client	  (i.e.,	  50-­‐60%	  chosen	  by	  therapist	  or	  client).	  One	  therapist	  (7.7%)	  rated	  that	  the	  rescript	  was	  mostly	  chosen	  by	  the	  therapist	  (80%	  chosen	  by	  therapist).	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 Timing	  and	  length	  of	  sessions	  3.2.2The	  timing	  between	  and	  length	  of	  sessions	  were	  analysed	  using	  independent	  t-­‐tests.	  Sessions	  were	  scheduled	  one	  week	  apart	  with	  an	  expected	  completion	  time	  of	  15	  days.	  Cancellations	  and	  failed	  attendance	  resulted	  in	  extensive	  variations	  in	  completion	  times	  across	  participants.	  The	  average	  length	  of	  time	  to	  complete	  the	  study	  was	  26	  days	  (M=26.38,	  SD=18.15,	  range=7-­‐70).	  The	  length	  of	  time	  between	  sessions	  was	  similar:	  the	  average	  length	  of	  time	  between	  exploration	  and	  rescripting	  sessions	  was	  11	  days	  (M=11.23,	  SD=9.83,	  range=3-­‐42)	  and	  15	  days	  (M=15.15,	  SD=11.99,	  range=4-­‐38)	  between	  rescripting	  session	  and	  follow-­‐up	  sessions.	  This	  difference	  in	  time	  lags	  between	  sessions	  was	  not	  significant,	  t(12)=-­‐1.15,	  p=.27.	  The	  exploration	  session	  was	  longer	  than	  the	  rescripting	  session:	  the	  average	  exploration	  session	  was	  47	  minutes	  (M=47.69,	  SD=8.99,	  range=32-­‐66)	  and	  the	  average	  rescripting	  session	  was	  37	  minutes	  (M=37.15,	  SD=11.78,	  range=20-­‐55).	  This	  difference	  was	  significant,	  t(12)=-­‐1.15,	  p=.01.	  	  
 Analysis	  of	  changes	  3.3 Statistical	  transformation	  was	  used	  to	  estimate	  missing	  data.	  7.14%	  of	  the	  data	  was	  missing.	  Three	  participants	  did	  not	  complete	  one	  of	  the	  items	  on	  the	  PDS	  and	  two	  participants	  did	  not	  complete	  one	  of	  the	  items	  on	  the	  PHQ-­‐9.	  Mean	  substitution	  was	  used	  to	  estimate	  these	  missing	  data	  points.	  Participant	  4	  was	  missing	  data	  ratings	  of	  VAS-­‐SG	  and	  VAS-­‐ID	  pre-­‐exploration	  session.	  These	  data	  points	  were	  estimated	  using	  regression	  analysis.	  Pre-­‐exploration	  PDS	  items	  that	  correlated	  with	  the	  missing	  VASs	  were	  used	  to	  compute	  a	  variable	  that	  could	  be	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used	  to	  estimate	  the	  missing	  values.	  The	  alpha	  of	  the	  computed	  PDS	  variable	  was	  .79.	  Regression	  equations	  that	  estimated	  missing	  VAS	  scores	  were	  created	  using	  the	  new	  PDS	  variable.	  The	  follow	  equations	  were	  used:	  VAS-­‐SG	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  =	  36.143	  +	  (4.608	  *	  12)	  =	  91.44;	  VAS-­‐ID	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  =	  23.927	  +	  (5.439	  *	  12)	  =	  89.20.	  The	  obtained	  values	  were	  similar	  to	  the	  population	  means	  (VAS-­‐SG:	  M=89.85,	  VAS-­‐ID:	  M=87.31).	  Analysis	  of	  changes	  during	  and	  following	  exploration	  and	  rescripting	  sessions	  was	  carried	  out	  using	  repeated-­‐measures	  tests.	  Participant	  13	  who	  dropped	  out	  after	  the	  exploration	  session	  was	  excluded	  from	  all	  analysis	  of	  change	  (n=13).	  	  
 Weekly	  symptom	  measures	  3.3.1The	  data	  was	  checked	  for	  normality	  using	  visual	  inspection	  of	  distributions	  and	  statistical	  analysis.	  PDS,	  PHQ-­‐9,	  MIS	  and	  SGM	  data	  met	  assumptions	  of	  parametric	  tests	  across	  time	  points.	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  weekly	  PTSD,	  survivor	  guilt,	  mental	  imagery	  and	  depression	  scores	  across	  the	  three	  time	  points	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  3.	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A	  two-­‐way	  repeated	  measures	  analysis	  of	  variance	  (ANOVA)	  test	  was	  performed	  to	  compare	  PDS	  re-­‐experiencing,	  avoidance,	  and	  hyperarousal	  subscales	  scores	  across	  time	  points	  (pre-­‐exploration	  session,	  pre-­‐rescripting	  session	  and	  one-­‐week	  follow	  up).	  The	  interaction	  between	  time	  points	  and	  PBD	  sub-­‐scales	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(4,48)=2.09,	  p=.10	  and	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  time	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(2,24)=.56,	  p=.58.	  	  Three	  one-­‐way	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  tests	  were	  performed	  to	  compare	  weekly	  mental	  imagery,	  SG	  and	  depression	  scores	  across	  the	  three	  time	  points.	  MIS	  total	  scores	  violated	  the	  sphericity	  assumption	  and	  Huynh-­‐Feldt	  correction	  was	  used	  to	  analyse	  the	  MIS.	  None	  of	  the	  comparisons	  were	  significant:	  PHQ-­‐9	  totals	  scores,	  F(1,12)=.56,	  p=.58,	  MIS	  total	  scores,	  F(1,12)=.17,	  
p=.78,	  or	  SGM	  total	  scores,	  F(1,12)=.89,	  p=.40,.	  These	  results	  show	  that	  there	  was	  no	  change	  in	  PTSD	  re-­‐experiencing,	  hyperarousal	  and	  avoidance	  symptoms;	  depression	  symptoms;	  mental	  imagery	  (frequency	  and	  distress);	  and	  SG	  (frequency	  and	  distress)	  after	  the	  exploration	  or	  rescripting	  session.	  These	  finding	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  participants	  would	  experience	  improvements	  in	  SG	  and	  mental	  imagery	  after	  the	  rescripting	  session	  (H2),	  or	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  participants	  would	  experience	  improvements	  in	  PTSD	  and	  depression	  symptoms	  (H3).	  	  
 Survivor	  guilt	  processes	  3.3.2The	  data	  was	  checked	  for	  normality.	  Pre-­‐exploration	  session	  VAS	  ratings	  were	  negatively	  skewed	  and	  did	  not	  meet	  parametric	  assumptions.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  a	  ceiling	  effect	  in	  ratings	  before	  the	  intervention.	  Several	  transformations	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were	  attempted	  to	  normalise	  the	  distributions	  including	  negative	  skew	  transformations,	  and	  positive	  skew	  transformations	  using	  reflected	  scores.	  These	  transformations	  failed	  to	  normalise	  the	  distribution.	  Changes	  in	  VAS	  ratings	  across	  the	  five	  time	  points	  were	  analysed	  using	  repeated	  measures	  ANOVA	  and	  non-­‐parametric	  equivalent	  tests	  (Friedman’s	  two-­‐way	  analysis	  of	  variance	  by	  ranks).	  Parametric	  and	  non-­‐parametric	  analysis	  showed	  the	  same	  result.	  The	  analysis	  showed	  significant	  changes	  in	  VAS	  ratings	  across	  time	  points:	  SG	  feelings:	  F(4,9)=6.57,	  p=002,	  encapsulated	  belief:	  F(4,9)=7.47,	  p=003,	  and	  imagery	  distress:	  F(4,9)=5.50,	  p=001.	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  VAS	  ratings	  across	  time	  points	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5	  (VAS-­‐EB),	  Figure	  6	  (VAS-­‐SG),	  and	  Figure	  7	  (VAS-­‐ID).	  Shaded	  areas	  indicate	  the	  changes	  that	  occurred	  during	  sessions.	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Figure	  5.	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  encapsulated	  belief	  ratings	  across	  time	  points	  (n=13).	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Figure	  6.	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  ratings	  across	  time	  points	  (n=13).	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VAS-­‐SG:	  t(12)=1.40,	  p=.19;	  VAS-­‐ID:	  t(12)=.00,	  p=1.00;	  and	  VAS-­‐EB:	  t(12)=.93,	  
p=.37;	  and	  post-­‐rescripting	  session	  to	  follow-­‐up:	  VAS-­‐SG:	  t(12)=-­‐.08,	  p=.94;	  VAS-­‐ID:	  t(12)=.57,	  p=.58;	  and	  VAS-­‐EB:	  t(12)=-­‐.39,	  p=.71.	  However,	  changes	  in	  ratings	  of	  how	  much	  participants	  believed	  their	  encapsulated	  belief	  during	  the	  exploration	  session	  approached	  significance	  (p=.06).	  	  These	  results	  show	  that	  participants	  experienced	  significant	  reductions	  in	  intensity	  of	  SG,	  imagery	  distress,	  and	  belief	  strength	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  but	  not	  during	  the	  exploration	  session.	  The	  changes	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  were	  maintained	  at	  one-­‐week	  follow	  up.	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  (H1).	  	  
 Analysis	  of	  responders	  versus	  non-­‐responders	  3.4 Variables	  that	  may	  influence	  IR	  treatment	  response	  were	  explored	  by	  categorising	  participants	  into	  responder	  and	  non-­‐responder	  groups	  using	  calculations	  of	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes.	  Participant	  13	  who	  dropped	  out	  after	  the	  exploration	  session	  was	  excluded	  from	  all	  analysis	  concerning	  treatment	  response	  (n=13).	  The	  primary	  outcome	  measure	  (VAS-­‐SG)	  was	  used	  to	  identify	  participants	  who	  experienced	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  criterion	  described	  by	  Veale,	  Page,	  Woodward	  and	  Salkovski	  (2015)	  was	  used	  to	  calculate	  clinically	  significant	  change:	  a	  reduction	  of	  at	  least	  two	  standard	  deviations	  from	  pre-­‐exploration	  to	  post-­‐rescripting	  session	  or	  follow-­‐up	  was	  defined	  as	  clinically	  significant	  change.	  Both	  post-­‐rescripting	  scores	  and	  follow-­‐up	  scores	  were	  used	  to	  include	  one	  participant	  that	  had	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shifted	  moderately	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session	  but	  showed	  a	  substantial	  delayed	  effect	  at	  follow-­‐up.	  The	  VAS-­‐SG	  scores	  of	  five	  participants	  decreased	  by	  39	  points	  or	  more	  and	  met	  the	  criterion	  for	  clinically	  significant	  change.	  	  Statistically	  significant	  change	  was	  calculated	  using	  the	  Reliable	  Change	  Index	  (RCI)	  developed	  by	  Jacobson	  and	  Truax	  (1991).	  The	  following	  formula	  was	  used	  to	  calculate	  RCI:	  (M1-­‐M2)	  /	  SEdiff.	  Post-­‐rescripting	  session	  scores	  were	  deducted	  from	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  scores	  and	  divided	  by	  the	  standard	  error	  of	  difference.	  The	  standard	  error	  of	  difference	  was	  calculated	  using	  the	  sample	  size	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  and	  post-­‐rescripting	  session	  VAS-­‐SG	  ratings	  (SEdiff=10.47).	  Jacobson	  and	  Truax	  (1991)	  suggested	  that	  RCI	  scores	  above	  1.96	  can	  be	  considered	  statistically	  reliable.	  The	  same	  five	  participants	  that	  met	  criterion	  for	  clinically	  significant	  change	  also	  met	  criterion	  for	  statistically	  reliable	  change.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  calculations,	  Participants	  4,	  5,	  6,	  8	  and	  9	  were	  categorised	  as	  responders.	  The	  remaining	  eight	  participants	  were	  categorised	  as	  non-­‐responders.	  A	  scatterplot	  of	  participants’	  pre-­‐treatment	  and	  post-­‐treatment	  SG	  scores	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  8.	  Pre-­‐treatment	  scores	  are	  the	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  VAS-­‐SG	  ratings,	  and	  post-­‐treatment	  scores	  are	  an	  average	  of	  post-­‐rescripting	  session	  and	  follow-­‐up	  VAS-­‐SG	  ratings.	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 Baseline	  scores	  and	  imagery	  variables	  3.4.1The	  type	  of	  SG	  appeared	  to	  distinguish	  participants	  that	  showed	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  from	  participants	  that	  did	  not:	  responders	  most	  commonly	  experienced	  primary	  existential	  SG,	  and	  non-­‐responders	  most	  commonly	  experienced	  primary	  content	  SG.	  The	  analysis	  of	  SG	  types	  by	  groups	  met	  the	  Roscoe	  and	  Byars	  (1971)	  criterion	  (average	  expected	  cell	  frequencies=3.25)	  and	  a	  chi-­‐square	  test	  was	  performed.	  The	  difference	  in	  frequency	  of	  primary	  existential	  and	  content	  SG	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  was	  non-­‐significant	  (Fisher’s	  exact	  test	  p=.10).	  The	  presence	  of	  secondary	  SG	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  differ	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  The	  frequencies	  of	  primary	  existential	  and	  content	  SG	  types	  experienced	  by	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  9.	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Existential	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  Content	  survivor	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Figure	  9.	  Frequency	  of	  primary	  existential	  and	  content	  survivor	  guilt	  types	  experienced	  by	  responders	  (n=5)	  and	  non-­‐responders	  (n=8).	  	  	   Differences	  in	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  scores	  between	  	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  were	  analysed	  using	  Mann-­‐Whitney	  u	  tests.	  The	  only	  difference	  between	  groups	  that	  reached	  statistical	  significance	  was	  VAS	  ratings	  of	  the	  encapsulated	  belief:	  responders	  had	  higher	  ratings	  of	  belief	  strength	  than	  non-­‐responders,	  p=.045.	  Differences	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  in	  PDS,	  PHQ-­‐9,	  MIS,	  SGM,	  VAS-­‐ID,	  and	  VAS-­‐SG	  scores	  were	  non-­‐significant,	  p=.17-­‐.83.	  Means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  scores	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Table	  4.	  	   	  
n=1	   n=4	   n=2	  n=6	  
Responders	   Non-­‐responders	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Analysis	  of	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  Roscoe	  and	  Byars	  (1971)	  criterion	  (average	  expected	  cell	  frequencies=1.3).	  Analysis	  of	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery	  across	  responder	  and	  non-­‐responder	  groups	  was	  carried	  out	  using	  visual	  inspection	  of	  patterns.	  There	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  difference	  in	  original	  imagery	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  that	  was	  not	  better	  accounted	  for	  by	  other	  variables.	  However,	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  appeared	  to	  differ	  on	  rescripted	  imagery.	  Most	  responders	  chose	  afterlife	  rescripted	  imagery,	  whereas	  non-­‐responders	  chose	  a	  range	  of	  rescripted	  imagery.	  The	  frequency	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  categories	  chosen	  by	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  10.	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Figure	  10.	  Frequency	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  categories	  chosen	  by	  responders	  (n=5)	  and	  non-­‐responders	  (n=8).	  	  	  	   The	  four	  participants	  who	  chose	  rescripted	  imagery	  that	  involved	  preventing	  death	  or	  repairing	  the	  imagery	  and	  moving	  the	  scene	  forward	  showed	  modest	  shifts	  (8-­‐25	  points).	  The	  two	  participants	  who	  chose	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased	  when	  they	  were	  alive	  had	  the	  worst	  outcomes:	  one	  participant	  increased	  by	  20	  point	  on	  VAS-­‐SG	  and	  one	  participant	  did	  not	  shift	  at	  all.	  	  
n=1	   n=1	  
n=1	  
n=2	  n=2	  
n=1	   n=4	  
Responders	   Non-­‐responders	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 Changes	  in	  weekly	  survivor	  guilt	  and	  mental	  imagery	  3.4.2Changes	  from	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  to	  follow	  up	  on	  weekly	  measures	  of	  SG	  (SGM)	  and	  mental	  imagery	  (SGM)	  were	  compared	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  Neither	  responders	  or	  non-­‐responders	  showed	  any	  changes	  in	  weekly	  SG	  scores	  (responders:	  M=.20,	  SD=3.49;	  non-­‐responders:	  M=-­‐.25,	  SD=.46).	  Responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  showed	  different	  patterns	  of	  change	  on	  the	  measure	  of	  mental	  imagery:	  on	  average,	  responders	  reduced	  13.60	  points	  (SD=15.73)	  and	  non-­‐responders	  increased	  6.88	  points	  (SD=33.59).	  However,	  the	  difference	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  in	  change	  scores	  of	  weekly	  mental	  imagery	  did	  not	  reach	  statistical	  significance,	  p=.17.	  	  
 Rescripting	  process	  variables	  3.4.3Coded	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  were	  compared	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  Participant	  3	  was	  not	  able	  to	  complete	  the	  rescripting	  process	  and	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  analysis.	  Two	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  consent	  to	  audio	  recording	  and	  were	  rated	  jointly	  by	  the	  therapist	  and	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  were	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Analysis	  of	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  Roscoe	  and	  Byars	  (1971)	  criterion	  (average	  expected	  cell	  frequencies=1.63)	  and	  the	  data	  was	  analysed	  descriptively,	  using	  visual	  inspection	  of	  patterns.	  Figure	  11	  shows	  rescripting	  process	  codes	  across	  participants,	  ordered	  by	  level	  of	  treatment	  response.	  Ratings	  are	  indicated	  using	  numerical	  codes	  and	  a	  shaded	  scale:	  darker	  shades	  indicate	  higher	  ratings,	  and	  lighter	  shades	  indicate	  lower	  ratings.	  	  Aaaaaaaaaa;lejl/kefjalefakjrfhlrjfhelkD.JHawdkljahDLKajsdlakjsdhlajksdhaslkd	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Several	  variables	  from	  the	  coding	  framework	  appeared	  to	  distinguish	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  Participants	  that	  showed	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  had	  lower	  imagery	  activation	  ratings:	  4	  of	  5	  responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  moderately	  vivid	  imagery,	  and	  5	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  very	  vivid	  imagery.	  Less	  intense	  original	  internal	  processes	  also	  appeared	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes:	  4	  of	  5	  responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  minimal-­‐low	  or	  low-­‐moderate	  activation,	  and	  4	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders	  had	  high	  or	  very	  high	  activation.	  Clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  appeared	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  therapist	  guidance:	  3	  of	  5	  responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  mostly	  guided	  by	  the	  therapist,	  and	  6	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  mostly	  or	  moderately	  self-­‐guided.	  The	  timing	  of	  change	  also	  appeared	  to	  differ	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders:	  4	  of	  5	  responders	  introduced	  change	  during	  the	  original	  imagery,	  whereas	  non-­‐responders	  mostly	  introduced	  change	  immediately	  after	  the	  original	  imagery	  (3	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders)	  or	  at	  a	  time	  that	  was	  not	  temporally	  connected	  to	  the	  original	  imagery	  (2	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders).	  Clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  appeared	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  higher	  activation	  of	  new	  internal	  processes:	  4	  of	  5	  responders	  had	  ratings	  of	  high	  or	  very	  high	  activation,	  and	  4	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders	  had	  ratings	  of	  minimal	  or	  low-­‐moderate	  activation.	  Responders	  also	  appeared	  to	  experience	  their	  rescripted	  imagery	  as	  more	  believable:	  4	  of	  5	  responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  completely	  believable,	  4	  of	  7	  non-­‐responders	  had	  a	  rating	  of	  completely	  believable.	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There	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  any	  association	  between	  responding	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  stay	  with	  the	  imagery,	  or	  the	  amount	  of	  departure	  from	  the	  original	  imagery.	  Both	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  were	  able	  to	  stay	  moderately	  (n=4,	  33.3%)	  or	  completely	  with	  the	  imagery	  (n=8,	  66.7%),	  and	  had	  mostly	  new	  imagery	  (n=9,	  75.0%)	  or	  all	  new	  imagery	  (n=3,	  25.0%).	  The	  development	  of	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  also	  appeared	  similar	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  Ten	  of	  twelve	  participants	  (83.3%)	  were	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  moderately	  or	  mostly	  coherent	  narrative.	  	  
 Subjective	  feedback	  3.5 Participants	  rated	  the	  overall	  therapy	  as	  moderately	  helpful	  (M=56.15,	  SD=24.59).	  The	  rescripting	  session	  was	  rated	  as	  slightly	  more	  helpful	  (M=55.00,	  SD=26.06)	  than	  the	  exploration	  session	  (M=50.38,	  SD=30.85)	  but	  the	  difference	  was	  not	  significant	  when	  compared	  using	  independent	  t-­‐test	  (t(13)=-­‐.88,	  p=.40).	  Several	  participants	  mentioned	  in	  the	  free	  text	  section	  of	  the	  feedback	  form	  that	  the	  sessions	  were	  helpful	  and	  stated	  that	  the	  sessions	  had	  changed	  their	  thinking	  or	  reasoning	  about	  the	  imagery.	  For	  example,	  one	  participant	  wrote	  that	  the	  sessions	  helped	  him	  “think	  more	  about	  it	  and	  question	  it”,	  and	  one	  participant	  reported	  that	  the	  session	  had	  helped	  him	  “face	  it	  and	  deal	  with	  it”.	  Two	  participants	  reported	  that	  the	  sessions	  had	  given	  them	  a	  different	  perspective	  and	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  event.	  One	  participant	  reported	  that	  he	  no	  longer	  believed	  that	  the	  deceased	  blamed	  him	  for	  the	  event	  but	  that	  he	  knew	  “inside	  that	  I	  am	  guilty”.	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Two	  participants	  mentioned	  that	  the	  sessions	  were	  difficult.	  One	  of	  these	  participants	  wrote	  that	  the	  sessions	  had	  involved	  “too	  many	  reminders	  of	  the	  event”	  and	  another	  suggested	  that	  it	  might	  get	  easier	  if	  she	  “did	  it	  more	  times”.	  One	  participant	  reported	  that	  the	  sessions	  had	  reduced	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  imagery	  but	  not	  the	  intensity.	  Another	  participant	  reported	  that	  “some	  of	  the	  weight	  dropped	  from	  talking	  about	  it”	  and	  that	  “finally	  changing	  the	  imagery	  to	  how	  it	  should	  have	  been”	  had	  made	  her	  feel	  better.	  One	  participant	  noted	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  techniques	  used	  for	  managing	  other	  symptoms	  such	  as	  nightmares.	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4 Discussion	  	  The	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  evaluate	  IR	  as	  a	  psychological	  treatment	  technique	  for	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  Steps	  were	  taken	  to	  disentangle	  IR	  from	  other	  effective	  PTSD	  treatment	  techniques	  to	  explore	  its	  value	  as	  a	  separate	  experiential,	  imagery-­‐based	  tool.	  A	  secondary	  aim	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  explore	  variables	  that	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  successful	  application	  of	  IR.	  This	  section	  summarises	  the	  findings	  and	  clarifies	  how	  the	  study	  results	  fit	  within	  existing	  literature.	  Potential	  theoretical	  and	  clinical	  implications	  of	  findings	  will	  be	  considered.	  Key	  strengths	  and	  limitations	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  suggested	  directions	  for	  future	  research	  are	  also	  provided.	  	  
 Interpretation	  of	  results	  4.1
 Treatment	  outcomes	  4.1.1
Single-­‐item	  process	  measures.	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  ratings	  of	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG	  feelings,	  and	  distress	  from	  SG	  imagery,	  reduced	  significantly	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  Participants	  did	  not	  show	  any	  significant	  changes	  during	  the	  exploration	  session,	  although	  reductions	  in	  ratings	  of	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  approached	  significance.	  VAS	  ratings	  did	  not	  change	  significantly	  between	  the	  two	  sessions,	  or	  during	  the	  week	  following	  rescripting.	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  participants	  experienced	  improvements	  in	  SG	  that	  were	  attributable	  to	  modification	  of	  imagery	  but	  not	  elaboration	  of	  imagery,	  and	  that	  these	  effects	  were	  maintained	  the	  subsequent	  week.	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These	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypotheses	  that	  the	  intervention	  would	  lead	  to	  significant	  improvements	  on	  VASs	  that	  measured	  cognitive,	  emotional	  and	  perceptual	  SG	  processes,	  and	  that	  these	  effects	  would	  take	  place	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  (H1).	  There	  is	  no	  comparative	  research	  in	  the	  SG	  literature	  but	  the	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  previous	  findings	  that	  IR	  is	  an	  effective	  technique	  for	  treatment	  of	  guilt	  and	  shame	  after	  trauma	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Arntz	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Most	  previous	  studies	  of	  IR	  have	  combined	  IR	  with	  other	  techniques	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2007)	  or	  delivered	  it	  as	  a	  component	  of	  broader	  treatment	  packages	  (Ehlers	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  It	  was	  not	  possible	  in	  these	  studies	  to	  determine	  the	  specific	  impact	  of	  IR.	  The	  present	  study	  showed	  that	  one	  session	  of	  independently	  delivered	  IR	  can	  lead	  to	  significant	  improvements.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  IR	  component	  of	  interventions	  used	  in	  previous	  studies	  may	  have	  been	  an	  important	  contributor	  to	  the	  observed	  effects.	  Reductions	  in	  ratings	  of	  belief	  strength	  during	  the	  exploration	  session	  suggest	  that	  elaboration	  of	  imagery	  may	  change	  its	  meaning.	  The	  observed	  trend	  contrasts	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  imagery	  exploration	  would	  not	  lead	  to	  substantial	  improvements	  in	  SG.	  However,	  exposure	  to	  trauma-­‐related	  material	  is	  commonly	  used	  to	  treat	  PTSD,	  and	  it	  was	  anticipated	  that	  elaboration	  of	  imagery	  could	  be	  therapeutic	  on	  its	  own.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  imagery	  interview	  exerted	  an	  inadvertent	  cognitive	  effect	  that	  stimulated	  new	  appraisals	  during	  the	  exploration	  session.	  Audio	  transcripts	  of	  sessions	  revealed	  that	  Socratic	  questioning	  used	  to	  identify	  SG	  imagery	  and	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  prompted	  thinking	  about	  whether	  guilt	  was	  warranted.	  Many	  participants	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continued	  to	  consider	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  imagery	  whilst	  exploring	  the	  imagery.	  Even	  though	  therapists	  remained	  neutral	  and	  refrained	  from	  actively	  challenging	  participants’	  appraisals,	  elaboration	  of	  imagery	  details	  seemed	  to	  produce	  a	  spontaneously	  shift	  in	  thinking	  for	  some	  participants.	  For	  example,	  several	  participants	  noted	  that	  their	  guilt	  feelings	  were	  unfounded	  since	  it	  was	  not	  within	  their	  capacity	  to	  prevent	  death.	  The	  combination	  of	  drawing	  participants’	  attention	  to	  the	  personal	  meaning	  of	  imagery	  during	  the	  imagery	  interview,	  and	  discovering	  new	  information	  as	  part	  of	  imagery	  exploration,	  may	  explain	  reductions	  in	  belief	  ratings	  after	  the	  exploration	  session.	  When	  considering	  potential	  beneficial	  effects	  of	  the	  exploration	  session,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  elaboration	  of	  imagery	  was	  an	  intensely	  distressing	  experience	  for	  participants.	  Participant	  12	  dropped	  out	  of	  the	  study	  because	  the	  exploration	  session	  was	  emotionally	  overwhelming	  and	  exacerbated	  his	  intrusive	  symptoms.	  Ratings	  of	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  provided	  by	  Participant	  12	  increased	  by	  80%	  during	  the	  exploration	  session.	  The	  observed	  trend	  reduction	  during	  the	  explorations	  session	  would	  disappear	  if	  Participant	  12	  was	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  (t(13)=.05,	  p=.96),	  and	  it	  can	  therefore	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  reliable	  effect.	  The	  experience	  of	  Participant	  12	  suggests	  that	  elaboration	  of	  imagery	  is	  not	  well	  tolerated	  by	  some	  clients	  and	  may	  even	  lead	  to	  deterioration.	  This	  interpretation	  is	  aligned	  with	  previous	  findings	  that	  IE	  can	  lead	  to	  increased	  distress	  for	  clients	  with	  PTSD	  who	  experience	  strong	  guilt	  or	  shame	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2003),	  and	  that	  ET	  for	  PTSD	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  drop-­‐outs	  (Arntz	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Previous	  research	  also	  indicates	  that	  IR	  is	  preferred	  by	  clinicians	  because	  they	  felt	  less	  helpless	  than	  during	  IE	  (Arntz	  et	  al.,	  2007).	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Weekly	  mental	  imagery	  and	  survivor	  guilt.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  (H2)	  and	  results	  from	  analysis	  of	  single-­‐item	  VASs,	  participants	  did	  not	  show	  any	  significant	  changes	  on	  weekly	  measures	  of	  SG	  and	  imagery	  distress.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  the	  intervention	  failed	  to	  decrease	  SG	  and	  imagery	  distress.	  These	  findings	  differ	  from	  previous	  PTSD	  research,	  which	  showed	  that	  brief	  IR	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  produce	  large	  changes	  that	  are	  demonstrable	  by	  both	  process	  and	  outcome	  measures	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  There	  are	  several	  potential	  explanations	  for	  these	  findings.	  One	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  intervention	  failed	  to	  produce	  general	  positive	  effects	  on	  SG	  and	  imagery	  distress	  that	  would	  be	  indicated	  by	  reductions	  in	  scores	  on	  weekly	  measures.	  Inspection	  of	  means	  suggests	  that	  MIS	  and	  SGM	  scores	  did	  not	  change	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  intervention:	  average	  MIS	  and	  SGM	  scores	  at	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  and	  at	  follow	  up	  were	  almost	  identical.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  participants	  experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  SGM	  and	  MIS	  scores	  from	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  to	  pre-­‐rescripting	  session.	  Although	  not	  significantly	  different,	  average	  scores	  at	  follow-­‐up	  signify	  some	  improvement	  from	  the	  previous	  week.	  It	  is	  widely	  known	  that	  treatment	  response	  to	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  treatment	  is	  not	  linear,	  and	  that	  clients	  often	  experience	  temporary	  increases	  in	  symptoms	  at	  the	  start	  of	  treatment	  before	  therapeutic	  gains	  become	  evident.	  This	  trajectory	  of	  PTSD	  symptoms	  poses	  a	  challenge	  for	  accurately	  evaluating	  outcomes	  after	  two	  sessions.	  Previous	  IR	  studies	  that	  have	  used	  longer	  follow	  up	  periods	  suggest	  that	  clients	  continue	  to	  improve	  in	  the	  weeks	  after	  IR	  even	  if	  no	  further	  sessions	  are	  offered	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  It	  is	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possible	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  present	  study	  continued	  to	  improve	  on	  weekly	  measures,	  but	  the	  study	  design	  prevented	  evaluation	  of	  longer-­‐term	  changes.	  Another	  potential	  explanation	  for	  these	  findings	  is	  that	  changes	  were	  not	  detected	  because	  the	  measures	  had	  poor	  sensitivity,	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  or	  construct	  validity.	  The	  MIS	  and	  SGM	  were	  developed	  specifically	  for	  the	  study	  and	  their	  full	  psychometric	  properties	  were	  not	  evaluated.	  The	  MIS	  and	  SGM	  showed	  good	  internal	  consistency	  but	  the	  measures	  consisted	  of	  only	  two	  items	  each.	  Measures	  with	  few	  items	  may	  contain	  poorer	  construct	  representation	  and	  multi-­‐item	  questionnaires	  are	  considered	  more	  reliable	  (Eisinga,	  Te	  Grotenhuis,	  &	  Pelzer,	  2012).	  The	  SGM	  was	  created	  from	  a	  validated	  PTSD	  measure	  with	  good	  psychometric	  properties	  but	  the	  items	  used	  may	  not	  be	  reliable	  or	  valid	  on	  their	  own.	  The	  SGM	  may	  also	  have	  poor	  sensitivity	  to	  detect	  weekly	  changes	  during	  treatment.	  Specifically,	  the	  range	  of	  the	  response	  scale	  of	  SGM	  items	  may	  have	  been	  too	  small	  to	  detect	  changes.	  A	  one-­‐point	  change	  on	  the	  five-­‐point	  scale	  would	  represent	  a	  considerable	  shift	  in	  the	  frequency	  or	  intensity	  of	  SG	  that	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  achieve	  in	  two	  sessions.	  The	  scale	  used	  for	  MIS	  items	  (range=0-­‐100)	  may	  have	  enabled	  detection	  of	  subtle	  changes	  during	  treatment.	  The	  MIS	  appeared	  to	  differentiate	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  during	  exploratory	  analysis	  of	  variables	  associated	  with	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes.	  Responders	  reduced	  by	  14	  points	  on	  average	  whereas	  non-­‐responders	  increased	  by	  7	  points	  on	  average.	  Inferential	  statistics	  failed	  to	  detect	  significance	  but	  the	  lack	  of	  effect	  could	  have	  been	  due	  to	  low	  power.	  The	  different	  patterns	  of	  change	  shown	  by	  responders	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and	  non-­‐responders	  may	  suggest	  that	  the	  MIS	  is	  sufficiently	  sensitive	  to	  detect	  improvements	  associated	  with	  IR	  treatment	  response.	  However,	  the	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  and	  construct	  validity	  of	  the	  MIS	  are	  unknown.	  	  
Post-­‐traumatic	  stress	  and	  depression	  symptoms.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  (H3),	  the	  results	  showed	  that	  the	  intervention	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  significant	  changes	  on	  measures	  of	  PTSD	  or	  depression	  symptoms.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  potential	  effects	  of	  the	  intervention	  remained	  specific	  to	  SG	  and	  did	  not	  generalise	  to	  other	  symptoms.	  These	  findings	  are	  contrary	  to	  previous	  IR	  research,	  which	  showed	  large	  effects	  on	  general	  symptom	  measures	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  Arntz	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  However,	  the	  intervention	  in	  the	  present	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  target	  a	  particular	  sub-­‐component	  of	  participants’	  PTSD	  presentation	  and	  was	  designed	  as	  an	  add-­‐on	  rather	  than	  a	  replacement	  for	  standard	  treatment.	  The	  sample	  used	  in	  the	  present	  study	  consisted	  predominantly	  of	  multiply	  traumatised	  individuals	  who	  experienced	  a	  range	  of	  difficulties.	  These	  difficulties	  related	  to	  various	  traumatic	  events,	  only	  one	  of	  which	  was	  the	  event	  giving	  rise	  to	  SG.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  two	  session	  intervention	  targeted	  specifically	  at	  SG	  failed	  to	  reduce	  other	  PTSD	  symptoms	  and	  depression	  for	  these	  clients.	  The	  psychometric	  properties	  of	  the	  PHQ-­‐9	  and	  PDS	  are	  also	  important	  considerations	  for	  interpreting	  the	  findings	  associated	  with	  these	  measures.	  Adaptations	  that	  were	  made	  to	  the	  measurement	  period	  of	  the	  scales	  to	  fit	  the	  design	  of	  the	  study	  may	  have	  reduced	  their	  reliability	  and	  sensitivity.	  The	  time	  frames	  of	  both	  PHQ-­‐9	  and	  PDS	  were	  changed	  to	  one	  week	  to	  assess	  changes	  that	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occurred	  between	  sessions.	  The	  PDS	  was	  also	  administered	  as	  a	  general	  PTSD	  symptom	  measure,	  rather	  than	  measuring	  symptoms	  relating	  to	  a	  specific	  event.	  Measurement	  of	  overall	  PTSD	  symptoms	  may	  have	  reduced	  the	  construct	  validity	  of	  the	  PDS,	  limiting	  its	  ability	  to	  capture	  changes	  following	  the	  research	  intervention.	  The	  design	  and	  methods	  used	  were	  based	  on	  a	  previous	  study	  that	  investigated	  IR	  as	  a	  technique	  for	  treatment	  of	  social	  anxiety	  (Wild	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  The	  outcomes	  in	  the	  present	  study	  are	  more	  modest	  than	  the	  large	  effects	  demonstrated	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  Methodological	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  studies	  may	  explain	  these	  differences.	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  used	  compassionate	  imagery	  following	  the	  protocol	  by	  Arntz	  and	  Weertman	  (1999)	  to	  rescript	  distressing	  imagery	  and	  relevant	  childhood	  memories.	  The	  intervention	  in	  the	  present	  study	  was	  tailored	  to	  address	  SG	  specifically	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  used.	  Also	  contrary	  to	  the	  present	  study,	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  combine	  IR	  with	  cognitive	  restructuring.	  Restructuring	  of	  the	  verbal	  narrative	  of	  imagery,	  and	  modification	  of	  childhood	  memories,	  may	  have	  enhanced	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  their	  intervention.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  SG	  is	  less	  responsive	  to	  IR	  and	  that	  clients	  with	  SG	  require	  a	  longer	  intervention	  to	  experience	  major	  improvements.	  This	  idea	  is	  supported	  by	  clinical	  observations	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  complex	  emotional	  reaction	  that	  can	  be	  resistant	  to	  change	  (Niederland,	  1981).	  	  
Subjective	  feedback.	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  both	  rescripting	  and	  elaboration	  sessions	  were	  rated	  as	  moderately	  helpful.	  Several	  participants	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wrote	  on	  the	  feedback	  form	  that	  the	  sessions	  were	  helpful	  and	  that	  the	  intervention	  enabled	  them	  to	  access	  a	  new	  perspective.	  	  
 Survivor	  guilt	  types	  and	  imagery	  4.1.2The	  results	  showed	  that	  the	  sample	  consisted	  of	  an	  even	  mix	  of	  participants	  with	  primary	  content	  SG	  and	  primary	  existential	  SG.	  SG	  was	  identified	  by	  asking	  clients	  if	  they	  experienced	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  or	  shame	  about	  surviving	  when	  others	  did	  not.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  self-­‐conscious	  distress	  which	  relates	  to	  peri-­‐traumatic	  actions	  experience	  distress	  and	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  survival	  are	  both	  identified	  as	  SG.	  These	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  previous	  suggestions	  that	  SG	  may	  present	  in	  existential	  or	  content	  forms	  (Matsakis,	  1999).	  Five	  participants	  were	  also	  coded	  as	  having	  secondary	  SG	  after	  observation	  that	  a	  number	  of	  participants	  appeared	  to	  describe	  both	  experiences.	  Co-­‐occurrence	  of	  content	  and	  existential	  SG	  types	  has	  not	  been	  demonstrated	  previously.	  Previous	  researchers	  have	  predominantly	  described	  individuals	  as	  having	  one	  or	  the	  other	  (Carmelly,	  1975;	  Jaffe,	  1970;	  Neiderland,	  1981).	  Coding	  of	  original	  imagery	  showed	  that	  participants	  experienced	  a	  variety	  of	  imagery	  associated	  with	  SG	  including	  trauma	  memories,	  constructed	  imagery,	  and	  imagery	  of	  the	  last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  (and	  last	  opportunity	  to	  intervene/prevent	  death).	  The	  type	  of	  original	  imagery	  appeared	  to	  differ	  by	  primary	  SG	  type.	  All	  but	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  who	  experienced	  content	  SG	  reported	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  memory	  of	  their	  last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  and	  last	  opportunity	  to	  intervene/prevent	  death.	  This	  observation	  suggests	  that	  SG	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that	  is	  underpinned	  by	  regrets	  about	  actions,	  is	  linked	  to	  distressing	  imagery	  of	  the	  memory	  that	  these	  regrets	  relate	  to.	  Participants	  who	  experienced	  existential	  SG	  most	  commonly	  reported	  imagery	  that	  included	  a	  trauma	  memory	  and/or	  constructed	  imagery.	  This	  observation	  suggests	  that	  SG	  that	  is	  underpinned	  by	  existential	  questions	  about	  life	  and	  death,	  is	  linked	  to	  seeing	  or	  imagining	  other	  people’s	  suffering	  and	  the	  distress	  that	  such	  imagery	  would	  elicit.	  Differences	  between	  participants	  with	  primary	  existential	  and	  content	  SG	  types	  were	  not	  tested	  using	  inferential	  statistics	  and	  interpretations	  should	  be	  considered	  with	  caution	  until	  further	  research	  on	  SG	  imagery	  is	  conducted.	  The	  rescripting	  protocol	  used	  in	  the	  present	  study	  was	  flexible	  and	  led	  by	  what	  participants	  felt	  needed	  to	  change	  to	  reduce	  distress	  associated	  with	  the	  imagery.	  Coding	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  showed	  that	  participants	  chose	  to	  modify	  distressing	  imagery	  in	  various	  ways	  including	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  in	  the	  afterlife,	  preventing	  death,	  recalling	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased	  during	  a	  happy	  period,	  and	  repairing	  distressing	  aspects	  of	  the	  imagery	  and	  moving	  the	  scene	  forward.	  There	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  relationship	  between	  primary	  SG	  type	  and	  rescripted	  imagery.	  	  
 Clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  4.1.3The	  finding	  that	  several	  participants	  showed	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  after	  only	  two	  therapy	  sessions	  supports	  the	  argument	  that	  mental	  imagery	  can	  be	  a	  powerful	  therapeutic	  tool	  (Holmes	  &	  Mathews,	  2005).	  Differences	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders	  were	  explored	  to	  elucidate	  processes	  that	  influence	  IR	  effectiveness.	  Responders	  and	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non-­‐responders	  did	  not	  differ	  in	  severity	  of	  PTSD	  and	  depression	  symptoms,	  SG	  or	  mental	  imagery	  before	  the	  intervention,	  but	  responders	  had	  significantly	  higher	  encapsulated	  belief	  ratings.	  This	  finding	  suggests	  that	  participants	  with	  strong	  negative	  beliefs	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  research	  intervention.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  finding	  is	  not	  known	  but	  may	  be	  explained	  by	  regression	  towards	  the	  mean,	  whereby	  extreme	  scores	  show	  a	  greater	  shift	  due	  to	  central	  tendency	  (Stigler,	  1997).	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  responders	  most	  commonly	  experienced	  existential	  SG,	  whereas	  non-­‐responders	  most	  commonly	  experienced	  content	  SG.	  This	  difference	  failed	  to	  reach	  statistical	  significance	  but	  a	  trend	  (p=.10)	  was	  observed,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  lack	  of	  effect	  may	  have	  been	  due	  to	  low	  power.	  Further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  determine	  if	  IR	  is	  more	  effective	  for	  clients	  who	  experience	  existential	  SG.	  The	  original	  SG	  imagery	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  differ	  between	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  Responders	  most	  commonly	  chose	  afterlife	  imagery	  whereas	  non-­‐responders	  chose	  a	  range	  of	  rescripted	  imagery.	  Due	  to	  the	  small	  sample	  size,	  this	  difference	  was	  not	  evaluated	  using	  inferential	  statistics.	  Further	  research	  is	  needed	  to	  determine	  if	  IR	  is	  more	  effective	  for	  treating	  SG	  when	  clients	  choose	  to	  modify	  imagery	  by	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  being	  happy	  or	  at	  peace	  in	  the	  afterlife.	  Several	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  were	  highlighted	  as	  factors	  that	  may	  predict	  effective	  IR.	  Differences	  between	  participants	  who	  experienced	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not,	  were	  not	  compared	  using	  inferential	  statistics	  and	  interpretations	  regarding	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  are	  highly	  tentative.	  Responders	  more	  commonly	  had	  lower	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ratings	  of	  imagery	  vividness	  and	  original	  internal	  processes.	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  clients	  who	  experiences=d	  very	  vivid	  imagery,	  and	  are	  very	  emotionally	  engaged	  with	  the	  imagery,	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  experience	  improvements.	  Imagery	  that	  is	  overly	  vivid	  and	  emotionally	  charged	  may	  limit	  clients’	  ability	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  imagery	  and/or	  the	  rescripting	  process,	  for	  example,	  by	  increasing	  the	  risk	  of	  dissociation.	  Responders	  more	  commonly	  had	  higher	  ratings	  of	  new	  internal	  processes	  and	  believability	  of	  rescripted	  imagery.	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  IR	  is	  more	  effective	  when	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  is	  compelling	  and	  enables	  clients	  to	  engage	  emotionally	  with	  the	  changes.	  Responders’	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  more	  commonly	  rated	  as	  mostly	  guided	  by	  therapists,	  as	  opposed	  to	  moderately	  or	  mostly	  self-­‐guided.	  This	  observation	  suggests	  that	  IR	  is	  enhanced	  when	  therapists	  stay	  actively	  involved	  with	  the	  rescripting	  process,	  perhaps	  by	  bringing	  the	  client’s	  attention	  to	  details	  that	  may	  otherwise	  be	  missed	  or	  by	  assisting	  the	  client	  to	  move	  the	  imagery	  forward	  at	  stuck	  points.	  Alternatively,	  active	  involvement	  of	  therapists	  may	  provide	  a	  grounding	  effect	  that	  enables	  clients	  to	  stay	  engaged	  with	  the	  rescripting	  process.	  Responders	  also	  more	  commonly	  implemented	  changes	  during	  the	  original	  imagery.	  This	  observation	  suggests	  that	  direct	  modification	  to	  the	  imagery	  sequence	  is	  more	  helpful	  than	  building	  on	  the	  story	  of	  the	  imagery,	  or	  visualising	  temporally	  unrelated	  positive	  imagery.	  This	  interpretation	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  suggestions	  that	  PTSD	  treatment	  can	  be	  enhanced	  by	  timing	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  updates	  at	  hot	  points	  in	  the	  memory	  (Grey,	  Young,	  &	  Holmes,	  2002).	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All	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  stay	  moderately	  or	  completely	  with	  the	  imagery,	  and	  had	  mostly	  or	  all	  new	  imagery.	  Staying	  with	  the	  imagery	  for	  the	  most	  part	  of	  the	  rescripting	  process,	  and	  introducing	  a	  high	  amount	  of	  new	  information,	  may	  be	  requisite	  variables	  for	  effective	  IR	  but	  the	  relative	  level	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  differentiate	  the	  size	  of	  the	  effect.	  Development	  of	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  appeared	  to	  be	  equally	  common	  across	  responder	  and	  non-­‐responder	  groups.	  This	  observation	  indicates	  that	  development	  of	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  IR	  effectiveness.	  However,	  rescripting	  narrative	  may	  indirectly	  influence	  IR	  effectiveness	  by	  affecting	  other	  important	  variables	  (e.g.,	  ability	  to	  stay	  with	  imagery).	  Potential	  co-­‐variation	  and	  cross-­‐influences	  of	  rescripting	  processes	  were	  not	  investigated.	  	  
 Summary	  of	  findings	  4.1.4These	  results	  suggest	  that	  IR	  is	  an	  effective	  technique	  for	  treating	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  Simply	  elaborating	  distressing	  imagery	  does	  not	  reliably	  improve	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG,	  or	  distress	  from	  SG	  imagery.	  Delivery	  of	  a	  single	  IR	  session	  is	  not	  sufficient	  to	  treat	  SG	  after	  trauma	  for	  most	  clients,	  although	  some	  clients	  can	  show	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes.	  SG	  improvements	  from	  IR	  do	  not	  generalise	  to	  PTSD	  or	  depression	  symptoms.	  Clients	  who	  experience	  existential	  SG,	  and	  clients	  who	  chose	  afterlife	  rescripted	  imagery,	  may	  be	  most	  likely	  to	  benefit	  from	  IR.	  IR	  effects	  may	  be	  enhanced	  when:	  therapists	  provides	  a	  high	  level	  of	  guidance;	  modifications	  are	  made	  directly	  to	  the	  imagery	  sequence;	  the	  imagery	  is	  active	  but	  not	  overly	  vivid	  or	  emotionally	  charged;	  and	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  is	  compelling	  and	  evokes	  a	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high	  level	  of	  new	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and	  sensations.	  Extensive	  modifications	  to	  the	  original	  imagery,	  and	  staying	  with	  the	  imagery	  for	  the	  most	  part	  of	  the	  rescripting	  process,	  may	  be	  necessary	  but	  not	  sufficient	  for	  effective	  IR.	  	  
 Theoretical	  contributions	  4.2 SG	  is	  a	  clinical	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  currently	  poorly	  understood.	  The	  processes	  that	  underpin	  IR	  are	  also	  unknown.	  The	  present	  study	  did	  not	  set	  out	  to	  test	  a	  particular	  theoretical	  framework	  but	  it	  makes	  several	  theoretical	  contributions	  to	  SG	  and	  IR	  	  theory.	  	  
 Conceptualisation	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  4.2.1Some	  of	  the	  collected	  data	  provide	  information	  that	  advances	  our	  phenomenological	  understanding	  of	  SG.	  Theoretical	  implications	  of	  findings	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  are	  speculative,	  and	  further	  research	  is	  needed	  before	  any	  firm	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  SG	  experienced	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  present	  study	  could	  be	  reliably	  classified	  into	  primary	  content	  and	  existential	  sub-­‐types.	  This	  observation	  may	  indicate	  that	  SG	  is	  not	  a	  unitary	  phenomenon	  but	  comprises	  two	  distinct	  types	  as	  suggested	  by	  previous	  researchers	  (Carmelly,	  1975;	  Jaffe,	  1970;	  Matsakis,	  1999).	  Secondary	  SG	  was	  evident	  for	  several	  participants.	  Audio	  transcripts	  of	  sessions	  suggested	  that	  primary	  and	  secondary	  SG	  types	  were	  interrelated.	  Participants	  with	  primary	  existential,	  and	  secondary	  content	  SG,	  transitioned	  from	  thinking	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  survival	  and	  if	  they	  deserved	  to	  live,	  to	  reflecting	  on	  their	  
	   125	  
conduct	  during	  trauma,	  and	  how	  they	  may	  have	  prevented	  death.	  Conversely,	  participants	  with	  primary	  content	  SG	  and	  secondary	  existential	  SG	  initially	  expressed	  regret	  about	  their	  actions,	  and	  then	  begun	  to	  question	  the	  impact	  of	  self-­‐perceived	  transgressions	  on	  the	  meaning	  of	  survival	  and	  their	  worthiness	  of	  survival.	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  existential	  and	  content	  SG	  may	  be	  dimensions	  of	  the	  same	  construct	  that	  partially	  overlap.	  The	  present	  study	  found	  that	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG,	  and	  distress	  from	  SG	  imagery,	  improved	  following	  the	  intervention.	  These	  shifts	  occurred	  independently	  from	  other	  symptoms	  which	  did	  not	  change.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  separate	  post-­‐traumatic	  problem	  rather	  than	  an	  epiphenomenon	  of	  PTSD	  or	  depression.	  This	  interpretation	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  observation	  that	  participants	  experienced	  marked	  SG	  despite	  having	  undergone	  a	  large	  number	  of	  trauma-­‐focused	  sessions	  prior	  to	  the	  study.	  The	  imagery	  associated	  with	  SG	  give	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  underpin	  SG.	  Participants	  who	  experienced	  content	  SG	  most	  commonly	  experienced	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  last	  contact	  with	  the	  deceased	  and	  last	  opportunity	  to	  intervene/prevent	  death.	  This	  observation	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  formulation	  that	  content	  SG	  is	  driven	  by	  rumination	  regarding	  peri-­‐traumatic	  actions	  and	  construction	  of	  counterfactual	  scenarios	  of	  the	  final	  moments	  with	  the	  deceased.	  This	  formulation	  of	  content	  SG	  fits	  with	  the	  cognitive	  conceptualisation	  of	  trauma-­‐related	  guilt	  (Kubany	  &	  Manke,	  1995).	  Participants	  who	  experienced	  existential	  SG	  most	  commonly	  reported	  imagery	  that	  was	  a	  trauma	  memory	  and/or	  constructed	  imagery.	  A	  commonality	  between	  these	  participants	  was	  that	  SG	  imagery	  depicted	  other	  people	  in	  physical	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and/or	  emotional	  distress.	  This	  observation	  suggests	  that	  existential	  SG	  is	  linked	  to	  seeing	  or	  imagining	  other	  people’s	  suffering	  and	  may	  be	  best	  conceptualised	  as	  empathic	  distress	  (Baumeister	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  The	  modifications	  that	  participants	  made	  to	  their	  imagery	  also	  give	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  underpin	  SG.	  Participants	  who	  experienced	  content	  SG	  chose	  to	  modify	  their	  distressing	  imagery	  in	  various	  ways.	  Two	  participants	  who	  chose	  to	  recall	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased	  in	  a	  happy	  moment	  showed	  the	  worst	  response.	  One	  of	  these	  participants	  experienced	  increased	  SG	  after	  the	  intervention.	  Imagining	  positive	  experiences	  that	  the	  deceased	  ‘missed	  out	  on’	  may	  have	  exacerbated	  distress	  by	  promoting	  unhelpful	  counterfactual	  thinking	  and	  rumination.	  Participants	  who	  experienced	  existential	  SG	  most	  commonly	  chose	  to	  modify	  their	  distressing	  imagery	  by	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  in	  the	  afterlife.	  Afterlife	  imagery	  was	  also	  commonly	  chosen	  by	  participants	  that	  showed	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes.	  The	  present	  study	  was	  not	  able	  to	  evaluate	  how	  afterlife	  imagery	  improved	  SG.	  Afterlife	  imagery	  involved	  bringing	  closure	  to	  distressing	  aspects	  of	  the	  imagery	  (e.g.,	  suffering	  during	  death)	  by	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  being	  happy	  or	  at	  peace.	  Changing	  the	  emotional	  valence	  of	  imagery	  and	  moving	  on	  from	  imagery	  are	  key	  aims	  of	  IR	  used	  to	  treat	  complicated	  grief	  (Fidaleo	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  Boelen	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  suggested	  that	  creation	  of	  new	  imagery	  can	  help	  clients	  grasp	  the	  reality	  of	  loss	  and	  experience	  the	  associated	  pain,	  enabling	  them	  to	  adjust	  to	  a	  new	  reality	  and	  move	  on	  with	  life.	  The	  observed	  success	  of	  afterlife	  imagery	  in	  reducing	  SG	  may	  suggests	  that	  existential	  SG	  more	  closely	  resembles	  a	  grief	  reaction	  than	  a	  type	  of	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trauma-­‐related	  guilt.	  The	  idea	  that	  SG	  constitutes	  a	  grief	  reaction	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	  other	  researchers	  (Niederland,	  1968;	  Fry	  1997;	  Vamos,	  1997).	  	  	  
 Imagery	  rescripting	  theory	  4.2.2There	  are	  several	  possible	  explanations	  for	  how	  IR	  improved	  SG	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  A	  key	  focus	  of	  debate	  concerning	  IR	  is	  whether	  it	  works	  through	  processes	  of	  habituation	  and	  extinction,	  or	  through	  changes	  to	  the	  semantic	  meaning	  of	  the	  imagery	  (Long	  &	  Quevillon,	  2009).	  The	  Fear	  Network	  Theory	  suggests	  that	  repeated	  exposure	  to	  distressing	  trauma-­‐related	  material	  (such	  as	  participants’	  imagery)	  creates	  new	  associations	  in	  the	  fear	  network,	  which	  leads	  to	  reduced	  distress	  (Foa	  &	  Kozak,	  1986).	  Both	  exploration	  and	  rescripting	  sessions	  involved	  exposure	  to	  imagery	  but	  only	  the	  rescripting	  session	  led	  to	  significant	  improvements.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  exposure	  to	  the	  distressing	  imagery,	  and	  habituation	  and	  extinction	  processes,	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  observed	  effects.	  The	  observed	  effects	  are	  better	  explained	  by	  cognitive	  theories.	  Significant	  reductions	  in	  ratings	  of	  the	  encapsulated	  belief	  indicate	  that	  a	  cognitive	  shift	  occurred.	  Subjective	  feedback	  from	  participants	  also	  indicated	  that	  the	  research	  intervention	  changed	  their	  thinking	  about	  the	  imagery.	  Ratings	  of	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  SG	  components,	  and	  distress	  from	  SG	  imagery,	  changed	  in	  similar	  patterns	  across	  the	  five	  time	  points.	  The	  interaction	  between	  these	  variables	  and	  the	  order	  in	  which	  they	  changed	  was	  not	  explored.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  imagery	  modification	  changed	  the	  meaning	  that	  was	  attributed	  to	  the	  imagery,	  and	  consequently	  improved	  how	  participants	  felt.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  modification	  of	  sensory-­‐based	  imagery	  stimulated	  basic	  emotional	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systems	  (Holmes	  &	  Mathews,	  2010)	  and	  directly	  impacted	  SG	  feelings.	  Kindt	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  found	  that	  perceptual	  processing	  precedes	  conceptual	  processing.	  These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  manipulation	  of	  imagery	  facilitated	  perceptual	  processing	  of	  the	  material,	  which	  was	  followed	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  meaning	  that	  was	  attributed	  to	  the	  imagery.	  Changes	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  imagery	  may	  have	  occurred	  through	  several	  mechanisms.	  Ehlers	  and	  Clark’s	  (2000)	  model	  suggests	  that	  changing	  how	  the	  imagery	  played	  out	  in	  participants’	  minds	  reduced	  the	  threat	  associated	  with	  the	  imagery	  and	  thereby	  lessened	  avoidance,	  allowing	  new	  information	  to	  be	  incorporated.	  The	  model	  proposed	  by	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  suggests	  that	  modification	  of	  imagery	  stimulated	  alternative	  adaptive	  schemas	  that	  lead	  to	  more	  helpful	  ways	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  imagery.	  Kubany	  and	  Manke’s	  (1995)	  model	  suggests	  that	  imagery	  manipulation	  reduced	  hindsight	  bias	  and	  enabled	  participants	  to	  gain	  a	  more	  accurate	  appraisal	  of	  their	  role	  (Kubany	  &	  Manke,	  1995).	  The	  Retrieval	  Competition	  Hypothesis	  (Brewin,	  2006)	  suggests	  that	  IR	  established	  an	  alternative	  memory	  representation	  that	  reduced	  distress	  by	  limiting	  access	  to	  the	  original	  imagery.	  The	  results	  are	  not	  able	  to	  indicate	  which	  account	  best	  explains	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  SG	  was	  reduced	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  	  
 Clinical	  implications	  4.3 The	  findings	  from	  the	  present	  study	  have	  important	  clinical	  implications	  for	  assessment	  and	  treatment	  of	  SG,	  and	  for	  the	  clinical	  application	  of	  IR.	  Some	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recommendations	  are	  based	  on	  observations	  and	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  caution	  until	  they	  are	  substantiated	  by	  empirical	  investigations.	  	  
 Assessment	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  4.3.1The	  study	  did	  not	  explore	  the	  prevalence	  of	  SG	  directly.	  However,	  the	  recruitment	  phase	  indicated	  that	  over	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  clients	  who	  were	  approached	  reported	  SG,	  indicating	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  common	  clinical	  phenomenon	  after	  surviving	  a	  fatal	  trauma.	  Several	  therapists	  commented	  that	  their	  clients	  had	  not	  mentioned	  SG	  spontaneously	  prior	  to	  the	  study	  but	  that	  participation	  had	  revealed	  that	  SG,	  and	  the	  associated	  imagery,	  was	  a	  major	  source	  of	  distress.	  SGM	  scores	  pre-­‐exploration	  session	  revealed	  that	  participants	  experienced	  a	  high	  level	  of	  SG	  distress:	  SG	  was	  most	  commonly	  rated	  as	  ‘Severe	  intensity’	  and	  as	  present	  ‘Much	  of	  the	  time	  -­‐	  50-­‐60%’	  the	  week	  before	  taking	  part	  in	  the	  study.	  The	  observation	  that	  clients	  do	  not	  raise	  SG	  spontaneously,	  despite	  causing	  substantial	  distress,	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  routine	  clinical	  screening	  for	  SG.	   A	  consideration	  during	  the	  planning	  phase	  of	  the	  study	  was	  if	  distressing	  mental	  imagery	  would	  be	  a	  consistent	  feature	  of	  SG	  presentation.	  All	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  identify	  relevant	  imagery	  to	  work	  on	  during	  the	  intervention,	  and	  their	  ratings	  of	  imagery	  distress	  were	  commensurate	  with	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG.	  Audio	  transcripts	  of	  sessions	  revealed	  that	  SG	  imagery	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  elicit	  intense	  emotions.	  These	  observations	  indicate	  that	  mental	  imagery	  is	  closely	  connected	  to	  SG	  thoughts	  and	  feelings,	  and	  may	  be	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a	  key	  source	  of	  SG	  distress.	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  clinicians	  explore	  the	  presence	  of	  distressing	  mental	  imagery	  as	  part	  of	  SG	  assessment.	  	  
 Treatment	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  4.3.2The	  results	  of	  the	  present	  study	  suggest	  that	  IR	  is	  an	  effective	  therapeutic	  technique	  to	  address	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  All	  participants	  were	  undergoing	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  treatment	  when	  they	  completed	  the	  IR	  session,	  but	  only	  some	  participants’	  standard	  treatment	  involved	  use	  of	  IR	  technique.	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  IR	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  adjunct	  component	  to	  address	  SG	  specifically	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  the	  main	  therapeutic	  technique	  used	  in	  the	  treatment.	  The	  observation	  that	  several	  participants	  experienced	  constructed	  imagery	  suggests	  that	  exposure-­‐based	  techniques	  are	  not	  appropriate	  to	  address	  some	  SG	  presentations.	  Furthermore,	  one	  of	  the	  fourteen	  participants	  dropped	  out	  after	  the	  exploration	  session,	  suggesting	  that	  purely	  exposure-­‐based	  techniques	  are	  poorly	  tolerated	  by	  a	  sub-­‐set	  of	  clients	  who	  experience	  SG.	  The	  study	  revealed	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  distressing	  experience	  and	  only	  a	  proportion	  of	  clients	  experience	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  after	  one	  session	  of	  experiential,	  imagery-­‐based	  restructuring.	  This	  finding	  suggests	  that	  SG	  is	  a	  complex	  emotional	  reaction	  and	  that	  some	  clients	  require	  longer	  direct	  intervention	  and/or	  use	  of	  different	  intervention	  techniques.	  Four	  of	  five	  participants	  who	  showed	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  experienced	  existential	  SG,	  indicating	  that	  clinicians	  should	  particularly	  consider	  use	  of	  IR	  for	  clients	  who	  experience	  existential	  SG.	  Six	  of	  seven	  participants	  who	  experienced	  content	  SG	  did	  not	  show	  clinically	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significance	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes,	  indicating	  that	  clinicians	  should	  consider	  other	  techniques	  that	  could	  address	  content	  SG.	  The	  formulation	  provided	  in	  4.2.1	  suggests	  that	  traditional	  verbal	  cognitive	  therapy	  techniques,	  that	  seek	  to	  address	  errors	  of	  foreseeability	  and	  preventability	  and	  hindsight	  bias	  (Kubany	  &	  Manke,	  1995),	  may	  be	  effective	  techniques	  for	  treatment	  of	  content	  SG.	  Propositions	  regarding	  the	  most	  appropriate	  and	  effective	  techniques	  to	  address	  content	  and	  existential	  SG	  require	  empirical	  testing.	  Four	  of	  five	  participants	  who	  showed	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistically	  reliable	  changes	  chose	  to	  modify	  their	  imagery	  by	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  in	  the	  afterlife.	  Imagery	  that	  was	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  deceased	  during	  a	  happy	  moment	  appeared	  least	  effective.	  Participants	  who	  modified	  imagery	  by	  repairing	  distressing	  aspects	  and	  moving	  the	  scene	  forward,	  or	  who	  chose	  to	  prevent	  death,	  showed	  moderate	  shifts.	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  clinicians	  should	  consider	  the	  use	  of	  afterlife	  imagery	  when	  treating	  SG	  with	  IR,	  but	  avoid	  imagery	  consisting	  solely	  of	  memories	  of	  the	  deceased	  when	  they	  were	  alive.	  These	  recommendations	  are	  based	  on	  observational	  analysis	  of	  patterns	  involving	  a	  small	  number	  of	  participants	  and	  further	  empirical	  research	  is	  needed.	  	  
 Clinical	  use	  of	  imagery	  rescripting	  4.3.3The	  present	  study	  demonstrated	  that	  IR	  can	  produce	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  changes	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  verbal	  cognitive	  restructuring.	  This	  is	  contrary	  to	  previous	  research,	  which	  suggested	  that	  development	  of	  a	  convincing	  argument	  against	  the	  associated	  belief	  is	  an	  important	  component	  of	  effective	  IR	  (Wild	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  This	  study	  adds	  to	  the	  evidence	  base	  for	  use	  of	  IR	  that	  is	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experiential	  and	  imagery-­‐based	  to	  work	  towards	  cognitive	  treatment	  goals.	  This	  finding	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  clinicians	  that	  may	  wish	  to	  consider	  using	  imagery-­‐based	  restructuring	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  verbal	  cognitive	  techniques	  for	  clients	  who	  struggle	  to	  engage	  with	  traditional	  techniques,	  or	  who	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  such	  techniques.	  Exploratory	  analysis	  of	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  provides	  some	  guidance	  for	  clinical	  application	  of	  IR.	  The	  observations	  that	  low	  levels	  of	  imagery	  vividness	  and	  activation	  of	  original	  internal	  processes	  appeared	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  more	  positive	  responses,	  suggest	  that	  clinicians	  should	  attempt	  to	  keep	  imagery	  at	  a	  level	  that	  is	  manageable	  for	  clients.	  The	  observations	  that	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  therapist	  guidance,	  and	  modifications	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  original	  imagery,	  appeared	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  more	  positive	  responses,	  suggest	  that	  clinicians	  should	  stay	  actively	  involved	  throughout	  the	  rescripting	  process	  and	  aim	  to	  intervene	  at	  the	  worst	  point	  of	  the	  imagery.	  Observations	  also	  indicated	  that	  participants	  appeared	  to	  show	  more	  positive	  responses	  if	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  felt	  believable,	  and	  evoked	  a	  high	  level	  of	  new	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and	  sensations.	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  clinicians	  should	  devote	  efforts	  to	  identifying	  a	  rescript	  that	  resonates	  emotionally	  with	  the	  client,	  and	  support	  the	  client	  in	  making	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  vivid.	  Audio	  transcripts	  and	  ratings	  provided	  by	  therapists	  indicated	  that	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  chosen	  by	  participants	  or	  therapists	  was	  not	  important.	  These	  observations	  suggest	  that	  allowing	  clients	  to	  identify	  the	  rescripted	  imagery	  is	  not	  important	  on	  its	  own,	  but	  it	  could	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  selecting	  a	  rescript	  that	  feels	  compelling	  to	  the	  client.	  In	  other	  words,	  clinicians	  can	  suggest	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options	  for	  changing	  the	  imagery	  but	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  selected	  rescript	  is	  one	  that	  the	  client	  feels	  able	  to	  connect	  with.	  The	  ability	  to	  stay	  with	  imagery,	  level	  of	  imagery	  departure	  or	  coherence	  of	  narrative	  did	  not	  appear	  to	  distinguish	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responders.	  However,	  these	  variables	  may	  be	  preconditions	  for	  effective	  rescripting.	  Until	  further	  research	  is	  conducted,	  clinicians	  should	  aim	  to	  keep	  clients	  engaged	  with	  the	  imagery	  throughout	  the	  session,	  make	  substantial	  modifications	  to	  the	  imagery,	  and	  construct	  a	  narrative	  that	  can	  be	  recalled	  and	  rehearsed	  after	  the	  session.	  	   	  
 Strengths	  of	  the	  study	  4.4 The	  present	  study	  is	  the	  first	  to	  explore	  treatment	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  specifically.	  The	  study	  is	  novel,	  contributing	  to	  two	  important	  areas	  of	  research.	  Efforts	  were	  devoted	  to	  ensuring	  that	  the	  research	  intervention	  closely	  resembled	  IR	  interventions	  that	  clients	  may	  receive	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  A	  high	  degree	  of	  flexibility	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  research	  protocol	  to	  maximise	  ecological	  and	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  results.	  The	  study	  attempts	  to	  address	  several	  issues	  associated	  with	  the	  IR	  literature	  raised	  by	  previous	  researchers	  (Arntz,	  2012).	  	  
 Study	  design	  4.4.1The	  flexible	  procedures	  used	  are	  a	  key	  strength	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  results	  are	  representative	  of	  a	  ‘real	  world’	  view	  of	  IR	  outcomes	  as	  applied	  to	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treatment	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  The	  observed	  effects	  are	  not	  artificially	  high,	  in	  contrast	  to	  some	  clinical	  trials	  that	  use	  restrictive	  research	  environments	  that	  may	  inadvertently	  bias	  recruitment	  towards	  more	  treatment-­‐responsive	  individuals.	  Flexible	  delivery	  of	  the	  research	  intervention	  also	  had	  ethical	  benefits	  of	  minimising	  disruption	  to	  standard	  care	  and	  allowing	  participants’	  needs	  to	  be	  met	  in	  a	  timely	  and	  appropriate	  manner.	  The	  research	  intervention	  was	  embedded	  within	  participants’	  standard	  treatment,	  and	  the	  timing	  was	  allowed	  to	  vary	  depending	  on	  the	  participant’s	  preference	  and	  best	  fit	  in	  the	  context	  of	  overall	  treatment	  targets.	  The	  treating	  clinician	  delivered	  the	  research	  intervention	  in	  the	  participant’s	  usual	  clinical	  setting.	  These	  design	  choices	  enabled	  clients	  who	  were	  anxious	  about	  meeting	  with	  an	  unfamiliar	  researcher	  and/or	  at	  a	  new	  location	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  study.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  participants	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  treatment,	  and	  clients	  with	  a	  representative	  spectrum	  of	  difficulties	  maximised	  the	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  results.	  A	  flexible	  IR	  protocol	  was	  used	  that	  could	  be	  adapted	  to	  meet	  individual	  needs.	  The	  type	  of	  changes	  that	  participants	  could	  make	  to	  their	  distressing	  imagery	  was	  not	  restricted.	  Instead,	  participants	  were	  free	  to	  choose	  the	  content	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  similarly	  to	  how	  IR	  would	  be	  used	  as	  part	  of	  standard	  treatment.	  Flexibility	  in	  the	  IR	  protocol	  allowed	  participants	  to	  identify	  a	  rescript	  that	  fitted	  with	  the	  individuality	  of	  their	  SG	  presentation.	  Seven	  different	  therapists	  delivered	  the	  research	  intervention	  and	  each	  of	  these	  therapists	  employed	  a	  somewhat	  different	  delivery	  style	  of	  the	  treatment	  method.	  Tailored	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use	  of	  IR	  delivered	  by	  several	  different	  therapists	  produce	  high	  face	  validity	  of	  the	  intervention	  and	  maximised	  the	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  results.	  	  
 Sampling	  4.4.2The	  participants	  in	  the	  present	  study	  were	  highly	  heterogeneous,	  including	  men	  and	  women	  of	  different	  ages,	  from	  a	  range	  of	  ethnic	  backgrounds	  and	  with	  experiences	  of	  various	  types	  of	  trauma.	  Most	  participants	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  multiple	  traumatic	  events	  and	  experienced	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  difficulties	  relating	  to	  these	  events.	  All	  participants	  had	  severe	  and	  complex	  presentations	  of	  PTSD.	  The	  diversity	  of	  participants	  across	  important	  domains	  indicates	  that	  the	  sample	  is	  representative	  of	  the	  target	  population	  and	  that	  the	  results	  are	  generalisable	  to	  individuals	  in	  specialist	  PTSD	  services.	  Minimal	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  criteria	  were	  used	  to	  prevent	  potential	  sampling	  bias.	  Clients	  were	  not	  excluded	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  complexity	  or	  engagement.	  Six	  clients	  were	  excluded	  because	  the	  research	  intervention	  did	  not	  fit	  with	  the	  treatment	  plan	  during	  the	  recruitment	  phase.	  Long	  latencies	  between	  sessions	  indicated	  that	  some	  participants	  struggled	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  research	  intervention.	  Audio	  transcripts	  of	  the	  sessions	  indicated	  that	  some	  participants	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  understand	  and	  use	  psychological	  concepts	  and	  techniques.	  The	  flexibility	  of	  the	  study	  protocol	  allowed	  for	  these	  clients	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  research	  intervention	  and	  complete	  participation	  in	  the	  study.	  Additional	  procedural	  constraints	  may	  have	  prevented	  clients	  with	  complex	  needs	  from	  taking	  part,	  creating	  an	  unrepresentative	  sample	  that	  was	  biased	  towards	  clients	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  show	  a	  quick	  response	  to	  treatment.	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 Measurement	  4.4.3Following	  recommendations	  by	  Arntz	  (2012),	  the	  research	  intervention	  was	  evaluated	  using	  both	  process	  and	  outcome	  measures.	  The	  outcome	  measures	  in	  the	  present	  study	  consisted	  of	  two	  measures	  that	  were	  designed	  specifically	  for	  the	  study,	  and	  two	  standardised	  measures	  that	  were	  adapted	  to	  fit	  the	  design	  of	  the	  study.	  In	  lieu	  of	  a	  validated	  measure,	  the	  SGM	  was	  developed	  from	  a	  well-­‐established	  measure	  of	  PTSD.	  The	  two	  items	  on	  the	  MIS	  were	  developed	  based	  on	  a	  precedent	  study:	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  demonstrated	  that	  imagery	  distress	  and	  imagery	  frequency	  VASs	  showed	  good	  test-­‐retest	  ability.	  Both	  the	  MIS	  and	  SGM	  had	  face	  validity	  and	  showed	  internal	  consistency	  from	  preliminary	  psychometric	  analysis.	  The	  process	  items	  closely	  resembled	  the	  items	  used	  by	  Wild	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  who	  demonstrated	  large	  effects	  sizes	  of	  IR	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  individuals	  with	  social	  anxiety.	  	  
 Limitations	  of	  the	  study	  4.5
 Study	  design	  4.5.1The	  interpretations	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  results	  are	  limited	  by	  the	  design	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  study	  did	  not	  vary	  the	  order	  of	  sessions,	  and	  the	  results	  may	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  sequencing	  effects.	  The	  observed	  effects	  could	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  time	  period	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  but	  may	  not	  have	  stemmed	  from	  IR.	  For	  example,	  participants	  may	  have	  experienced	  a	  delayed	  effect	  from	  the	  exploration	  session	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  Non-­‐significant	  improvements	  that	  were	  observed	  during	  the	  week	  between	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sessions	  suggest	  that	  maturation	  effects	  may	  have	  been	  at	  play.	  The	  study	  did	  not	  set	  out	  to	  compare	  IE	  and	  IR,	  but	  aimed	  to	  investigate	  if	  IR	  produced	  effects	  that	  were	  above	  and	  beyond	  imagery	  exposure.	  Based	  on	  a	  precedent	  study	  from	  the	  social	  anxiety	  literature,	  the	  exploration	  session	  was	  used	  to	  establish	  a	  baseline	  effect	  of	  elaborating	  the	  imagery	  since	  the	  therapeutic	  effects	  of	  exposure-­‐based	  treatments	  are	  well	  documented.	  However,	  it	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  observed	  improvements	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  may	  be	  attributable	  to	  a	  combined	  effect	  of	  IR	  and	  maturation	  from	  elaborating	  the	  imagery	  in	  the	  previous	  session.	  IR	  is	  generally	  conducted	  by	  elaborating	  the	  imagery	  before	  implementing	  changes	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  present	  intervention	  would	  be	  less	  effective	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  Randomised	  controlled	  trials	  are	  currently	  underway	  to	  compare	  IE	  and	  IR	  directly	  (Hoffart,	  in	  prep).	  The	  research	  intervention	  was	  delivered	  as	  part	  of	  participants’	  standard	  treatment	  package	  at	  a	  point	  in	  therapy	  that	  suited	  the	  participant’s	  treatment	  plan.	  This	  design	  was	  chosen	  to	  minimise	  disruption	  to	  standard	  treatment	  –	  this	  was	  considered	  especially	  important	  since	  the	  study	  was	  a	  pilot	  investigation	  and	  it	  was	  not	  known	  if	  participants	  would	  benefit	  from	  the	  research	  intervention.	  However,	  these	  design	  choices	  contain	  limitations.	  Firstly,	  participants	  had	  received	  a	  large	  number	  of	  trauma-­‐focused	  therapy	  sessions	  prior	  to	  participation	  in	  the	  study.	  Participants	  may	  have	  been	  better	  able	  to	  utilise	  sessions	  because	  of	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  therapeutic	  relationship	  with	  their	  therapist,	  and	  familiarity	  with	  psychological	  treatment.	  In	  particular,	  the	  extent	  of	  prior	  exposure-­‐based	  PTSD	  treatment	  may	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  whether	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participants	  experienced	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statistical	  changes.	  Participants	  who	  had	  more	  experienced	  of	  exposure-­‐based	  PTSD	  treatment	  may	  have	  been	  more	  able	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  research	  intervention	  and	  experience	  greater	  benefit.	  Furthermore,	  all	  therapists	  were	  clinical	  psychologists	  who	  specialised	  in	  PTSD	  treatment	  and	  had	  extensive	  experience	  using	  trauma-­‐focused	  techniques.	  The	  significant	  improvements	  following	  the	  brief	  research	  intervention	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  therapists’	  expertise	  and	  high	  competence	  in	  delivering	  the	  research	  intervention.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  research	  intervention	  would	  be	  less	  effective	  if	  it	  was	  delivered	  in	  isolation	  and/or	  by	  an	  unfamiliar	  or	  less	  experienced	  therapist.	  In	  clinical	  settings,	  this	  would	  rarely	  be	  done	  since	  it	  would	  not	  constitute	  good	  practice	  to	  proceed	  with	  trauma-­‐focused	  work	  on	  highly	  distressing	  trauma	  memories	  without	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  the	  client’s	  difficulties	  and	  strengths.	  The	  small	  sample	  size	  prevented	  evaluation	  of	  potential	  influences	  of	  the	  content	  of	  participants	  prior	  treatment	  or	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  research	  intervention	  within	  participants’	  standard	  treatment.	  The	  findings	  from	  the	  study	  may	  not	  generalise	  to	  clients	  who	  are	  not	  receiving	  psychological	  treatment	  for	  PTSD.	  Embedding	  the	  research	  intervention	  within	  standard	  treatment	  also	  prevented	  further	  follow-­‐up	  and	  evaluation	  of	  long-­‐term	  effects.	  The	  one	  week	  follow-­‐up	  indicated	  that	  improvements	  in	  VASs	  ratings	  of	  cognitive	  and	  emotional	  components	  of	  SG,	  and	  level	  of	  imagery	  distress,	  were	  maintained	  in	  the	  short	  term	  but	  the	  trajectories	  beyond	  this	  point	  are	  unknown.	  The	  observed	  effects	  may	  have	  diminished	  with	  time	  or	  participants	  may	  have	  continued	  to	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improve	  over	  the	  coming	  months	  as	  shown	  in	  other	  IR	  studies	  (Grunert	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  The	  timing	  between	  sessions	  and	  length	  of	  sessions	  varied	  substantially	  between	  participants.	  These	  variations	  may	  have	  influenced	  the	  study	  results,	  but	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  prevented	  evaluation	  of	  the	  potential	  effect	  of	  time-­‐related	  variables.	  The	  average	  number	  of	  days	  between	  exploration	  and	  rescripting	  sessions	  and	  between	  rescripting	  and	  follow-­‐up	  session	  were	  not	  significantly	  different.	  However,	  the	  exploration	  session	  was	  significantly	  longer	  than	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  participants	  became	  more	  fatigued,	  and	  therefore	  showed	  less	  response	  during	  the	  exploration	  session.	  	  
 Sampling	  4.5.2The	  study	  aimed	  to	  obtain	  a	  sample	  that	  was	  representative	  of	  the	  clinical	  population	  seen	  in	  specialist	  PTSD	  services.	  However,	  funding	  constraints	  may	  have	  created	  sampling	  bias.	  Only	  clients	  who	  were	  able	  to	  complete	  the	  study	  without	  an	  interpreter	  were	  eligible	  to	  take	  part.	  The	  study	  sample	  was	  ethnically	  diverse	  and	  included	  many	  non-­‐native	  English	  speakers.	  However,	  many	  non-­‐native	  English	  speaker	  clients	  seen	  in	  specialist	  PTSD	  services	  prefer	  to	  communicate	  in	  their	  mother	  tongue	  when	  discussing	  highly	  emotive	  material.	  The	  non-­‐native	  English-­‐speaking	  participants	  in	  the	  present	  study	  may	  have	  consisted	  of	  individuals	  who	  experienced	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  distress	  or	  were	  more	  able	  to	  regulate	  their	  emotions	  during	  sessions.	  The	  study	  results	  may	  only	  generalise	  to	  clients	  that	  engage	  in	  trauma-­‐focused	  therapy	  without	  the	  use	  of	  an	  interpreter.	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 Measurement	  4.5.3All	  outcome	  data	  was	  collected	  by	  the	  therapists.	  Therapists	  also	  supported	  participants	  to	  complete	  the	  measures	  when	  required.	  This	  method	  of	  data	  collection	  may	  have	  biased	  participants’	  responses.	  Knowing	  that	  their	  therapist	  could	  see	  questionnaire	  responses	  may	  have	  influenced	  their	  ratings.	  For	  example,	  participants	  may	  have	  felt	  pressured	  to	  indicate	  that	  the	  intervention	  had	  been	  helpful,	  particularly	  since	  the	  therapist	  was	  also	  their	  treating	  clinician.	  The	  risk	  of	  acquiescence	  was	  considered	  prior	  to	  the	  study	  and	  addressed	  by	  withholding	  the	  research	  hypothesis	  that	  only	  the	  rescripting	  session	  would	  lead	  to	  significant	  improvements.	  The	  lack	  of	  significant	  changes	  during	  the	  exploration	  session	  suggests	  that	  the	  observed	  improvements	  during	  the	  rescripting	  session	  represent	  true	  changes.	  Comments	  by	  participants	  during	  sessions,	  and	  on	  the	  feedback	  form,	  indicated	  that	  they	  felt	  able	  to	  express	  their	  honest	  opinions.	  However,	  the	  finding	  that	  participants	  only	  showed	  a	  significant	  change	  on	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  (that	  were	  delivered	  twice	  in	  each	  sessions)	  and	  not	  measures	  (that	  were	  delivered	  weekly)	  may	  suggest	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  inclined	  to	  reduce	  their	  ratings	  when	  they	  were	  able	  to	  recall	  their	  previous	  ratings.	  The	  measures	  used	  in	  the	  present	  study	  contain	  important	  limitations.	  The	  measures	  consisted	  predominantly	  of	  VASs	  that	  were	  designed	  specifically	  for	  the	  study.	  The	  main	  outcome	  measures	  were	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  of	  SG	  processes	  that	  may	  have	  poor	  test-­‐retest	  reliability.	  The	  psychometric	  properties	  of	  weekly	  measures	  of	  SG	  and	  mental	  imagery	  were	  not	  tested	  and	  the	  coding	  of	  SG	  type	  was	  not	  based	  on	  prior	  research.	  Reliability	  analysis	  indicated	  that	  the	  SGM	  and	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MIS	  had	  good	  internal	  consistency,	  and	  that	  coding	  of	  primary	  SG	  type	  was	  identical	  between	  two	  independent	  raters.	  The	  coding	  of	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  decided	  after	  the	  data	  had	  been	  collected	  and	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  single	  rater.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  coding	  of	  original	  and	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  subject	  to	  bias	  and	  may	  not	  be	  replicable.	  Future	  studies	  should	  use	  coding	  that	  is	  theoretically	  grounded	  and	  include	  a	  second	  rater	  to	  assess	  reliability	  of	  imagery	  categories.	  The	  rescripting	  process	  coding	  framework	  was	  an	  abbreviated	  version	  of	  a	  more	  extensive	  coding	  framework	  and	  was	  not	  empirically	  tested.	  However,	  preliminary	  reliability	  analysis	  suggested	  that	  it	  had	  good	  inter-­‐rater	  reliability.	  The	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  were	  also	  coded	  using	  two	  different	  methods.	  	  The	  standard	  procedure	  was	  for	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  to	  rate	  the	  coding	  framework	  using	  audio	  transcripts	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session.	  Two	  participants,	  who	  did	  not	  consent	  to	  audio	  recording,	  were	  coded	  jointly	  by	  the	  therapist	  and	  the	  Principal	  Investigator	  based	  on	  the	  therapist’s	  recollection	  of	  the	  session.	  Therapists	  may	  have	  been	  biased	  and	  cannot	  be	  considered	  equivalent	  to	  ratings	  made	  by	  an	  independent,	  impartial	  rater.	  However,	  coding	  of	  participants	  who	  refused	  audio	  recording	  appeared	  to	  fit	  with	  observed	  patterns	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
 Analysis	  4.5.4The	  study	  was	  a	  pilot	  investigation	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  technique	  for	  treatment	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  and	  an	  appropriate	  step	  at	  this	  stage	  in	  the	  research	  process.	  However,	  the	  research	  intervention	  was	  only	  delivered	  to	  14	  participants	  and	  multiple	  comparisons	  were	  performed	  without	  correction	  procedures.	  This	  may	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have	  increased	  the	  familywise	  error	  rate	  and	  risk	  of	  Type	  1	  error.	  Previous	  researchers	  have	  suggested	  that	  adjustment	  of	  alpha	  is	  a	  problematic	  tool	  for	  protecting	  against	  Type	  I	  error	  because	  it	  reduces	  statistical	  power	  and	  increases	  the	  risk	  of	  Type	  II	  error	  (O’Keefe,	  2003).	  Feise	  (2002)	  suggested	  that	  identification	  of	  a	  primary	  outcome	  is	  an	  alternative	  strategy	  for	  protecting	  against	  Type	  I	  error.	  The	  VAS-­‐SG	  was	  identified	  as	  the	  primary	  outcome	  measures	  and	  analysis	  using	  data	  from	  the	  single-­‐item	  VASs	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypotheses.	  Furthermore,	  hypothesis-­‐driven	  planned	  a	  priori	  contrasts	  that	  specified	  the	  specific	  time	  point	  where	  effects	  would	  be	  detected	  were	  used.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  results	  from	  the	  present	  study	  could	  change	  with	  a	  larger	  sample	  and	  the	  findings	  need	  to	  be	  corroborated	  by	  future	  research.	  The	  finding	  that	  a	  sizeable	  minority	  of	  participants	  showed	  changes	  that	  met	  criteria	  for	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statically	  reliable	  after	  two	  sessions	  is	  impressive.	  However,	  analysis	  of	  responders	  and	  non-­‐responder	  groups	  contained	  important	  limitations.	  The	  SG	  ratings	  used	  to	  estimate	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statically	  reliable	  changes	  may	  not	  have	  been	  reliable.	  Using	  a	  non-­‐standardised	  measure	  also	  prevented	  application	  of	  more	  sophisticated	  norm-­‐based	  methods	  for	  calculating	  clinically	  significant	  and	  statically	  reliable	  changes	  (Jacobson	  &	  Truax,	  1991).	  The	  responder	  and	  non-­‐responder	  analysis	  was	  underpowered	  and	  carried	  out	  using	  visual	  inspection	  of	  patterns.	  The	  investigation	  of	  imagery	  and	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  was	  exploratory	  and	  not	  driven	  by	  hypotheses.	  Only	  speculative	  conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  exploratory	  comparisons	  of	  small	  groups	  using	  observational	  methods.	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 Directions	  for	  future	  research	  4.6 The	  present	  study	  has	  highlighted	  several	  important	  areas	  for	  further	  research	  according	  to	  three	  research	  objectives:	  to	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma,	  improve	  treatment	  of	  SG	  as	  part	  of	  standard	  clinical	  care,	  and	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  technique.	  	  
 Advancing	  understanding	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  4.6.1The	  current	  literature	  on	  SG	  is	  sparse	  and	  outdated,	  and	  the	  prevalence	  of	  SG	  in	  clinical	  populations	  is	  not	  known.	  Future	  studies	  should	  determine	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  SG	  occurs	  at	  a	  level	  that	  warrants	  direct	  intervention.	  Our	  phenomenological	  understanding	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  is	  currently	  poor	  and	  there	  is	  no	  agreed	  definition	  of	  SG.	  A	  goal	  of	  future	  research	  should	  be	  to	  devise	  a	  comprehensive	  definition	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  that	  is	  grounded	  in	  empirical	  research	  and	  applicable	  to	  all	  fatal	  traumas.	  Qualitative	  designs	  that	  include	  semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  with	  clients	  who	  report	  problematic	  SG	  are	  a	  good	  next	  step.	  Factorial	  studies	  could	  improve	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  components	  that	  make	  up	  SG.	  Future	  researchers	  may	  particularly	  want	  to	  explore	  existential	  and	  content	  SG	  dimensions	  including	  the	  differences	  and	  potential	  overlap	  of	  these	  experiences.	  Increased	  understanding	  of	  SG	  could	  lead	  to	  development	  of	  a	  clinical	  treatment	  model.	  Publication	  of	  a	  SG	  model	  would	  increase	  awareness	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  and	  may	  improve	  screening	  for	  and	  treatment	  of	  SG	  in	  clinical	  practice.	  Development	  of	  a	  standardised	  measure	  of	  SG	  with	  good	  psychometric	  properties	  is	  also	  an	  important	  goal	  for	  future	  researchers.	  Systematic	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measurement	  of	  SG	  would	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  SG	  research	  allowing	  clear	  conclusions	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  SG	  studies.	  Development	  of	  a	  suitable	  clinical	  measure	  would	  enable	  screening	  of	  SG	  and	  evaluation	  of	  treatment	  effects.	  Availability	  of	  a	  clinical	  measure	  may	  help	  identify	  SG	  and	  facilitate	  access	  to	  treatment	  for	  clients	  who	  experience	  SG.	  Previous	  studies	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  SG	  and	  PTSD	  were	  conducted	  using	  single-­‐item	  measurement	  of	  SG	  based	  on	  various	  definitions.	  Future	  research	  should	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  SG	  after	  trauma	  and	  other	  post-­‐traumatic	  difficulties	  using	  rigorous	  methods.	  The	  relationship	  between	  SG,	  PTSD	  and	  depression	  require	  investigation	  to	  establish	  if	  SG	  is	  a	  separate	  clinical	  problem,	  secondary	  to	  other	  post-­‐traumatic	  reactions	  after	  trauma,	  or	  a	  problem	  that	  underpins	  other	  symptoms.	  	  
 	  Improving	  treatment	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  	  4.6.2The	  present	  study	  provides	  preliminary	  evidence	  that	  IR	  is	  a	  suitable	  technique	  for	  treating	  SG	  as	  part	  of	  standard	  treatment	  packages	  for	  PTSD.	  Future	  research	  should	  address	  some	  of	  the	  questions	  raised	  regarding	  SG	  treatment	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  For	  example,	  investigations	  of	  other	  techniques	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	  treat	  SG,	  and	  of	  variables	  that	  distinguish	  clients	  that	  benefit	  from	  IR	  are	  warranted.	  The	  hypotheses	  that	  existential	  SG	  responds	  particularly	  well	  to	  IR,	  and	  that	  content	  SG	  may	  respond	  to	  traditionally	  verbal	  cognitive	  treatment	  techniques	  are	  valuable	  research	  avenues.	  The	  design	  of	  the	  present	  study	  prevented	  evaluation	  of	  the	  longer-­‐term	  effect	  of	  the	  research	  intervention.	  The	  findings	  suggested	  that	  MIS	  and	  SGM	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shifted	  in	  the	  desired	  direction	  from	  pre-­‐rescripting	  session	  to	  follow-­‐up.	  Future	  studies	  should	  explore	  the	  longer-­‐term	  impact	  of	  IR	  when	  used	  to	  treat	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  Future	  studies	  may	  also	  wish	  to	  explore	  the	  appropriate	  time	  point	  in	  treatment	  to	  address	  SG	  and	  how	  successful	  treatment	  of	  SG	  may	  impact	  on	  treatment	  of	  other	  post-­‐traumatic	  difficulties.	  Rehearsal	  of	  rescripted	  imagery	  was	  not	  advised	  in	  the	  present	  study	  to	  ensure	  comparability	  between	  exploration	  and	  rescripting	  sessions.	  Rehearsal	  is	  commonly	  used	  to	  boost	  the	  effect	  of	  IR	  but	  the	  impact	  of	  rehearsal	  on	  IR	  effectiveness	  has	  not	  been	  established	  through	  empirical	  research.	  Future	  studies	  of	  SG	  should	  explore	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  between-­‐session	  rehearsal	  on	  treatment	  effects.	  	  
 Advancing	  understanding	  of	  imagery	  rescripting	  4.6.3The	  present	  study	  provides	  preliminary	  evidence	  that	  IR	  produces	  effects	  that	  are	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  effect	  of	  imagery	  exploration,	  and	  that	  IR	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  verbal	  cognitive	  restructuring.	  Further	  investigations	  of	  the	  independent	  therapeutic	  effect	  of	  IR	  should	  compare	  it	  directly	  to	  other	  techniques	  such	  as	  cognitive	  restructuring	  and	  IE.	  Component	  analysis	  of	  techniques	  should	  also	  investigate	  the	  combined	  effect	  of	  techniques,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  may	  enhance	  one	  another.	  Single-­‐case	  experimental	  designs	  with	  extended	  baselines	  and	  staged	  starting	  points,	  or	  randomised	  between-­‐subjects	  trials	  could	  be	  used	  to	  pursue	  these	  research	  goals.	  	  Future	  research	  should	  continue	  exploration	  of	  processes	  that	  influence	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  IR	  to	  elucidate	  the	  active	  ingredients	  of	  IR.	  Experimental	  research	  and	  statistical	  modelling	  may	  be	  used	  to	  test	  mechanisms	  that	  underpin	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IR,	  and	  develop	  empirically	  derived	  theories	  of	  IR.	  A	  larger	  investigation	  of	  the	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  that	  appeared	  to	  be	  important	  factors	  in	  the	  present	  study	  is	  warranted.	  Investigation	  of	  the	  psychometric	  properties	  of	  the	  brief	  version	  of	  the	  coding	  framework	  is	  needed	  to	  enable	  its	  use	  in	  larger	  studies.	  Exploration	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  rescripting	  process	  variables	  co-­‐vary	  or	  exert	  influence	  on	  one	  another	  may	  also	  be	  an	  area	  of	  interest	  for	  future	  researchers.	  	  
 Conclusions	  and	  final	  words	  4.7 This	  proof-­‐of-­‐concept	  clinical	  trial	  provides	  evidence	  for	  the	  use	  of	  IR	  to	  treat	  SG	  after	  trauma	  as	  one	  component	  of	  trauma-­‐focused	  psychological	  treatment	  packages.	  The	  present	  study	  is	  the	  first	  to	  investigate	  treatment	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma	  specifically,	  and	  to	  explore	  IR	  as	  an	  independent	  therapeutic	  technique	  in	  a	  PTSD	  sample.	  An	  imagery	  exploration	  session	  in	  which	  participants	  elaborated	  their	  distressing	  SG	  imagery	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  significant	  changes	  to	  the	  associated	  meaning,	  SG	  feelings	  or	  distress	  from	  SG	  imagery.	  In	  contrast,	  rescripting	  of	  imagery	  led	  to	  significant	  improvements	  to	  each	  of	  these	  processes.	  These	  findings	  support	  the	  use	  of	  IR	  as	  an	  adjunct	  intervention	  to	  treat	  SG	  after	  trauma.	  IR	  appears	  to	  be	  most	  useful	  for	  clients	  who	  experience	  existential	  SG,	  and	  clients	  who	  modify	  imagery	  by	  imagining	  the	  deceased	  in	  the	  afterlife	  –	  these	  observations	  need	  to	  be	  tested	  using	  inferential	  statistics	  in	  future	  studies.	  Imagining	  the	  deceased	  being	  happy	  or	  at	  peace,	  may	  improve	  SG	  because	  it	  enables	  clients	  to	  mourn	  their	  losses	  and	  move	  on	  from	  traumatic	  experiences.	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Existential	  SG	  may	  be	  best	  understood	  using	  the	  concept	  of	  empathic	  distress	  and	  models	  of	  complicated	  grief,	  whereas	  content	  SG	  may	  be	  formulated	  and	  treated	  using	  cognitive	  models	  of	  trauma-­‐related	  guilt.	  The	  findings	  from	  the	  present	  study	  have	  highlighted	  several	  important	  research	  strands	  that	  could	  improve	  treatment	  of	  SG	  after	  trauma,	  and	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  IR	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  technique.	  It	  is	  hoped	  that	  this	  study	  acts	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  continued	  research	  on	  SG	  and	  IR	  in	  the	  context	  of	  psychological	  treatment	  of	  post-­‐traumatic	  stress.	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6 Appendices	  
Appendix	  A.	  
DSM-­‐5	  diagnostic	  criteria	  for	  Post-­‐Traumatic	  Stress	  Disorder	  (American	  
Psychiatric	  Association,	  2013).	  
Criterion	  A:	  stressor	  The	  person	  was	  exposed	  to:	  death,	  threatened	  death,	  actual	  or	  threatened	  serious	  injury,	  or	  actual	  or	  threatened	  sexual	  violence,	  as	  follows:	  (one	  
required)	  1. Direct	  exposure.	  2. Witnessing,	  in	  person.	  3. Indirectly,	  by	  learning	  that	  a	  close	  relative	  or	  close	  friend	  was	  exposed	  to	  trauma.	  If	  the	  event	  involved	  actual	  or	  threatened	  death,	  it	  must	  have	  been	  violent	  or	  accidental.	  4. Repeated	  or	  extreme	  indirect	  exposure	  to	  aversive	  details	  of	  the	  event(s),	  usually	  in	  the	  course	  of	  professional	  duties	  (e.g.,	  first	  responders,	  collecting	  body	  parts;	  professionals	  repeatedly	  exposed	  to	  details	  of	  child	  abuse).	  This	  does	  not	  include	  indirect	  non-­‐professional	  exposure	  through	  electronic	  media,	  television,	  movies,	  or	  pictures.	  
	  
Criterion	  B:	  intrusion	  symptoms	  The	  traumatic	  event	  is	  persistently	  re-­‐experienced	  in	  the	  following	  way(s):	  (one	  
required)	  1. Recurrent,	  involuntary,	  and	  intrusive	  memories.	  Note:	  Children	  older	  than	  six	  may	  express	  this	  symptom	  in	  repetitive	  play.	  2. Traumatic	  nightmares.	  Note:	  Children	  may	  have	  frightening	  dreams	  without	  content	  related	  to	  the	  trauma(s).	  3. Dissociative	  reactions	  (e.g.,	  flashbacks)	  which	  may	  occur	  on	  a	  continuum	  from	  brief	  episodes	  to	  complete	  loss	  of	  consciousness.	  Note:	  Children	  may	  reenact	  the	  event	  in	  play.	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4. Intense	  or	  prolonged	  distress	  after	  exposure	  to	  traumatic	  reminders.	  5. Marked	  physiologic	  reactivity	  after	  exposure	  to	  trauma-­‐related	  stimuli.	  
	  
Criterion	  C:	  avoidance	  Persistent	  effortful	  avoidance	  of	  distressing	  trauma-­‐related	  stimuli	  after	  the	  event:	  (one	  required)	  1. Trauma-­‐related	  thoughts	  or	  feelings.	  2. Trauma-­‐related	  external	  reminders	  (e.g.,	  people,	  places,	  conversations,	  activities,	  objects,	  or	  situations).	  
	  
Criterion	  D:	  negative	  alterations	  in	  cognitions	  and	  mood	  Negative	  alterations	  in	  cognitions	  and	  mood	  that	  began	  or	  worsened	  after	  the	  traumatic	  event:	  (two	  required)	  1. Inability	  to	  recall	  key	  features	  of	  the	  traumatic	  event	  (usually	  dissociative	  amnesia;	  not	  due	  to	  head	  injury,	  alcohol,	  or	  drugs).	  2. Persistent	  (and	  often	  distorted)	  negative	  beliefs	  and	  expectations	  about	  oneself	  or	  the	  world	  (e.g.,	  "I	  am	  bad,"	  "The	  world	  is	  completely	  dangerous").	  3. Persistent	  distorted	  blame	  of	  self	  or	  others	  for	  causing	  the	  traumatic	  event	  or	  for	  resulting	  consequences.	  4. Persistent	  negative	  trauma-­‐related	  emotions	  (e.g.,	  fear,	  horror,	  anger,	  guilt,	  or	  shame).	  5. Markedly	  diminished	  interest	  in	  (pre-­‐traumatic)	  significant	  activities.	  6. Feeling	  alienated	  from	  others	  (e.g.,	  detachment	  or	  estrangement).	  7. Constricted	  affect:	  persistent	  inability	  to	  experience	  positive	  emotions.	  
	  
Criterion	  E:	  alterations	  in	  arousal	  and	  reactivity	  Trauma-­‐related	  alterations	  in	  arousal	  and	  reactivity	  that	  began	  or	  worsened	  after	  the	  traumatic	  event:	  (two	  required)	  1. Irritable	  or	  aggressive	  behavior	  
	   169	  
2. Self-­‐destructive	  or	  reckless	  behavior	  3. Hypervigilance	  4. Exaggerated	  startle	  response	  5. Problems	  in	  concentration	  6. Sleep	  disturbance	  
	  
Criterion	  F:	  duration	  Persistence	  of	  symptoms	  (in	  Criteria	  B,	  C,	  D,	  and	  E)	  for	  more	  than	  one	  month.	  
	  
Criterion	  G:	  functional	  significance	  Significant	  symptom-­‐related	  distress	  or	  functional	  impairment	  (e.g.,	  social,	  occupational).	  
	  
Criterion	  H:	  exclusion	  Disturbance	  is	  not	  due	  to	  medication,	  substance	  use,	  or	  other	  illness.	  	  
Specify	  if:	  With	  dissociative	  symptoms.	  In	  addition	  to	  meeting	  criteria	  for	  diagnosis,	  an	  individual	  experiences	  high	  levels	  of	  either	  of	  the	  following	  in	  reaction	  to	  trauma-­‐related	  stimuli:	  1. Depersonalization:	  experience	  of	  being	  an	  outside	  observer	  of	  or	  detached	  from	  oneself	  (e.g.,	  feeling	  as	  if	  "this	  is	  not	  happening	  to	  me"	  or	  one	  were	  in	  a	  dream).	  2. Derealization:	  experience	  of	  unreality,	  distance,	  or	  distortion	  (e.g.,	  "things	  are	  not	  real").	  	  
Specify	  if:	  With	  delayed	  expression.	  Full	  diagnosis	  is	  not	  met	  until	  at	  least	  six	  months	  after	  the	  trauma(s),	  although	  onset	  of	  symptoms	  may	  occur	  immediately	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Appendix	  B.	  
Figure	  of	  Ehlers	  and	  Clark’s	  cognitive	  model	  of	  PTSD.	  
























Note.	  Reproduced	  from	  Ehlers	  and	  Clark	  (2000).	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Appendix	  C.	  






















Note.	  Reproduced	  from	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (2001).	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Figure	  of	  Lee,	  Scragg	  and	  Turner’s	  cognitive	  model	  of	  shame-­‐based	  PTSD.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Note.	  Reproduced	  from	  Lee	  et	  al.	  (2001).	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Appendix	  D.	  












Note.	  Reproduced	  from	  Litz	  et	  al.	  (2009).	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Appendix	  E.	  
Figure	  of	  Bolen,	  van	  den	  Hout	  and	  van	  den	  Bout’s	  cognitive	  





















Note.	  Reproduced	  from	  Boelen	  et	  al.	  (2006).	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Appendix	  F.	  
Participant	  Information	  Sheet.	  	   	  Version(3,(21/02/14(
A pilot study of imagery rescripting for survivor guilt after trauma 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
We want to invite you to participate in a research study that takes up to three weeks to 
complete. Taking part in the study is entirely up to you. We have developed this information 
sheet to help you decide if you want to take part. Part 1 explains the purpose of the study 
and what will happen if you decide to take part. Part 2 gives more detailed information about 
the study. Please ask if anything is not clear or if you have any questions. You can take time 




Why are you doing this study? 
We are interested in ‘mental images’ and a therapy called ‘imagery rescripting’. Mental 
images are pictures in our mind. Imagery rescripting involves talking about and making 
changes to these mental images. 
 
We want to find out if imagery rescripting is helpful for people that feel guilt after 
experiencing a ‘fatal trauma’. A fatal trauma is a traumatic event in which other people died. 
We are also interested in which parts of imagery rescripting are most helpful. 
 
Taking part in the study is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw from the study at any 
point. Your decision to take part or not take part will not affect the care that you receive from 
the Traumatic Stress Service in any way. 
 
Why are you asking me to take part? 
We are inviting you to take part because you have experienced a fatal trauma and you have 
told your therapist that you feel guilt. We are recruiting 12 people for the study during April 
2014 – April 2015. 
 
What will I do as part of the study if I take part? 
The study involves meeting with your therapist on three occasions over three weeks at the 
Traumatic Stress Service. During these meetings, your therapist will help you complete 
some questionnaires and do the therapy with you. We will not ask you to meet with anyone 
else. However, we will ask for your permission to record these sessions so that the 
researcher can check that the therapists are consistent. The recording will not be shared 
with anyone else and will be deleted after the researcher has listened to it. You can choose 
to not have your sessions recorded if this makes you feel uncomfortable. The contact details 
for the researcher are listed in Part 2 of this information sheet. 
 
Questionnaires 
The questionnaires will ask you about mental images, feelings of guilt, and current 
difficulties or symptoms that are linked to the traumatic event. The questions are similar to 
questionnaires that you have completed as part of your standard therapy. They will have 
yes/no answers and rating scales. We will not ask you about any details of the traumatic 
event. 
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Therapy 
The therapy involves talking about and making changes to your mental images in two 
therapy sessions. Your therapist will first help you identify and pay attention to your mental 
images. Your therapist will then guide you to talk about and make changes to your mental 
images. 
 
The researcher will also ask your therapist some questions about your demographic details 
(for example, age, gender and ethnicity) and some general questions about the traumatic 
event (for example, type of trauma) and your current therapy (for example, number of 
sessions completed). Your therapist will not share any detailed information about your 
therapy or the traumatic event. 
 
Possible benefits of taking part 
Research suggests that imagery rescripting therapy is helpful for some people that have 
experienced a traumatic event. We hope that this study will show if imagery rescripting 
therapy is helpful for people that feel guilt after a fatal trauma. We also hope that this study 
will show which aspects of imagery rescripting therapy are most helpful. This may help us 
improve treatments that we offer to people that feel guilt after a fatal trauma. 
 
Possible disadvantages of taking part 
Completing the questionnaires or doing the imagery rescripting therapy may remind you of 
the traumatic event and may make you feel upset. Your wellbeing is our key priority. You will 
be able to take breaks or stop the sessions if you want. Your therapist will support you 
during the study and help you cope with any distressing feelings. You can change your mind 
about taking part at any point during the study. 
 
Taking part involves taking a two-week break from your standard therapy. This is because 
we need to do the imagery rescripting therapy during this time. If you do not want to take a 
break, you can choose to do the study after you have finished your standard therapy. You 
can speak to your therapist about the best time for you to take part in the study. 
 
We are doing this study because imagery rescripting is a new type of therapy. We cannot be 
sure that it will be helpful for you. There are no indications from research or therapists’ 
experiences that this therapy is harmful. If any new information became available we would 
share this with you so that you can consider if you want to continue taking part in the study. 
 
We do not expect that there will be any lasting negative effects from taking part in the study. 
If you are worried about anything to do with the study you should speak to your therapist or 
you can contact the researcher. 
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What will happen to my information? 
The information that we gather as part of the study is kept securely at the Traumatic Stress 
Service. It will be kept for 5 years after the end of the study and then destroyed. Your 
information will not be shared with anyone outside the research team. You can change your 
mind about taking part at any point and ask for your information to be removed and 
destroyed. 
 
Your information will be anonymised. This means that your information will not be kept with 
your name. You will be given a participant number which will be used to keep track of your 
information. Only the researcher will know the participant number that belongs to each 
participant. 
  
The information from the study will be used for publication in a peer-reviewed journal and 
presented at a conference. The information from several participants will be combined and 
no one will be able to identify your information from these publications. 
 
You can choose to find out about the results from the study by ticking yes and including your 
contact details on the Study results opt-in form. This information will only be used to send 
you the information and will not be shared with anyone outside the research team. 
 
Who is organising and funding this study? 
This study is being carried out as part of a Doctorate of Clinical Psychology degree. The 
researcher is funded by Camden & Islington NHS Trust to complete this degree and Royal 
Holloway, University of London is supporting the study. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people called a Research 
Ethics Committee to protect your interests. This study has been reviewed and given a 
favourable opinion by NRES Committee London-Dulwich. 
 
The study has also been reviewed and approved by a group of people at Royal Holloway, 
University of London. A service user has looked at the research methods, questionnaires 
and verbal instructions to make sure that these are easy to understand and worded to 
minimise distress for participants. 
 
Who can I speak to if I have a problem? 
If you have any concerns or problems with this study, you should speak to your therapist or 
contact the researcher. We will do our best to answer you questions. Evelina Medin is the 
researcher and can be contacted by email (evelina.medin.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk) or 
telephone (01784 414 388). 
 
If you want to make a formal complaint about the study you can contact Royal Holloway, 
University of London or the NHS Complaints Manager at South West London and St 
Georges Mental Health Trust. Details can be obtained from http://www.swlstg-
tr.nhs.uk/contact-us/how_to_complain/. 
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What happens now? 
If you decide to take part, you and your therapist can decide the best time for you to do the 
study. You should complete the consent form with your therapist just before starting the 
study. Please take as much time as you need to think about whether you want to take part 
before you decide. 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet! 
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  G.	  
Consent	  Form.	  	   	  
Version(3,(21/02/14((




Please read through the consent form. To consent to the study, put your initials in 
the boxes next to each statement and sign at the bottom. 
 
I confirm that I have read the Participant Information Sheet (Version 3, 
21/02/14) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information and ask questions. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time without giving a reason. Withdrawing from the study does not 
affect my medical care or legal rights in any way. 
 
I consent for my therapist to share my demographic details and basic details 
about the traumatic event and my standard therapy with the researcher. 
 
 
I consent for the therapy sessions that are part of the study to be audio 
recorded for the researcher to listen to. 
Note. Audio recording is optional. Please cross out this box if you do not consent to 









_________________________________   _________________ 








_________________________________   _________________ 
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To:	   	   	   Evelina	  Medin	  
From:	   	   Gary	  Brown	  (on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Research	  Sub-­‐	  Committee	  and	  Course	  Executive)	  
Date:	   	   5th	  December	  2013	  
Copy	  To:	   	  
Re:	   	   	   Main	  Research	  Project	  Proposal	  	  	  The	  Research	  Sub-­‐Committee	  has	  considered	  your	  Main	  Research	  Project	  Proposal	  response	  and	  has	  decided	  to	  give	  you	  Approval.	  	  Your	  research	  costs	  have	  also	  been	  approved.	  	  Please	  note	  that	  if	  these	  costs	  change	  and	  you	  do	  not	  re-­‐submit	  an	  amended	  form	  for	  approval	  prior	  to	  incurring	  any	  additional	  costs,	  these	  additional	  costs	  will	  not	  be	  reimbursed.	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A Research Ethics Committee established by the Health Research Authority 
 
NRES Committee London - Dulwich 
Health Research Authority 
Skipton House 




Telephone: 020 7972 2582 
25 March 2014 
 
Miss Evelina Medin 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Camden & Islington NHS Foundation Trust 
Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
Royal Holloway, University of London 




Dear Miss Medin 
 
Study title: A pilot study on the effectiveness of brief imagery 
rescripting as a therapeutic technique for people that 
experience survivor guilt after a traumatic event. 
REC reference: 14/LO/0192 
Protocol number: N/A 
IRAS project ID: 144830 
 
Thank you for your letter of 26 February 2014, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the HRA website, 
together with your contact details, unless you expressly withhold permission to do so.  
Publication will be no earlier than three months from the date of this favourable opinion letter.  
Should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, require further information, or wish to 
withhold permission to publish, please contact the REC Manager Stephanie Hill, 
nrescommittee.london-dulwich@nhs.net. 
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
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NHS sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 




Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the 
start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
Management permission ("R&D approval") should be sought from all NHS organisations 
involved in the study in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. 
 
Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is available in the Integrated Research 
Application System or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.   
 
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
participants to research sites ("participant identification centre"), guidance should be sought 
from the R&D office on the information it requires to give permission for this activity. 
 
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in accordance with the 
procedures of the relevant host organisation.  
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host organisations 
 
Registration of Clinical Trials 
 
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) must be registered 
on a publically accessible database within 6 weeks of recruitment of the first participant (for 
medical device studies, within the timeline determined by the current registration and publication 
trees).   
 
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at the earliest 
opportunity e.g when submitting an amendment.  We will audit the registration details as part of 
the annual progress reporting process. 
 
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is registered but 
for non clinical trials this is not currently mandatory. 
 
If a sponsor wishes to contest the need for registration they should contact Catherine Blewett 
(catherineblewett@nhs.net), the HRA does not, however, expect exceptions to be made. 
Guidance on where to register is provided within IRAS. 
 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied with 
before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as applicable). 
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The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
Evidence of insurance or indemnity  Appendix L - 
indemnity 
letter  
02 September 2013  
Other: Appendix A - Service user consultation    06 December 2013  
Other: Appendix E - Research committee provisional opinion 
approval  
  29 October 2013  
Other: Appendix F - Research committee full approval    05 December 2013  
Other: Summary CV for supervisor - Hannah Murray  1  15 January 2013  
Other: References    13 January 2013  
Other: Email from sponsor responding to query    17 January 2014  
Other: Email from researcher responding to query    19 January 2014  
Other: Study results opt-in form       
Participant Consent Form  3  21 February 2014  
Participant Information Sheet  3  21 February 2014  
Protocol  Version 1. 
Major Project 
proposal  
10 October 2013  
Questionnaire: Non-validated - Appendix H - Survivor guilt measure.  1  12 January 2014  
Questionnaire: Non-validated - Appendix I - Process items   1  12 January 2014  
Questionnaire: Non-validated - Appendix J - Image severity 
measure  
1  12 January 2014  
Questionnaire: Non-validated - Appendix K - client feedback form  1  12 January 2014  
Questionnaire: PHQ-9       
Questionnaire: PDS       
REC application  3.5  17 January 2014  
Response to Request for Further Information    26 February 2014  
Summary/Synopsis  Version 1. 
Study design 
figure  
17 January 2014  
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 




The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
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guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
x Notifying substantial amendments 
x Adding new sites and investigators 
x Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
x Progress and safety reports 
x Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of 




You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make your views known 
please use the feedback form available on the website. 
 
Further information is available at National Research Ethics Service website > After Review 
 
14/LO/0192                          Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
We are pleased to welcome researchers and R & D staff at our NRES committee members’ 
training days – see details at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/  
 











Enclosures:  “After ethical review – guidance for 
   researchers” [SL-AR2] 
 
Copy to:  Prof Andrew MacLeod 
Ms Enitan Eboda, Research & Development Team, South West London 
and St George's Mental Health NHS Trust 
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  K.	  
Study	  approval	  from	  South	  West	  London	  and	  St	  George’s	  Mental	  Health	  
NHS	  Trust	  Research	  &	  Development	  Committee.	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Study	  approval	  from	  Camden	  and	  Islington	  NHS	  Foundation	  Trust	  Research	  
Support	  Service.	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Summary	  of	  service	  user	  consultation.	  
	  
Service	  user	  consultation	  	  	  Overall	  	  SU	  comment:	  This	  is	  a	  very	  interesting	  study	  and	  I	  think	  it	  will	  be	  very	  helpful	  for	  people.	  	  Participant	  Information	  Sheet	  	  SU	  comment:	  Overall	  very,	  very	  clear.	  As	  I	  read	  through	  it,	  all	  my	  questions	  were	  being	  answered.	  It	  stressed	  privacy	  which	  is	  good	  because	  privacy	  can’t	  be	  stressed	  enough.	  It	  was	  honest	  about	  potential	  negative	  effects	  of	  things	  being	  triggered.	  
Response:	  N/A	  	  SU	  comment:	  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  information	  sheet	  should	  have	  the	  time	  frame.	  It	  is	  not	  until	  later	  that	  you	  find	  it	  out	  the	  time	  frames	  and	  it	  may	  put	  some	  people	  off	  if	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  upfront.	  
Response:	  The	  time	  frames	  were	  added	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  information	  sheet.	  	  SU	  comment:	  How	  to	  contact	  the	  main	  researcher	  should	  be	  presented	  earlier	  when	  the	  main	  researcher	  is	  first	  mentioned.	  
Response:	  A	  sentence	  was	  included	  to	  direct	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  contact	  details	  for	  the	  
main	  researcher.	  	  SU	  comment:	  The	  second	  paragraph	  on	  the	  second	  page	  goes	  into	  too	  much	  detail.	  Some	  might	  have	  difficulty	  understanding	  that.	  They	  don’t	  need	  to	  know	  the	  exact	  information	  as	  long	  as	  they	  know	  that	  details	  won't	  be	  shared.	  
Response:	  The	  paragraph	  was	  shortened	  but	  the	  key	  information	  was	  retained.	  	  SU	  comment:	  It	  could	  be	  condensed	  a	  bit.	  It	  is	  a	  bit	  long	  for	  some	  people	  and	  could	  be	  a	  bit	  tighter.	  
Response:	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  information	  sheet	  has	  been	  reviewed	  and	  shortened	  
to	  the	  extent	  possible	  without	  loosing	  vital	  information.	  	  Consent	  Form	  	  SU	  comment:	  It	  was	  very	  clear	  and	  not	  heavy	  to	  read.	  More	  sentences	  and	  boxes	  would	  have	  been	  too	  much.	  
Response:	  N/A.	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  SU	  comment:	  It	  should	  mention	  that	  they	  can	  consent	  or	  not	  to	  have	  their	  sessions	  video	  recorded.	  
Response:	  A	  sentence	  was	  included	  to	  inform	  participants	  that	  video	  recording	  is	  
optional	  and	  instruct	  them	  to	  cross	  out	  the	  box	  on	  consent	  form	  if	  they	  do	  not	  
consent	  to	  video	  recording.	  	  SU	  comment:	  It	  would	  be	  good	  to	  mention	  when	  the	  results	  will	  be	  available.	  
Response:	  A	  sentence	  was	  included	  on	  the	  second	  page	  of	  the	  consent	  form	  to	  
inform	  participants	  when	  the	  results	  will	  be	  distributed.	  	  Instructions	  	  SU	  comment:	  Very	  clear.	  It	  is	  good	  that	  it	  is	  your	  usual	  therapist	  that	  does	  the	  therapy	  since	  they	  know	  you	  and	  will	  be	  able	  to	  help	  draw	  out	  the	  information.	  
Response:	  N/A.	  	  Measures	  	  SU	  comment:	  These	  measures	  are	  the	  same	  or	  very	  similar	  to	  measures	  used	  as	  part	  of	  therapy.	  I	  have	  no	  concerns	  about	  the	  measures.	  
Response:	  N/A.	  	  SU	  comment:	  The	  percentages	  from	  the	  survivor	  guilt	  measure	  can	  be	  removed.	  People	  may	  not	  be	  familiar	  with	  percentages	  in	  this	  context.	  
Response:	  The	  service	  user’s	  comment	  was	  considered	  but	  the	  survivor	  guilt	  
measure	  was	  not	  changed.	  The	  items	  were	  adapted	  from	  a	  standardised	  
questionnaire	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  keeping	  the	  wording	  kept	  as	  similar	  as	  possible	  to	  
the	  original.	  Therapists	  will	  be	  available	  to	  assist	  participants	  in	  completing	  the	  
questionnaire.	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Survivor	  Guilt	  Measure.	  
	  
SURVIVOR	  GUILT	  	  Survivor	  guilt	  refers	  to	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  and/or	  shame	  about	  surviving	  a	  traumatic	  event	  when	  others	  did	  not.	  The	  next	  two	  items	  ask	  about	  your	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  over	  the	  past	  week.	  Please	  circle	  one	  answer	  for	  each	  question.	  	  	  	  1.	  FREQUENCY	  	  How	  much	  of	  the	  time	  have	  you	  felt	  survivor	  guilt	  over	  the	  past	  week?	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  None	  of	  the	  time	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	  little	  of	  the	  time	  (less	  than	  10%)	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  Some	  of	  the	  time	  (approx.	  20-­‐30%)	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  Much	  of	  the	  time	  (approx.	  50-­‐60%)	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  Most	  or	  all	  of	  the	  time	  (more	  than	  80%)	  	  	  	  2.	  INTENSITY	  	  How	  strong	  were	  these	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  over	  the	  past	  week?	  How	  much	  distress	  or	  discomfort	  did	  they	  cause?	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  1	  	  	  	  	  	  Mild,	  slight	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  2	  	  	  	  	  	  Moderate	  guilt	  feelings	  definitely	  present,	  some	  distress	  but	  still	  manageable	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  Severe,	  marked	  feelings	  of	  guilt,	  considerable	  distress	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  Extreme,	  pervasive	  feelings	  of	  guilt,	  incapacitating	  distress	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  O.	  
Mental	  Imagery	  Scale.	  
	  
MENTAL	  IMAGES	  	  The	  next	  two	  items	  ask	  about	  your	  mental	  image	  over	  the	  past	  week.	  Please	  mark	  your	  answers	  on	  the	  scales	  below.	  	  	  	  	  1.	  IMAGE	  FREQUENCY	  	  How	  frequently	  has	  your	  image	  occurred	  over	  the	  past	  week?	  	  	  	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Extremely	  	  	  	  	  2.	  IMAGE	  DISTRESS	  	  How	  distressing	  or	  upsetting	  has	  your	  image	  been	  over	  the	  past	  week?	  	  	  	  	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Extremely	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  P.	  
Single-­‐item	  process	  measures.	  
	  1.	  ENCAPSULATED	  BELIEF	  	  	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  _____________________________________________________________________________________________	  	  How	  much	  do	  you	  believe	  this	  statement	  to	  be	  true	  right	  now?	  	  
	   	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Extremely	  
	  
	  	  2.	  SURVIVOR	  GUILT	  	  How	  strong	  are	  your	  feelings	  of	  survivor	  guilt	  right	  now?	  	  
	   	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Extremely	  	  	  	  3.	  IMAGE	  DISTRESS	  	  Please	  bring	  your	  image	  to	  mind	  and	  dwell	  on	  it	  for	  a	  few	  moments.	  	  How	  distressing	  or	  upsetting	  is	  this	  image	  to	  you	  right	  now?	  	  
	   	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Extremely	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Appendix	  Q.	  	  















	  	   	  
	   196	  
Appendix	  R.	  




	   	  	  
	  
	  	  last	  1	  week	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Appendix	  S.	  
Client	  Feedback	  Form.	  
	  
	   	  
!Thank!you!for!taking!part!in!the!research!study!!!
!
Client'Feedback'Form'!You!have!now!finished!your!participation!in!the!research!study.!We!would!like!to!hear!how!you!found!the!overall!therapy!and!the!individual!sessions.!! 1. Imagery!Therapy!!You!had!two!sessions!of!therapy!that!focused!on!mental!images!connected!to!your!feelings!of!survivor!guilt.!How!helpful!did!you!find!this!therapy!overall?!!!!!!!!!!!|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|!!!!!!!!!!0!!!!!!!!!!!10!!!!!!!!!!20!!!!!!!!!!30!!!!!!!!!!40!!!!!!!!!!50!!!!!!!!!!60!!!!!!!!!!70!!!!!!!!!!80!!!!!!!!!!90!!!!!!!!!100!!Not!at!all! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Extremely!!! 2. Elaboration!Session!!Your!first!session!focused!on!exploring!your!mental!image.!The!session!involved!picturing!and!describing!your!image.!How!helpful!did!you!find!this!session?!!!!!!!!!!!|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|!!!!!!!!!!0!!!!!!!!!!!10!!!!!!!!!!20!!!!!!!!!!30!!!!!!!!!!40!!!!!!!!!!50!!!!!!!!!!60!!!!!!!!!!70!!!!!!!!!!80!!!!!!!!!!90!!!!!!!!!100!!Not!at!all! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Extremely!!! 3. Rescripting!Session!!Your!second!session!focused!on!transforming!your!mental!image.!The!session!involved!making!changes!to!your!image!by!creatively!imagining!something!different.!How!helpful!did!you!find!this!session?! !!!!!!!!!!|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|AAAAAAAAA|!!!!!!!!!!0!!!!!!!!!!!10!!!!!!!!!!20!!!!!!!!!!30!!!!!!!!!!40!!!!!!!!!!50!!!!!!!!!!60!!!!!!!!!!70!!!!!!!!!!80!!!!!!!!!!90!!!!!!!!!100!!Not!at!all! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Extremely!!!Do!you!have!any!other!comments!about!the!image!therapy?!
(please0continue0on0the0back0if0you0need0more0space)0!!! !
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Appendix	  T.	  
Brief	  Rescripting	  Process	  Coding	  Framework.	  
	  
2.2	  	   Activation	  of	  imagery	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  client’s	  ability	  to	  visualise	  the	  imagery	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  vividness	  of	  their	  description.	  	  
3	  =	  	  Mostly	  able:	  The	  client	  can	  see	  the	  imagery	  easily	  in	  the	  mind’s	  eye;	  the	  imagery	  is	  very	  vivid	  (“I	  can	  see,	  hear,	  smell,	  feel	  and/or	  taste	  it	  very	  clearly”).	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  creates	  imagery	  that	  is	  very	  clear	  and	  
intense	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  session.	  All	  or	  most	  of	  the	  imagery	  is	  
experienced	  in	  great	  detail.	  The	  imagery	  is	  mostly	  or	  entirely	  described	  in	  
present	  tense	  and	  first	  person.	  	  
2	  =	   Moderately	  able:	  Parts	  of	  the	  imagery	  can	  be	  seen	  easily	  in	  the	  mind’s	  eye;	  most	  of	  the	  imagery	  is	  vivid	  (“Mostly	  all	  of	  the	  details	  are	  there”).	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  creates	  imagery	  where	  parts	  are	  clear	  and	  
intense,	  while	  other	  parts	  are	  lacking	  in	  clarity.	  Both	  present	  and	  past	  tense,	  
and	  first	  and	  third	  person	  may	  be	  used.	  	  
1	  =	   Somewhat	  able:	  Some	  of	  the	  imagery	  can	  be	  seen	  easily	  in	  the	  mind’s	  eye;	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  imagery	  are	  vivid	  (“Some	  of	  the	  details	  are	  there”).	  
	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  creates	  imagery	  where	  many	  parts	  are	  
lacking	  in	  clarity.	  The	  imagery	  may	  be	  mostly	  described	  in	  third	  person	  but	  
first	  person	  may	  also	  be	  used.	  	  
0	  =	   Minimal/not	  at	  all	  able:	  Very	  little	  or	  none	  of	  the	  imagery	  can	  be	  seen	  clearly	  in	  the	  mind’s	  eye;	  the	  imagery	  is	  not	  vivid	  (“Everything	  is	  a	  bit	  blurred”).	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Client	  is	  not	  able	  to	  bring	  to	  mind	  imagery	  that	  is	  




	   	  




2.1A	  	   Ability	  to	  stay	  with	  the	  imagery	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  client’s	  ability	  to	  continuously	  activate	  and	  stay	  with	  the	  imagery	  throughout	  the	  rescripting	  process.	  	  
3	  =	  	  Mostly	  stays	  with:	  The	  client	  stays	  with	  the	  imagery	  throughout.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  for	  the	  most	  part	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  to	  mind	  
and	  stay	  with	  the	  imagery	  through	  the	  entire	  rescripting	  session.	  	  
2	  =	   Stays	  with	  moderately:	  The	  client	  stays	  with	  the	  imagery	  but	  falls	  short	  of	  doing	  so	  for	  the	  entire	  session.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  to	  mind	  and	  stay	  with	  the	  
imagery	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  rescripting	  session,	  but	  comes	  out	  of	  the	  
imagery	  at	  times	  (e.g.,	  if	  it	  gets	  too	  distressing,	  if	  he/she	  requires	  
clarification	  or	  if	  he/she	  starts	  talking	  about	  the	  memory	  or	  event	  more	  
generally).	  	  
1	  =	   Stays	  with	  somewhat:	  The	  client	  struggles	  to	  stay	  with	  the	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Although	  the	  client	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  to	  mind	  and	  stay	  
with	  the	  imagery	  at	  times,	  he/she	  frequently	  come	  back	  to	  the	  therapy	  
room.	  	  
0	  =	   Stays	  with	  minimally/not	  at	  all:	  The	  client	  cannot	  stay	  with	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  is	  unable	  to	  bring	  the	  imagery	  to	  mind	  for	  
most	  of	  the	  session	  (e.g.,	  because	  it	  is	  too	  distressing).	  
	   	  




2.1B	  	   Development	  of	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  client’s	  ability	  to	  develop	  and	  follow	  a	  coherent	  rescript	  narrative.	  	  
3	  =	  	  Mostly	  coherent:	  The	  rescript	  follows	  a	  coherent	  narrative.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  It	  is	  easy	  for	  the	  listener	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  
happening	  in	  the	  imagery;	  the	  narrative	  flows	  like	  a	  coherent	  script.	  	  
2	  =	   Moderately	  coherent:	  The	  rescript	  mostly	  follows	  a	  coherent	  narrative	  but	  it	  is	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  follow.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  It	  is	  mostly	  easy	  for	  the	  listener	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  
happening	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  imagery.	  However,	  the	  narrative	  tends	  to	  jump	  
from	  point	  to	  point.	  	  
1	  =	   Somewhat	  coherent:	  There	  is	  some	  coherent	  narrative	  in	  the	  rescript	  but	  it	  is	  often	  difficult	  to	  follow.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Although	  there	  is	  some	  coherent	  narrative,	  it	  is	  
difficult	  for	  the	  most	  part	  for	  the	  listener	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  happening	  
in	  the	  imagery.	  	  
0	  =	   Minimal/not	  at	  all	  coherent:	  The	  rescript	  does	  not	  follow	  a	  coherent	  narrative.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  There	  is	  no	  coherent	  narrative,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  
the	  listener	  to	  understand	  and	  follow.	  
	  
	  
	   	  




2.1C	  	   Amount	  of	  guidance	  given	  by	  the	  therapist	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  client’s	  ability	  to	  follow	  the	  rescripting	  process	  and	  incorporate	  changes	  in	  the	  imagery	  without	  significant	  guidance	  from	  the	  therapist.	  	  
3	  =	  	  Mostly	  self-­‐guided:	  Little	  guidance	  from	  therapist	  is	  needed;	  the	  client	  is	  able	  to	  incorporate	  change	  into	  the	  imagery	  and	  guide	  themselves	  through	  the	  rescript	  with	  little	  or	  no	  prompting.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  to	  mind	  and	  describe	  the	  
rescripted	  imagery	  with	  little	  input	  from	  the	  therapist.	  For	  example,	  	  the	  
therapist	  provides	  infrequent	  minor/general	  prompts	  to	  capture	  more	  
details	  or	  to	  bring	  in	  additional	  changes.	  	  
2	  =	   Moderately	  self-­‐guided:	  Some	  guidance	  from	  therapist	  is	  provided;	  the	  client	  and	  therapist	  guide	  the	  rescript	  equally.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  is	  able	  to	  follow	  therapist	  prompts	  in	  order	  
to	  bring	  to	  mind	  and	  vividly	  describe	  the	  rescripted	  imagery.	  Without	  these	  
prompts,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  client	  would	  leave	  out	  details	  or	  become	  stuck.	  	  
1	  =	   Somewhat	  self-­‐guided:	  The	  rescript	  is	  mostly	  guided	  by	  the	  therapist;	  the	  client	  struggles	  to	  guide	  the	  rescript.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Rescripting	  is	  mostly	  guided	  by	  the	  therapist;	  the	  
client	  finds	  it	  difficult	  to	  describe	  the	  imagery	  and	  to	  incorporate	  change.	  
For	  example,	  the	  therapist	  provides	  frequent	  specific	  prompts	  to	  capture	  
more	  details	  or	  to	  bring	  in	  additional	  changes.	  	  
0	  =	   Minimally/not	  at	  all	  self-­‐guided:	  The	  rescript	  is	  mostly/completely	  guided	  by	  the	  therapist.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  is	  reliant	  on	  the	  therapist	  for	  guiding	  the	  
rescript.	  It	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  therapist	  to	  become	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  
description	  of	  the	  event	  and	  to	  ensure	  changes	  to	  the	  imagery	  are	  
incorporated.	  
	   	  







3.1	  	   Activation	  of	  original	  internal	  processes	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  activation	  of	  emotions,	  cognitions	  and/or	  physical	  sensations	  associated	  with	  the	  original	  imagery.	  	  
3	  =	  	  Very	  high	  activation:	  Most	  or	  all	  trauma-­‐related	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and/or	  physiological	  reactions	  are	  present	  in	  the	  session.	  Processes	  are	  very	  intense.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  accesses	  exactly	  how	  they	  felt	  emotionally	  
or	  physically,	  or	  what	  they	  thought	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  original	  event	  or	  when	  
accessing	  the	  original	  imagery.	  Only	  select	  this	  option	  if	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  
client	  is	  experiencing	  these	  trauma-­‐related	  internal	  processes	  very	  intensely	  
through	  self-­‐report	  or	  observation.	  The	  client	  may	  dissociate	  or	  come	  out	  of	  
the	  imagery	  at	  times.	  	  
2	  =	   High	  activation:	  A	  high	  amount	  of	  trauma-­‐related	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and/or	  physiological	  reactions	  are	  present	  during	  the	  session.	  Processes	  are	  intense.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Trauma-­‐related	  internal	  experiences	  are	  experienced	  
intensely.	  Select	  this	  option	  if	  the	  client	  reports	  or	  appears	  to	  be	  
experiencing	  these	  internal	  processes	  in	  the	  session	  (e.g.,	  more	  than	  50%	  if	  
the	  client	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  the	  intensity).	  	  
1	  =	   Moderate/low	  activation:	  A	  moderate	  or	  low	  amount	  of	  trauma-­‐related	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and/or	  physiological	  reactions	  are	  present	  during	  the	  session.	  Processes	  are	  moderately	  intense.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Trauma-­‐related	  internal	  experiences	  are	  present	  in	  
the	  description	  of	  how	  the	  client	  feels	  but	  are	  experienced	  at	  a	  moderate	  or	  
low	  level	  (e.g.,	  less	  than	  50%	  if	  the	  client	  were	  asked	  to	  rate	  the	  intensity).	  	  
0	  =	   Minimal/no	  activation:	  Trauma-­‐related	  thoughts,	  feelings	  and/or	  physiological	  reactions	  are	  minimal/absent	  during	  the	  session.	  Processes	  are	  of	  very	  low	  intensity.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  does	  not	  access	  trauma-­‐related	  thoughts,	  
feelings	  and/or	  physiological	  reactions	  during	  the	  session.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  
the	  client	  does	  not	  express	  these	  internal	  experiences,	  or	  that	  the	  client	  
reports	  how	  he/she	  felt/thought	  at	  the	  time	  but	  does	  not	  feel/think	  that	  
way	  now	  in	  the	  therapy	  room.	  	   	  







4.1A	  	   Departure	  from	  the	  original	  imagery	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  rescript	  departs	  from	  the	  original	  imagery	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  amount	  of	  new	  material	  being	  introduced.	  Consider	  the	  setting	  and	  time	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  new	  imagery.	  	  
3	  =	  	  All	  new:	  All	  new	  (e.g.,	  safe	  place	  imagery);	  none	  of	  the	  original	  imagery	  is	  	  included	  in	  the	  rescript.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  For	  example,	  all	  of	  the	  session	  time	  is	  spent	  talking	  
about	  new	  information	  or	  new	  imagery	  is	  created	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  
different	  setting.	  
	  
2	  =	  	  Mostly	  new:	  Mostly	  new	  imagery,	  some	  old	  material;	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  	  the	  original	  intrusive	  imagery	  is	  incorporated	  into	  the	  rescript.	  
	  
Additional	  guidance:	  For	  example,	  most	  of	  the	  session	  time	  is	  spent	  talking	  
about	  new	  information	  or	  new	  imagery	  is	  created	  that	  mostly	  takes	  place	  in	  
a	  different	  setting.	  
	  
1	  =	  	  Some	  new:	  Less	  than	  half	  of	  the	  imagery	  incorporates	  new	  material,	  the	  	  majority	  of	  the	  imagery	  is	  taken	  up	  with	  the	  original	  intrusive	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  For	  example,	  less	  than	  half	  the	  session	  time	  is	  spent	  
talking	  about	  new	  information,	  or	  change	  in	  the	  imagery	  occurs	  mostly	  in	  
the	  original	  setting.	  	  
0	  =	  	  Mostly	  old/no	  change:	  Mostly	  old	  imagery	  or	  no	  change	  from	  original	  intrusive	  imagery	  (e.g.,	  reliving	  only);	  a	  minimal	  amount	  of	  new	  material	  is	  incorporated.	  
	  
Additional	  guidance:	  For	  example,	  all	  of	  the	  session	  time	  is	  spent	  talking	  
about	  the	  original	  imagery	  or	  the	  imagery	  occurs	  in	  the	  original	  setting	  
without	  introducing	  new	  material.	   	  







4.1B	  	   Timing	  of	  change	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  point	  in	  time	  when	  new	  information	  is	  introduced	  into	  the	  imagery.	  	  
3	  =	  	  During	  the	  imagery:	  The	  rescript	  coincides	  in	  time	  with	  the	  original	  	  imagery.	  
	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Change	  in	  the	  imagery	  is	  introduced	  part	  way	  through	  
the	  original	  imagery	  –	  the	  original	  imagery	  and	  rescript	  overlap	  in	  time.	  
For	  example,	  the	  new	  imagery	  changes	  the	  way	  events	  in	  the	  original	  
imagery	  unfolds	  by	  adding	  or	  removing	  elements	  within	  the	  original	  
imagery.	  
	  
2	  =	  	  Immediately	  (1)	  before	  OR	  (2)	  after	  the	  imagery:	  The	  rescript	  occurs	  immediately	  before	  or	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  original	  imagery	  (specify	  before	  or	  after).	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Change	  in	  the	  imagery	  is	  introduced	  immediately	  
before	  or	  at	  the	  end	  of	  events	  in	  the	  original	  imagery	  –	  the	  original	  imagery	  
and	  rescript	  do	  not	  overlap	  but	  they	  are	  contiguous	  in	  time	  (i.e.,	  one	  follows	  
consecutively	  after	  the	  other).	  For	  example,	  events	  in	  the	  new	  imagery	  pre-­‐
empt	  events	  in	  the	  original	  imagery	  or	  build	  on	  the	  ending	  of	  the	  original	  
imagery.	  
	  
1	  =	  	  Some	  time	  (1)	  before	  or	  (2)	  after	  the	  imagery:	  The	  rescript	  occurs	  a	  while	  before	  or	  after	  the	  original	  imagery	  (specify	  before	  or	  after).	  
	  
Additional	  guidance:	  A	  new	  imagery	  is	  created	  that,	  if	  real,	  would	  have	  
occurred	  some	  length	  of	  time	  before	  or	  after	  the	  original	  imagery	  –	  the	  
original	  imagery	  and	  rescript	  are	  not	  contiguous	  in	  time	  (i.e.,	  one	  does	  not	  
follow	  consecutively	  after	  the	  other)	  but	  the	  temporal	  link	  is	  clear.	  For	  
example,	  the	  new	  imagery	  changes	  the	  story	  of	  the	  original	  imagery	  by	  
adding	  new	  content	  at	  an	  earlier	  or	  later	  point	  in	  time	  (e.g.,	  days,	  weeks	  or	  
years	  earlier	  or	  later).	  	  
0	  =	  	  No	  temporal	  relationship	  to	  the	  imagery:	  The	  rescript	  occurs	  at	  a	  time	  that	  appears	  unrelated	  to	  the	  original	  imagery	  or	  the	  temporal	  relationship	  between	  original	  and	  new	  imagery	  is	  not	  apparent.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  New	  imagery	  is	  created	  that,	  if	  real,	  would	  have	  
occurred	  at	  a	  time	  that	  is	  unrelated	  to	  the	  original	  imagery	  -­‐	  the	  temporal	  
link	  is	  not	  clear.	  The	  new	  imagery	  is	  thus	  not	  part	  of	  the	  original	  imagery.	   	  







4.3	  	   Believability	  of	  rescript	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  rescript	  feels	  believable	  and	  compelling	  to	  the	  client	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  physically	  possible.	  	  	  
3	  =	  	  Completely	  believable:	  The	  rescript	  feels	  completely	  believable.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  describes	  the	  new	  outcome	  as	  feeling	  
believable	  and	  something	  they	  can	  connect	  with.	  	  	  
2	  =	   Mostly	  believable:	  The	  client	  cannot	  connect	  with	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  rescript.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  describes	  the	  new	  outcome	  as	  feeling	  mostly	  
believable	  but	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  connect	  with	  some	  aspects.	  	  	  
1	  =	   Somewhat	  believable:	  The	  rescript	  mostly	  does	  not	  feel	  believable	  but	  the	  client	  can	  connect	  with	  some	  aspects.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  mostly	  does	  not	  feel	  that	  the	  new	  outcome	  is	  
believable.	  	  	  
0	  =	   Minimally/Not	  at	  all	  believable:	  The	  rescript	  seems	  alien	  and	  the	  client	  cannot	  connect	  with	  it.	  
	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  does	  not	  feel	  that	  the	  new	  outcome	  is	  
believable.	  	  	   	  





4.4	  	   Activation	  of	  new	  internal	  processes	  Summary:	  This	  item	  rates	  activation	  of	  emotions,	  cognitions	  and/or	  	  physical	  sensations	  associated	  with	  change	  in	  the	  imagery.	  	  
3	  =	  	  Very	  high	  activation:	  New	  emotions,	  cognitions	  and/or	  physiological	  sensations	  are	  present	  and	  very	  intense	  during	  the	  rescripted	  part	  of	  the	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Change-­‐related	  internal	  processes	  are	  experienced	  
very	  intensely.	  Only	  select	  this	  option	  if	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  client	  is	  
experiencing	  these	  internal	  processes	  very	  intensely	  through	  self-­‐report	  or	  
observation.	  The	  client	  may	  dissociate	  or	  come	  out	  of	  the	  imagery	  at	  times.	  	  
2	  =	   High	  activation:	  New	  emotions,	  cognitions	  and/or	  physiological	  sensations	  are	  present	  and	  intense	  during	  the	  rescripted	  part	  of	  the	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Change-­‐related	  internal	  experiences	  are	  experienced	  
intensely.	  Select	  this	  option	  if	  the	  client	  reports	  or	  appears	  to	  be	  
experiencing	  these	  internal	  processes	  but	  at	  less	  than	  full	  intensity.	  	  
1	  =	   Moderate/low	  activation:	  New	  emotions,	  cognitions	  and/or	  physiological	  sensations	  are	  present	  but	  of	  moderate/low	  intensity	  during	  the	  rescripted	  part	  of	  the	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  Change-­‐related	  internal	  experiences	  are	  present	  in	  the	  
description	  of	  how	  the	  client	  feels,	  but	  are	  experienced	  at	  a	  moderate	  or	  low	  
level.	  	  
0	  =	   Minimal/no	  activation:	  New	  emotions,	  cognitions	  and/or	  physiological	  sensations	  are	  not	  accessed	  during	  the	  rescripted	  part	  of	  the	  imagery.	  	  
Additional	  guidance:	  The	  client	  does	  not	  access	  change-­‐related	  thoughts,	  
feelings	  and/or	  physiological	  reactions	  during	  the	  session.	  Either	  they	  are	  
completely	  absent,	  or	  the	  client	  can	  hypothetically	  describe	  how	  he/she	  
might	  feel/think	  but	  does	  not	  experience	  them	  directly	  from	  the	  rescript.	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Thank you for supporting this research project ! 
 
This manual was developed to ensure consistency between therapists. We have kept it as 
brief and simple as possible. Please familiarise yourself with the procedures before seeing 
your client. Feel free to contact us if you have any questions. 
 
General information 
A flow diagram of the project design and procedures appear on the next page. 
The project consists of three sessions, delivered one week apart: 
 
 
The sessions are different in length to make the therapy component of sessions equal in 
length. The length of the sessions may vary between participants but, for each participant, 
the elaboration and rescripting components of sessions should be similar in length. For 
example, 40 minutes of elaboration should be paired with 40 minutes of rescripting. 
 
Comments, feedback and questions 
On the next page, there is blank section where you can make notes. For example, useful 
observations, techniques and questions that worked well, things that did not go well, 
suggestions about the manual and procedures, comments from your client etc. It is 
particularly important that you record any deviations from the procedures. Participants can 
choose to receive a summary of the results by completing the ‘Study results opt-in form’. 
 
Demographic and clinical information 
There are four demographic and five clinical questions on pages 3-4 for you to complete. 
Your client knows that this information is being collected from you. There are also some 
questions and comment boxes (about images and scripts) later in the manual. You will be 
prompted to complete these. You can leave some questions blank if you want to discuss 
these with us first. 
 
Verbal instructions 
We have tried to keep standardised instructions to a minimum. Instructions in blue should be 
read out as written in the manual. We have considered the wording very carefully so please 
stick to these instructions as closely as possible. 
 
Red, italicised instructions indicate flexibility to use your own questions. We want you to draw 
on your clinical skills and knowledge of your client to tailor the intervention to your client’s 
needs. Optional prompts are given for guidance. You can use some or none of these, or 
adapt them to suit you and your client. It may be helpful to think about how you are going to 
identify images and scripts, and highlight useful prompts before starting the sessions. 
 
Administration of questionnaires 
The self-report questionnaires are included in the manual (in coloured plastic pockets) at the 
point where we want you to administer them. A tick list will help you (and us) check that the 
correct questionnaires are administered at the right point. The Encapsulated Belief 
Questionnaire requires you to fill in the identified encapsulated belief. The instructions for this 
are highlighted in yellow. Please put completed questionnaires in the plastic folder. 
 
 
Evelina Medin           1 
evelina.medin.2012@live.rhul.ac.uk! ! ! ! ! ! ! !  
Session 1   Session 2   Session 3   
  80-90 min, Pages 5 - 10   60 min,  Pages 11 - 14   15 min, Pages 15   
o   Questionnaires (15 min) o   Questionnaires (15 min) o   Questionnaires (15 min) 
o   Imagery interview (20-30 min) o   Image rescripting (45 min)     
o   Image elaboration (45 min)         
!!!
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2. Did any sessions focus on survivor guilt? 
 
 
      
  No      Yes  !     How many sessions?__________________ 
 
 
3. Did any sessions involve imagery rescripting? 
 
 
      
  No      Yes  !     How many sessions?__________________ 
 
 












	   211	  
	   	  !
! 5!
!!!
Introduction and questionnaires                           15 minutes 
        
 
1. Obtain informed consent     Date:______________ 
 



















2. Start audio recording (if consented) 
 
 
3. Introduce the session 
 
In the next two sessions, we’ll focus on mental images and feelings of survivor 
guilt. I‘ll tell you a bit more about this in a minute. Before I do that, I’ll give you 
some questionnaires to fill in. I’ll give you some more questionnaires during 
and after the session. 
 
 
4. Administer questionnaires  Please tick when completed 
 
• PHQ-9     
• PDS 










Imagery interview                             20-30 minutes 
 
 
1. Introduce and identify distressing mental images 
 
Mental images are ‘pictures in our mind’. They can include smells, tastes, 
sounds and sensations. They can be a memory of an event, or an imaginary 
situation. 
 
Mental images can be very powerful and linked to strong feelings. They can 
be very distressing when they are linked to unpleasant feelings. I want to help 
you identify any mental images that are linked to your feelings of survivor 
guilt. 
 
I want you to focus on your feelings of survivor guilt – are there any images 
that go through your mind? It may be helpful to close your eyes. 
 
 
Explore with your client to identify images and record on the next page 
 
Optional prompts: 
• What do you think about when you notice feelings of survivor guilt? 
• Do you get any pictures or any sensations? 
 
 
 Are there any other images that are linked to your feelings of survivor guilt? 
 
Explore additional images with your client 
 




2. Identify the main image 
 
You’ve mentioned several images to me. Which of these images is the most 
distressing or most closely connected to your feelings of survivor guilt? 
 
Identify the main image with your client 
 
Optional prompts: 
• Does one image feel more upsetting than the others? 
• Which image feels most problematic or most important to talk about? 
• Which image comes to mind first or stand out when you focus on your 
feelings of survivor guilt? 
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Please complete the following questions with your client 
 





    Constructed    Memory        Combination      
         image 
 
 ! Is the memory a trauma memory? 
          
 
 
            Trauma  Non-trauma 
 
 
Is the image distorted? (i.e. how much does the image deviate from how it would 
appear in real life, e.g. colour, shape, perspective, relative size, intensity) 
Note.!An!image!can!be!constructed!but!not!distorted!if!it!looks!true<to<life.!!!!!!!!!!!|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|!!!!!!!!!!0!!!!!!!!!!!10!!!!!!!!!!20!!!!!!!!!!30!!!!!!!!!!40!!!!!!!!!!50!!!!!!!!!!60!!!!!!!!!!70!!!!!!!!!!80!!!!!!!!!!90!!!!!!!!100% 
 
 Not at all                           Completely!
 distorted                    distorted 
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  !
! 8!
!
! The purpose of the encapsulated belief is to find the essential meaning of the image for your client. This is most commonly an negative belief about the 
person but may be a belief about something else. !
3. Identify the Encapsulated Belief 
 
Mental images often have a meaning to the person, what does your image 
mean to you? 
 








• What is most upsetting or the worst thing about the image? 
• What does it say about you as a person? 
• What does it say about other people, the world or your future? 
 
 



















5. Administer questionnaires  Please tick when completed 
 
• Mental Images 
• Process items – Pre-session 1 
  
!!
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! 9!
! The purpose of the session is to elaborate the image without interfering with it. Explore the content and meaning of the image in a non-directional way. Gently lead your client to vividly imagine and share details of the image. 
Listen, reflect and empathise but do not challenge interpretations.  
Image elaboration                              45 minutes !
 
 
1. Start time:     
 
 
2. Introduce image elaboration 
 
I’d like to talk a bit more about your mental image. We’re going to spend the 




3. Conduct image elaboration 
 
I want you to bring your image to mind. If you feel comfortable to, you can 
close your eyes or you can look at a point on the wall or the carpet. Can you 
tell me what you see? 
 









• Can you hold the image in mind and focus on it for a little while. 
• What else do you see; do you notice any other details? 
• Do you notice any smells, sounds, tastes or sensations? 
• How does the image make you feel? 
• What does the image mean to you? 
• What has happened leading up to the image? 
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! 10!
6. Administer questionnaire  Please tick when completed 
 









-  Ensure that your client is feeling ok  




– END OF SESSION – 
  
!
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! 11!
Introduction and questionnaires                           15 minutes 
        
      
1. Start audio recording (if consented)    Date:______________ 
 
 
2. Introduce the session 
 
Today we’ll continue to work on mental images and feelings of survivor guilt. 
Before we do that, I want to give you some more questionnaires to fill in. Like 
last time, I’ll give you some more questionnaires after the session. 
 
 
3. Administer questionnaires  Please tick when completed 
 
• PHQ-9     
• PDS 
• Survivor guilt 
• Mental Images 
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The purpose of the session is to make changes or add to the image to make 
it feel less distressing. This can be done in many ways. Research suggests 
that individualised, client-lead scripts are most helpful. We are also 
interested to find out what scripts participants choose so introduce ideas in 
general terms and only when necessary. Help your client to be as creative 
as they want. Do not introduce ideas with the main aim of changing the 
verbal meaning. !
!
Image rescripting                               45 minutes  
 
 
1. Start time:     
 
 
2. Introduce image rescripting 
 
Today I’d like to talk a bit more about changes that you want to make to your 
mental image. We’re going to spend the next 45 minutes transforming your 
image by creatively imagining something different. 
 
 
3. Identify script 
 
Last week you described the details of your image. What changes would you 
like to make that could make the image feel less upsetting? 
 
Perhaps you want to change some details of the image, create a different 
outcome or build on ‘the story’ of the image? We can be as creative as you 
want to be. 
 











• Are there some aspects of the image that are the most upsetting? 
• What can we do to deal with those aspects? 
• Do you want to make any changes to how the image is played out in 
your mind? 
• Is there something else that we could imagine that would make the 
image feel less upsetting? 
 
Examples of scripts: 
• Changing image characteristics 
• Changing details of the image 
• Changing the ending or outcome of the image 
• Build on the story of the image 
• Bring in survivor self or other person 
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Gradually implement the identified script. We are interested in the impact of 
sensory-based modifications so help your client to focus on sensory aspects 
associated with the script. Although cognitive shift may occur, do not try to 
change the verbal meaning directly. You can make additional changes that 
are identified during the rescripting process or carry out several scripts that 
relate to the original image. !
4. Conduct image rescripting 
 
 
I want you to bring your image to mind. If you feel comfortable to, you can 
close your eyes or you can look at a point on the wall or the carpet. 
  











• What else could you do to the image to make it feel less upsetting? 
• Are there any other changes you would like to make? 




5. Administer questionnaire  Please tick when completed 
 









-  Ensure that your client is feeling ok 
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! 14!
!
8. Record rescript 
 !


























Was the script(s) selected by the client or the therapist? 
 !!!!!!!!!!!|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|<<<<<<<<<|!!!!!!!!100%!!!!!90!!!!!!!!!!80!!!!!!!!!!70!!!!!!!!!!!60!!!!!50/50!!!!!!!60!!!!!!!!!!70!!!!!!!!!!80!!!!!!!!!!90!!!!!!!!100% 
 




– END OF SESSION – 
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! 15!
Follow-up                                 15 minutes  




1. Administer questionnaires  Please tick when completed 
 
• PHQ-9     
• PDS 
• Survivor guilt 
• Mental Images 
• Process items – Follow-up 





-  Ensure that your client is feeling ok 




– END OF SESSION – 
 !
!!!!!!
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Appendix	  V.	  
PowerPoint	  presentation	  used	  for	  therapists’	  training	  event.	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Appendix	  W.	  
Participant	  travel	  claim	  form.	  
	  
Travel	  reimbursement	  	  	  Session	  1:	  	  Claim	  amount:	  	  £	   	   	   	   	   Date:	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Session	  2:	  	  Claim	  amount:	  	  £	   	   	   	   	   Date:	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Follow-­‐up:	  	  Claim	  amount:	  	  £	   	   	   	   	   Date:	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  I	  confirm	  that	  this	  travel	  was	  carried	  out	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  study	  ‘A	  pilot	  study	  
of	  imagery	  rescripting	  for	  survivor	  guilt	  after	  trauma’.	  I	  have	  attached	  receipts	  for	  each	  journey.	  	  	  	  	  ____________________________	   	   _______________________	  Participant	  signature	   	   	   	   Date	  	  	  ____________________________	  Participant	  name	  	  	  	  	  ____________________________	   	   _______________________	  Researcher	  signature	   	   	   	   Date	  	  	  ____________________________	  Researcher	  name	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Appendix	  X.	  
Participant	  opt-­‐in	  form	  for	  receiving	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  study	  results.	  	  
	  
Study	  results	  opt-­‐in	  form	  	  Would	  you	  like	  to	  find	  out	  about	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study?	  Please	  tick:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Yes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  No	  	  If	  yes,	  please	  provide	  your	  name	  and	  address	  in	  the	  box:	  
Note.	  The	  information	  that	  we	  gather	  as	  part	  of	  the	  study	  is	  kept	  securely	  at	  the	  Traumatic	  Stress	  Service.	  Your	  address	  will	  not	  be	  used	  for	  any	  other	  purposes	  and	  will	  not	  be	  shared	  with	  anyone	  outside	  the	  research	  team.	  This	  page	  will	  be	  destroyed	  when	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study	  are	  sent	  out	  in	  September	  2015.	  	  	  
